



# Practice Note

## Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants







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and Reintegration of Ex-combatants



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**This UNDP Practice Note is a contribution to a wider UN effort** to enhance cooperation and improve effectiveness in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. This Practice Note defines DDR and outlines UNDP's role in the process. It reflects on lessons learned from previous UNDP DDR programmes, and offers practical guidance for DDR policy makers and practitioners, providing a framework for future UNDP interventions in the field.

UNDP has been actively engaged in the DDR of ex-combatants since 1991. The rationale for UNDP's engagement in this area is to support peace processes and enhance security so that post-conflict reconstruction and recovery can begin. The organization works to develop comprehensive DDR strategies, which ensure that short-term security imperatives are integrated into long-term development programming.

DDR is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to address the post-conflict security challenge that arises from ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and development. DDR seeks to support the ex-combatants' economic and social reintegration, so they can become stakeholders in peace.

Despite concerns that ex-combatants receive disproportionate benefits in the post-conflict phase, there is a growing consensus that a focus on former combatants in DDR programmes is necessary and justified in order to build confidence and security in war-torn societies, thereby reducing the obstacles and blocks to broader recovery efforts. This Practice Note argues that to achieve the *security objectives* of a DDR programme, support should be given to achieve full *initial* socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. However, in the context of longer-term reintegration, a balance must be struck between supporting ex-combatants' specific needs and the needs of the wider community in order to prevent resentment. Emphasis should be placed on moving quickly from ex-combatant-specific programmes to community-based and national development programmes. Failure to do so will result in ex-combatants continuing to identify themselves as belonging to a special group outside society, retarding their effective reintegration into local communities.

DDR is context specific and this Practice Note argues that each DDR programme should be tailored to take account of the nature and underlying causes of conflict. Much also depends on the nature of the peace that has been established, the capacity of the state and the security context. In all circumstances, successful DDR requires strong political will and commitment from all parties to the conflict and stakeholders in the peace process, backed by sustained support from the international community. While UNDP and others can help strengthen capacities and provide material support, only the continued engagement of local stakeholders, and their ownership of the process, will ensure that DDR succeeds. DDR must therefore be implemented through multiple national and international partnerships. The scope of UNDP engagement will largely be determined by whether a peacekeeping operation is in place and the state of governance in the country. This Practice Note offers UNDP practitioners guidance on the potential

role of UNDP within different DDR scenarios and provides advice on developing integrated programmes with other UN agencies as well as national and international partners.

UNDP's country presence and technical capacity enables its practitioners to play a key role in needs assessments and planning missions which define the minimum political, military and socio-economic conditions necessary for DDR to succeed, particularly the responsibilities to be assumed by the conflicting parties. The Practice Note argues that, once the decision to engage has been taken, significant time and resources should be invested in assessment, planning and programme design. Before launching the programme, UNDP practitioners should help establish clear and unambiguous selection criteria for participation in a DDR programme to minimize the perception that any particular group is being favoured, victimized or marginalized. Early agreement by all parties regarding the number of participants eligible for the DDR programme will also greatly assist programme design and resource management.

Sufficient resources should be mobilized to support not just the initial start-up, but to assure steady funding throughout the DDR programme, in order to avoid dangerous gaps between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Given UNDP's presence and its role as UN coordinator, it can help to mobilize and manage resources from bilateral and multilateral donors.

However, DDR alone cannot be expected to restore stability or prevent further conflict. It must be accompanied by other economic, political and social reforms, as well as wider development and recovery initiatives. This Practice Note therefore argues that DDR must be conceptualized, designed, planned and implemented within a wider recovery and development strategy.



# Abbreviations

<b>ANBP</b>	Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme
<b>BCPR</b>	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
<b>CBO</b>	Community-Based Organization
<b>CCA</b>	Common Country Assessment
<b>CDA</b>	Conflict-related Development Analysis
<b>CO</b>	Country Office
<b>CPC</b>	Crisis and post-conflict country
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
<b>DEX</b>	Direct Execution
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>DRP</b>	Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
<b>ECHA</b>	United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
<b>GTZ</b>	German Technical Cooperation Agency
<b>HC</b>	Humanitarian Coordinator
<b>IDP</b>	internally displaced persons
<b>IDDRS</b>	Integrated DDR Standards
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>JIU</b>	Joint Implementation Unit
<b>JSSR</b>	Justice and Security Sector Reform
<b>MIS</b>	management information system
<b>M&amp;E</b>	monitoring and evaluation
<b>MOU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>MYFF</b>	Multi-Year Funding Framework
<b>NEX</b>	National Execution
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>PKO</b>	Peacekeeping Operations
<b>QIPS</b>	quick impact projects
<b>RC</b>	Resident Coordinator
<b>RR</b>	Resident Representative
<b>SADU</b>	Small Arms and Demobilization Unit
<b>SALW</b>	small arms and light weapons
<b>SG</b>	Secretary-General
<b>SRSG</b>	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
<b>TRU</b>	Transition Recovery Unit
<b>TSS</b>	transitional subsistence support
<b>TTF</b>	Thematic Trust Fund
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNAIDS</b>	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
<b>UNAMSIL</b>	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone



<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>UNDDA</b>	United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
<b>UNDG</b>	United Nations Development Group
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Education Fund
<b>UNIFEM</b>	United Nations Development Fund for Women
<b>UNOPS</b>	United Nations Office for Project Services
<b>UNV</b>	United Nations Volunteer
<b>UXO</b>	unexploded ordnance
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization



# 1

## Introduction

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*“Demobilizing combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations. Without demobilization, civil wars cannot be brought to an end and other critical goals—such as democratization, justice and development— have little chance for success.”*

**Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN 2004.**

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UNDP has been a key actor in the area of DDR since 1991, where it has managed and implemented DDR programmes in both peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping contexts<sup>1</sup>. The rationale for UNDP’s engagement is to support peace processes and enhance security so that post-conflict recovery can begin. The organization works to develop comprehensive DDR strategies, which ensure that short-term security imperatives are integrated into longer-term recovery and development programming.

This UNDP Practice Note is a contribution to a wider UN effort to enhance cooperation and improve effectiveness in the area of DDR of ex-combatants.<sup>2</sup> This Practice Note defines DDR and outlines UNDP’s role in the process. It reflects on lessons learned from previous UNDP DDR programmes, and offers practical guidance for DDR policy makers and practitioners, providing a framework for future UNDP interventions in the field.

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<sup>1</sup> UNDP has supported DDR in peacekeeping contexts in Afghanistan, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. UNDP support for DDR in non-peacekeeping contexts includes Central African Republic, Comoros Islands, Indonesia, Niger, Republic of Congo, Somalia, Solomon Islands, and Uganda.

<sup>2</sup> In March 2005, the Executive Committee on Peace and Security approved the establishment of a *UN DDR Working Group* made up of fourteen departments, agencies and funds working to enhance cooperation and effectiveness on DDR issues. This inter-agency effort aims to bring together all relevant UN agencies to support efforts to strengthen and to comprehensively improve DDR programmes. The group is also tasked with developing clear and usable policies and operational tools – *the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS)*—to assist DDR managers in the field to plan and implement effective and efficient programmes. For more information see section 3 and 4.1 of the Annex.



# 2

## DDR Defined

### 2.1 | What is DDR?

The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to address the post-conflict security challenges that arise from ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and development. DDR seeks to support the ex-combatants' economic and social reintegration, so they can become stakeholders in peace. While much of a DDR programme is focused on ex-combatants, the main beneficiaries of the programme should ultimately be the wider community.

### 2.2 | What are the objectives of DDR?

DDR has the following objectives:

- To contribute to security and stability by facilitating reintegration and providing the enabling environment for rehabilitation and recovery to begin;
- To restore trust through confidence-building among conflicting factions and with the general population;
- To help prevent or mitigate future violent conflict;
- To contribute to national reconciliation; and
- To free up human and financial resources, and social capital, for reconstruction and development.

DDR alone, however, cannot be expected to prevent further conflict and restore stability. It must be accompanied by other economic, political and social reforms. DDR must therefore be conceptualized, designed, planned and implemented within a wider recovery and development framework.

#### DDR DEFINED<sup>3</sup>

**Disarmament.** Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

<sup>3</sup> These are working definitions used by DPKO. They are currently being discussed in the UN DDR Working Group, with a view to standardizing them across the United Nations system.

**Demobilization.** Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

**Reinsertion.** Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.

**Reintegration.** Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.



# 3

## UNDP's Role in DDR

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*“Demobilizing combatants and reintegrating them into normal life is one of the most challenging priorities in post-conflict situations.”*

UNDP Human Development Report, 2002

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The Brahimi Report, which outlined UN roles and responsibilities in peace operations, identified UNDP<sup>4</sup> as best placed to take the lead in peace-building activities<sup>4</sup>. DDR is increasingly considered a vital component of peace-building, acting as a bridge between immediate security and longer-term recovery priorities in the transition from war to peace. As such, DDR is a core component of UNDP's crisis prevention and recovery mandate.

UNDP's institutional expertise, capacities and resources have focused on a range of issues including demobilization and reintegration assistance, capacity development, community armed violence reduction and weapons control. Moreover, UNDP's coordination role at the country level, together with its involvement in a range of post-conflict transition and recovery initiatives enable it to promote coordinated UN action on DDR, and integrate it within broader peace and recovery frameworks. Outlined below are UNDP's key *strengths* as well as the challenges the organization faces in the field of DDR.

### 3.1 | UNDP's strengths

UNDP has the following strengths in implementing DDR programmes:

- **Extensive field presence:** UNDP is operational in 166 countries. Its Country Offices and Regional Bureaux have a good understanding of socio-economic and political issues on the ground, and can make an important contribution to designing DDR programmes;
- **Experience:** UNDP has been working on DDR programmes since 1991 and has developed experience in programme design and implementation. The Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) can offer Country Offices (COs) rapid access to technical and financial resources, together with DDR planning and implementation support;
- **Impartiality:** UNDP is generally recognized as a trusted and impartial development actor;

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<sup>4</sup> Paragraphs 13 and 16 of the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305 – S/2000/809, August 2000.

- **Pivotal coordination role:** The appointment of the UNDP Resident Representative (RR) as the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC) of the UN Country Team greatly contributes to UNDP's ability to assist in managing post-conflict transition coordination. UNDP's role in *donor coordination* also creates a channel for the quick mobilization of resources, which is critical during DDR operations.
- **Ability to contextualize DDR:** UNDP is well placed to help design DDR processes within the context of its other local and national recovery and development strategies;
- **Commitment to capacity development:** UNDP supports the development of national capacity to design and implement DDR programmes, which it regards as critical for long-term sustainability of the process; and
- **Ability to respond rapidly and mobilize resources:** UNDP can mobilize funds from bilateral resources, as well as from regional and multilateral financial institutions. Use of TRAC 1.1.3<sup>5</sup> resources also gives UNDP significant scope for rapidly initiating DDR start-up activities.

### 3.2 | Challenges for UNDP

UNDP faces the following constraints and challenges when designing and implementing DDR programmes:

- **Capacity:** The dramatic increase in DDR programmes has challenged UNDP's capacity to respond effectively in terms of human and financial resources;
- **Relationship to government:** While its status as trusted partner of governments can be an advantage, this same closeness of UNDP to governments may diminish the perception of its neutrality for non-governmental actors;
- **Procedures:** UNDP's contractual and procurement procedures, even though decentralized and flexible, are often challenged because of the rapid disbursement imperatives generated by DDR programmes; and
- **Security of staff:** This is a particular concern when a UN peacekeeping force is not available and the government and local police force are weak.

### 3.3 | UNDP's entry points into DDR

DDR priorities will vary in different country contexts and so will the entry points through which UNDP can offer support. The table that follows sets out the range of entry points which UNDP has used in the past. UNDP practitioners may need to make strategic choices regarding which entry points to prioritize.

Entry point	Description
<b>Technical assistance to a peace process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pre-positioning DDR advisers to provide technical advice and build capacity during a peace process.</li> </ul>
<b>Assistance in planning for DDR</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conducting integrated assessment missions to assess context and scope of a DDR programme;</li> <li>• Developing the capacity of COs and country teams on DDR issues;</li> <li>• Providing programming and planning support to government and non-governmental counterparts; and</li> <li>• Introducing gender and child protection considerations and the needs of the receiving community into DDR planning.</li> </ul>

<sup>5</sup> TRAC (Target for Resource Assignment from the Core) refers to the level of funding that UNDP expects to make available from regular (core) resources during a specified period to finance UNDP programming at the country level. TRAC 1.1.1 is earmarked by country according to the distribution methodology approved by the Executive Board; TRAC 1.1.2 is earmarked by region for use at the country level based on programme quality; TRAC 1.1.3 sets aside 6.6 percent of UNDP regular resources to rapidly address the special development needs of countries in crisis or countries vulnerable to crises.

Entry point	Description
<b>Develop capacity to ensure national ownership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supporting local actors in their advocacy for peace and reconciliation;</li> <li>• Facilitating participatory consensus-building forums to build an understanding of DDR; and</li> <li>• Developing capacity of government ministries, national implementing agencies, NGOs and communities.</li> </ul>
<b>Supporting civil society</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supporting activities regarding respect for human rights, promotion of gender equality, reconciliation and the rule of law.</li> </ul>
<b>Arms control and reduction</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assisting in developing national strategies and legal frameworks related to disarmament, small arms management and armed violence reduction;</li> <li>• Building the capacity of institutions to control and reduce small arms availability;</li> <li>• Using livelihoods support and community development programmes as an incentive for disarmament, arms management and armed violence reduction; and</li> <li>• Providing technical assistance on weapons and ammunition management and destruction.</li> </ul>
<b>Mine Action</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Providing technical assistance and capacity development on mine action; and</li> <li>• Training former combatants in mine clearance.</li> </ul>
<b>Assistance to demobilization programmes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Registration and socio-economic profiling of ex-combatants;</li> <li>• Participating in the pre-discharge orientation of ex-combatants;</li> <li>• Assessing the socio-economic and psychological needs of ex-combatants and mapping the existing economic opportunities and support services;</li> <li>• Providing technical assistance and advice on assistance to women, children, dependents, and other vulnerable groups during the demobilization process;</li> <li>• Administering transitional subsistence support (TSS) activities; and</li> <li>• Offering DDR management information system (MIS) software and related capacity development.</li> </ul>
<b>Support to reintegration programmes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conceptualizing, planning and executing reintegration programmes and projects;</li> <li>• Providing technical assistance and capacity development in areas such as job referral, training and job creation;</li> <li>• Providing management information systems (MIS) and monitoring, information and evaluation (MIE) tools and mechanisms;</li> <li>• Carrying out Stop Gap projects;</li> <li>• Enhancing the absorptive capacity of receiving communities and supporting their projects;</li> <li>• Undertaking DDR information and sensitization campaigns;</li> <li>• Promoting gender awareness and adequate representation of women in decision-making within the scope of the DDR programme; and</li> <li>• Integrating HIV/AIDS awareness and response into DDR programmes.</li> </ul>
<b>Management and coordination</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Providing overall management and coordination of DDR through the UNDP RR and RC;</li> <li>• Providing technical assistance for planning, designing, monitoring and evaluating DDR programmes;</li> <li>• Assisting with the development of operational systems for DDR implementation;</li> <li>• Coordinating donor relations; and</li> <li>• Partnership coordination.</li> </ul>



# 4

## Lessons learned and guidance for DDR programming: Programme design

Many lessons have been learned from previous UNDP DDR programmes, especially in the field of programme design. While recognizing that DDR is not a linear process, this section follows a programming cycle, from the discussion of whether UNDP should engage in DDR at all, through to programme design and planning and offers practical guidance for UNDP policy makers and practitioners.

### 4.1 | Clarifying the framework for UNDP engagement

DDR is a high risk, time consuming, expensive process. It is essential that UNDP practitioners are clear that the right conditions exist before engaging in DDR. The sub-sections below outline the key questions which need to be answered before embarking on programme design.

#### 4.1.1 | Are the conditions right for DDR?

In order for DDR to have a chance of success, certain preconditions need to be met. When determining whether the time is right to embark on a DDR process, UNDP practitioners should assess whether all or most of the following conditions are in place, or are likely to be in place in the foreseeable future:

- Commitment by all, or almost all,<sup>6</sup> military and political factions to disarm, demobilize and implement the ceasefire or peace agreement;
- Complete or near cessation of armed hostilities;
- Agreement on monitored and enforced ceasefire modalities;
- Clear goals, strategies and timeframes for DDR;
- Agreement on the number of participants in the DDR programme;
- Comprehensive and clearly understood selection criteria for an individual's participation in DDR;
- Clear legal, political and practical security arrangements for those who give up arms and demobilize; and

<sup>6</sup> In some cases a faction may not be a signatory to peace agreement. This may be manageable if a significant amount of force is in the hands of the parties to the peace agreement and/or the peacekeeping forces. These groups must eventually be brought into the process if lasting security and stability is to be achieved.

- Tailored support strategies for female ex-combatants, children associated with fighting forces and dependents.<sup>7</sup>

A pre-positioned UNDP DDR Adviser could help raise these issues during the peace process (see 4.2.1 for more details).

It is unlikely that UNDP will be able to develop a thorough resource mobilization strategy or secure financial pledges *prior* to deciding whether to become involved in the DDR process. However, it is recommended that UNDP practitioners engage with potential donors and secure *informal* indications of support as early as possible.

#### 4.1.2 | Are the objectives and expected results of the DDR process clear to all parties?

As outlined above, the overall objective of a DDR programme is to enhance national and community security by supporting ex-combatants in their efforts to find a new and peaceful role in society. However, depending on the nature of the conflict, and the nature of the peace process, DDR may serve a variety of purposes such as *buying time* for security sector reform and elections to take place, or engaging ex-combatants in peaceful livelihoods to *enhance national security*. UNDP practitioners should work with all parties to ensure the specific objectives and expected results are clear and all parties commit to the agreed framework.

#### 4.1.3 | Will the DDR programme support wider development objectives?

Many DDR interventions have in the past failed because of their narrow focus and short-term approach. A well-designed DDR programme will not only enhance basic security but also support wider recovery and development programmes, if the following issues are taken into account during the design and planning stage:

- The need to bridge social divisions and promote reconciliation;
- The need for political reforms, a functional justice system, and effective security forces;
- The need for social, political and economic reforms aimed at promoting human development and expanding basic social services, education, training, employment opportunities and sustainable livelihoods for both ex-combatants and their communities; and
- The need to reallocate military/security expenditure towards development goals, wherever possible.

All efforts should be made to coordinate closely with other actors implementing related programmes in these areas, and DDR Programme Managers should consider recruiting specialists whose core responsibility is liaison with programmes such as recovery or security sector reform. However, UNDP practitioners should clearly identify which objectives the DDR programme can directly address and those to which it can only contribute.

#### 4.1.4 | Will DDR be integrated into UN and UNDP programming frameworks?

UNDP practitioners should aim to ensure that DDR is included in the programming strategy of the UNDP Country Office as well as the overall in-country support framework of the UN system. Attention should be paid to integrating DDR objectives and expected outcomes into the relevant mechanisms and frameworks, including the UNDP Multi-Year Funding Framework (MYFF), the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). This is vital to ensure that DDR programming is linked to peace building, transition, recovery and reconstruction strategies and to UNDP's wider programming portfolio. Inclusion of DDR within the overall UN strategy will ensure the attention and engagement of other UN agencies, as well as facilitate resource mobilization.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The demobilization of *children associated with fighting forces* should be sought and supported at all times, with or without a formal DDR intervention, or even a peace process.

<sup>8</sup> See also IDDRS 02.20, *Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery*.

#### 4.1.5 | Is there a peacekeeping operation?

The nature of UNDP's involvement in DDR will depend on whether a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) has been deployed.<sup>9</sup> The United Nations is currently developing *Integrated DDR Standards* (IDDRS). These standards cover a wide range of issues relating to DDR policy and programming during a peace support operation. The first draft of the IDDRS is due to be published in early 2006. It is anticipated, however, that the United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) guidelines outlined below will remain the same. These should be adhered to when designing UNDP interventions.<sup>10</sup>

- **When no peacekeeping operation is deployed but UN support is required:**
  - i) The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)/ Resident Coordinator (RC) should take responsibility for overall DDR coordination with the UN system;
  - ii) The HC and/or RC should establish a UN Country Team DDR Task Force, drawing on UN agencies with relevant experience and capacity;
  - iii) The task force should also include non-UN agencies; and
  - iv) Roles and responsibilities should be assigned on the basis of competence and comparative advantage.
- **When a peacekeeping operation is deployed:**
  - i) Lead responsibility falls to the Head of Mission, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG);
  - ii) Effective coordination will be enhanced if the RC/HC is appointed Deputy to the SRSG;
  - iii) The SRSG will convene an In-Country Task Force for DDR, with participation of all relevant UN and non-UN agencies; and
  - iv) The lead for non-military components will be determined on the basis of competency and track record of potential implementing agencies.

The table below summarises UNDP's role during peacekeeping operations (PKO) and where there is no peacekeeping operation.<sup>11</sup>

UNDP'S ROLE		
	Where there is a PKO	Where there is no PKO
<b>STRONG STATE</b>	<p><b>Government-run DDR</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participation in integrated UN mission.</li> <li>• UNDP staff members integrated into UN Mission DDR Unit.</li> <li>• UNDP execution of components of DDR programme.</li> </ul> <p><b>Examples:</b> Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Sudan</p>	<p><b>Government-run DDR</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct UNDP technical assistance and capacity development to government and communities.</li> <li>• Possible UNDP execution of DDR programme sub-components.</li> </ul> <p><b>Example:</b> Angola</p>
<b>WEAK STATE</b>	<p><b>National policy-making body with Mission-executed DDR</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participation in integrated mission assessment and planning, with joint implementation arrangements.</li> <li>• UNDP staff members integrated into UN Mission DDR Unit.</li> <li>• UNDP support for capacity-building of government and communities.</li> </ul> <p><b>Examples:</b> Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone</p>	<p><b>National policy-making body with UNDP-led inter-agency and NGO execution or Direct Execution.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP direct execution.</li> <li>• UNDP support for capacity development of government and communities.</li> </ul> <p><b>Examples:</b> Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Somaliland</p>

<sup>9</sup> See page 3-4 of "Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of the DDR of Former Combatants", ECHA, 19 July 2000.

<sup>10</sup>The establishment of the DDR component of a peacekeeping operation often includes the use of UNDP's UN Volunteers (UNV), an important UNDP resource which should be fully tapped, especially in implementing integrated activities at the community level, (see section 4.4.2).

<sup>11</sup>See IDDRS, Module 02.30, *Concepts of Integrated DDR*.

## 4.2 | Advice and Assessment

Once conditions are seen to be conducive to engagement in DDR, planning can begin. DDR should be understood as an integral component of peace-building and post-conflict recovery, and UNDP should adopt a proactive role in identifying how the DDR process could best contribute to sustainable social and economic rehabilitation and long-term development.

### 4.2.1 | Pre-positioning a DDR Adviser to support the peace process

Proactively positioning DDR advisers to provide technical assistance before, during and immediately after the peace agreement provides UNDP with a strategic entry point into DDR at an early stage. Such an adviser can also ensure that DDR is placed within the context of wider recovery and peace-building efforts. To be effective, appointed advisers should be able to provide advice and assistance directly to the SRSG or Deputy SRSG in situations where there is a PKO, or have direct access to the political decision-makers in non-PKO situations.

### 4.2.2 | UNDP participation in an inter-agency planning mission

There is a need to clearly define the roles between UN agencies and other actors in order to avoid “turf” wars, create coherence in programme design, minimize resource wastage and ensure timely implementation. Due to the diversity of actors involved in DDR, integrated planning should be established to allow for effective coordination of efforts. The development of the IDDRS will facilitate this process and UNDP practitioners are encouraged to utilize this resource.

An *integrated mission* should be established early on in the peace negotiations to assess DDR requirements. This mission should draw heavily on the experience of the UN Country Team, and should define the minimum political, military and socio-economic conditions necessary for DDR to succeed, particularly the responsibilities to be assumed by the conflicting parties. The mission should have expertise in the following areas:

- Political/diplomatic (the underlying causes of conflict and potential role of DDR in helping to address them);
- Military (security sector reform and DDR);
- Human security (gender analysis, child protection, HIV awareness);
- Humanitarian (basic needs, trauma counselling, women and children associated with fighting forces);
- Reintegration (education, human rights, training, employment and livelihoods development);
- Resource mobilization; and
- DDR design and operational planning.

### 4.2.3 | Undertaking comprehensive needs assessments

UNDP should undertake a comprehensive needs assessment to determine the focus of its support. **Where possible and appropriate, the inter-agency planning mission and the needs assessment should be combined.**<sup>12</sup>

Whilst no standard formula exists for a UNDP DDR needs assessment, it is recommended that a holistic analysis of conflict and security dynamics should be applied to inform the development of a DDR strategy.<sup>13</sup> The initial conflict and security analysis should seek to clarify the nature of the conflict and its resolution, and to identify the resulting challenges facing a DDR programme. It is recommended that this go beyond the mere identification of institutional constraints and needs, to include the analysis of the political and social context of DDR and the overall constraints on governance and risks to stability. One tool that can be used for these assessments is the *Conflict-*

<sup>12</sup>For the sake of consistency, the questions below are also included in the IDDRS. See module IDDRS 04.40, *Reintegration of Ex-combatants* for more details.

<sup>13</sup>The UN DDR Working Group is currently considering developing a standard tool for DDR assessment. This is likely to be developed in the next year and will be made available to UNDP practitioners.

related *Development Analysis (CDA)*, which has been developed as an analytical aid for Country Offices. It has been designed as a participatory process, which will assist UNDP and local counterparts in understanding conflict causes and dynamics, and the impact of current policies and programmes, in order to design conflict sensitive interventions.<sup>14</sup> It is recommended that local interlocutors with strong knowledge of the political and social contexts should be engaged in the process. Key questions to be included in this assessment are outlined below.

<b>Needs Assessment: Questions</b>	
<b>Root causes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the root causes of conflict?</li> <li>• Have they been resolved or do they remain latent?</li> <li>• Was it an informal conflict of shifting alliances among many groups, or an organized conflict among clearly defined warring parties?</li> </ul>
<b>Nature of war &amp; peace</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the nature of the peace agreement?</li> <li>• Are all parties to the conflict included?</li> <li>• Has one of the parties won the fighting?</li> <li>• Has it been a war of liberation?</li> <li>• Does it involve cross-border and multi-country DDR operations?</li> </ul>
<b>Security situation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the capacity of state security forces to enforce security during the peace consolidation phase?</li> <li>• What is the capacity of the peacekeepers to do so?</li> <li>• How long is this phase expected to last?</li> </ul>
<b>Combatant profile</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were combatants mainly civilians or military personnel?</li> <li>• Were combatants part-time or full-time fighters?</li> <li>• Did the fighting last long?</li> <li>• Has it become a way of life for the combatants?</li> <li>• Have combatants already been engaged for years, or just a few months?</li> <li>• Have combatants been living outside of their communities during the conflict?</li> <li>• Have they lost social capital during the conflict?</li> <li>• Have they lost access to means of production because of the conflict?</li> <li>• Have they been alienated from their traditional support network during the conflict?</li> </ul>
<b>Role of the Government</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does the Government have political legitimacy?</li> <li>• Will it be sought through elections?</li> <li>• When will these realistically take place?</li> </ul>
<b>Capacity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What institutional actors in the country are able to undertake DDR-related activities (public and private institutions, UN agencies, international and local NGOs, donors and other civil society actors)?</li> </ul>
<b>Role of DDR</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the intended role of the DDR intervention?</li> <li>• Is it buying time before an election?</li> <li>• Does it aim to reintegrate violence-prone groups in order to reduce the potential for future conflict?</li> <li>• Is its role to support the return of freedom fighters after a war of liberation or defence?</li> <li>• Is the process linked to a down-sizing of armed security forces?</li> <li>• Is it linked to security sector reform?</li> <li>• Is this a formal process (e.g. peacekeeping operations, encampment, formal demobilization with disarmament, and structured reintegration procedures)?</li> <li>• Is it more informal (decentralized DDR interventions, voluntary turn-in of weapons, self-demobilization and decentralized reintegration support mechanisms)?</li> </ul>
<b>Resources</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What internal and external resources are available to assist with DDR and with wider reconstruction and recovery?</li> </ul>

<sup>14</sup>For further reference see [http://intra.undp.org/bcpr/workspaces/cpr/files/progr\\_proj/toolkit\\_guide.htm](http://intra.undp.org/bcpr/workspaces/cpr/files/progr_proj/toolkit_guide.htm).

This assessment phase should lead to the establishment of *key indicators of success* for DDR, particularly in terms of socio-economic integration of ex-combatants and overall security dimensions, and the evaluation of the relevant *baseline information* for these indicators.

### SMALL ARMS BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

UNDP, through country offices and regional programmes, has commissioned small arms baseline assessments. These assessments have provided useful baseline data on various issues, including small arms availability and misuse. They have been critical inputs for UNDP’s small arms related programming in a number of countries, particularly in designing incentives that can promote voluntary disarmament and for identifying indicators that can be used to monitor and evaluate interventions. The methodology and utility of these assessments is currently being reviewed by BCPR so that these assessments can be used to support UNDP programming on a wider range of security issues, including DDR.

Assessments require considerable time and resource commitments both by UNDP and national counterparts. They generally raise local expectations of follow on support. *Detailed* needs assessments should therefore only be undertaken once a country office has decided that it is willing to engage in supporting a DDR programme.

#### 4.2.4 | Pre-registration beneficiary survey

The registration of demobilized combatants will give the DDR programme a clear picture of their social and economic expectations, as well as their capacities and resources. However, by the time this registration takes place, usually during demobilization, it is already too late to begin planning the reintegration process. A profile of the target group should therefore be developed *before disarmament and demobilization begins*. For this purpose, pre-registration surveys should be undertaken, based on the preliminary definition of the target group as set out by the concerned parties. Information should be *gender disaggregated* to give an accurate picture of the different needs of women/girls and men/boys ex-combatants, supporters, or wives/dependents. Early information should be gathered in the areas outlined below.

Beneficiary Survey: Questions	
<b>Demographic composition</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the age, sex, ethnic group of the group (s) to be reintegrated?</li> </ul>
<b>Background</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is their marital status?</li> <li>• How many dependents do they have?</li> <li>• Do they plan to be reunited with their family/ social group at their selected return destination?</li> </ul>
<b>Education and qualifications</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is their level of education?</li> <li>• What skills and work experience do they have?</li> <li>• What is their standard of living?</li> <li>• What was their rank grade in the fighting forces?</li> </ul>
<b>Special needs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has an analysis of special needs groups amongst ex-combatants taken place? Has this analysis taken place within communities?</li> <li>• If not, how, when and by whom can it be done most effectively?</li> <li>• Do other programmes/services provide targeted assistance to these special needs groups?</li> <li>• What are the outstanding needs of these groups with respect to the reintegration programme?</li> </ul>
<b>Areas of return</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are their communities of origin?</li> <li>• Where do they plan to (re)integrate?</li> </ul>
<b>Expectations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are their expectations or concerns regarding the reintegration programme and their return to civilian life?</li> </ul>

#### 4.2.5 | Socio-economic assessments and reintegration opportunities mapping

The post-conflict economic environment is extremely challenging. It is therefore essential that DDR programmes avoid creating unrealistic expectations among participants regarding their reintegration prospects. Expectations can best be managed if programme managers have a clear understanding of the *actual* reintegration opportunities and support services available. During the assessment and planning phase, the DDR programme should prioritize the development of a country-wide systematic mapping to identify potential employment opportunities, whether in existing enterprises, public works, self-employment or through micro-enterprise creation. Relevant education, training, micro-grants and other business development services (technical advisory, information and counselling services) should also be mapped. The survey should also include other development programmes (both existing and planned) within the national recovery effort, as well as those of international and national development organizations. This will give UNDP practitioners early guidance on how to link the reintegration of ex-combatants to wider recovery programming. Social support services like trauma and drug abuse counselling and/or disability rehabilitation services should also be identified. The assessment and mapping should address the following questions.

Reintegration Opportunities: Questions	
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the overall economic situation of the country?</li> <li>• Which are the most dynamic, or potentially dynamic, sectors?</li> <li>• Do these present reintegration opportunities for ex-combatants?</li> <li>• What other opportunities are, or can be, available to them, given their skill sets (and can these be enhanced)?</li> <li>• Have opportunities for public/private partnerships been explored?</li> </ul>
<b>Infrastructure</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What infrastructure exists to facilitate economic activity (e.g. roads, communications, electricity, etc.)?</li> <li>• Where are the key bottle-necks?</li> </ul>
<b>Services</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What business development services are available and where?</li> <li>• What services could be developed with minimal support?</li> </ul>
<b>Training providers</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What training providers and institutions exist?</li> <li>• What do they specialize in?</li> <li>• What capacity do they have to support the DDR programme?</li> </ul>
<b>Development programmes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What other recovery and development initiatives are being planned or implemented?</li> </ul>

An early survey of existing training providers and their training courses is particularly important. This should include information on which sectors they cover, their capacity, equipment, teacher and trainer resources, and what assistance they require to implement training. This assessment should take place as early as possible as lead times for upgrading of training infrastructure and services are long, and training is often the first component of the reintegration process. However, as will be stressed in 5.6.6, training should only be viewed as a tool for reintegration, not reintegration *per se*.

#### 4.2.6 | Developing rigorous monitoring and evaluation processes <sup>15</sup>

The lack of clearly defined impact indicators for monitoring and evaluation has been a major weakness of previous DDR programmes. As a result, it has been difficult to assess the actual overall impact of DDR inter-

<sup>15</sup> See also IDDRS 03.50, *Monitoring and Evaluation of IDDRS Programmes*.

ventions and the relative merits of specific approaches. In future programmes, UNDP practitioners should ensure that national actors, UN agencies and implementation partners develop a process for monitoring and evaluation during the planning phase and that sufficient resources are specifically allocated to these tasks at the outset.

The starting point for effective, results-based monitoring and evaluation should be the clear and unambiguous agreement of objectives and expected results of the DDR programme as stated in section 4.1.2. Once expected results are clearly defined, key indicators for assessing programme impact must be designed, and the baselines for these indicators must be measured. Conventional assessments of DDR programmes tend to focus on short-term quantitative outputs such as the number of weapons collected and the number of ex-combatants demobilized or trained. DDR needs to focus also on qualitative impacts such as changes in ex-combatant behaviour, especially in their interactions with other social groups.

### MEASURING SUCCESS IN DDR

Previous DDR programmes have often failed to successfully measure impact and success. While there is some limited qualitative evidence of increases in perceived community/ combatant security there are very few evaluations which actually demonstrate a statistical correlation between DDR and reduced conflict outbreak. This underlines the importance of parallel investment in monitoring of public health/crime/economic trends, to assess the impact of DDR interventions. Monitoring and evaluation of DDR should routinely include surveys of socio-economic behaviour, household profiles of expenditure/ consumption patterns. These will enable a more accurate assessment of the actual impact of DDR on both security and conflict prevention.

## 4.3 | Promoting national ownership and capacity<sup>16</sup>

Successful DDR requires strong political will and commitment from all the parties to the conflict, backed by sustained support from the international community. While UNDP and others can help strengthen capacities and provide material support, only the continued engagement of all stakeholders and their ownership of the process will ensure that DDR succeeds. Programmes which are nationally owned, and focus on building national capacity, have a greater chance of success and sustainability.

### NATIONAL OWNERSHIP OF THE AFGHANISTAN DDR PROGRAMME

One of the key aims of UNDP's Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) is to transfer ownership and responsibility for DDR to the Government. UNDP works closely with the Afghan Government's two DDR related commissions—the Disarmament Commission and the Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. The two Commissions have brought together central actors in Afghanistan to develop a framework for DDR. UNDP, with other international partners, works to support the government in this process, recognizing that creating political consensus is an essential prerequisite for an equitable, successful DDR programme.

While *national* ownership is often defined (and laid down as a pre-condition) by financiers as *government* ownership, UNDP practitioners should ensure that ownership and participation extends to all national stakeholders, including the receiving community and civil society. DDR cannot be designed and implemented by a group of experts and with external financial resources alone: national stakeholders, rather than internation-

<sup>16</sup> See also IDDRS 03.40, *National Institutions for DDR* and IDDRS 02.40, *Stakeholders & Strategic Partnerships*.



al actors, should assume full responsibility for the DDR programme at the policy level, and as much responsibility for programme implementation as local capacity and impartiality concerns allow. Whenever a balance needs to be struck between national capacity development and rapid direct implementation of DDR by international actors, a *phased approach* should be taken, with strong UNDP (or other partner) leadership at the start, phasing to full national control as national capacity increases.<sup>17</sup>

#### 4.3.1 | Ensuring that planning is participatory

UNDP's experience has shown that the participation of a broad spectrum of stakeholders in the development of a DDR programme is key to its success. Discussion and participation are essential elements of the process, and both ex-combatants and communities need to be fully involved in planning and decision-making from the earliest stages. A participatory approach provides a forum for testing DDR assumptions and ideas, thereby enhancing programme design. Extensive stakeholder participation can, by promoting communication and negotiation among the main actors, help reduce levels of tension and fear, and improve human security.<sup>18</sup>

##### STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

Lessons from **Sierra Leone and Tajikistan** suggest that dialogue forums allow all parties to discuss and contribute to shaping programme design. Even in places where a central government is lacking, such as **Somaliland**, community participation in DDR planning can be very helpful in assuring national ownership of the process, and more effective use of programme resources at the local level. Time constraints, however, can limit the extent and depth of the consultation process, especially in the early stages of a DDR programme.

#### 4.3.2 | Supporting National Commissions<sup>19</sup>

Once a DDR intervention is seen as necessary and feasible, and buy-in into the programme is secured, a national body, usually a *National Commission for DDR* should be established, whose role should ideally have been defined in the peace accords themselves. UNDP practitioners should ensure that DDR is not left to military institutions alone. DDR, even if it looks like a military-oriented process, quickly becomes a civilian affair. Although the military should be involved, the leadership of the reintegration process must be civilian, and the make-up of the National Commission should reflect this.

##### SUPPORTING NATIONAL PLANNING

The 1996 **Guatemala Peace Accord** addressed four key issues: (a) demobilization and reintegration of populations affected by the conflict (b) integrated human development (c) sustainable economic development and (d) political reform. The Peace Accord was considered “an action plan for the political, economic, social and cultural development of Guatemala.” UNDP played a leading role in the planning process and participated in many of the commissions created to oversee implementation.

This National Commission must be an *inclusive body*, made up of representatives of all, or at least most, of the actors in the conflict, together with all the main stakeholders in the peace process, including relevant Government authorities, and representatives of civil society: religious and civic leaders, business and labour representatives and NGOs. It should be perceived, and should act, as a *national body* where the interests of all parties to the conflict are fully represented. The National Commission should in all cases be the sole DDR

<sup>17</sup> For more detailed guidance see IDDRS 03.50, *National Institutions for DDR*.

<sup>18</sup> See also IDDRS 03.20, *Programme Design*.

<sup>19</sup> For more detailed guidance see IDDRS 03.50, *National Institutions for DDR*.

policy-making body. But a clear distinction should be made between policy-making and implementation. At the operational level, a separate programme management unit should be established, that will be responsible for implementation. The institutional structure of the National Commission should be *temporary*, to be dissolved once the DDR process is over.

### 4.3.3 | Supporting community participation

National Commissions represent one element of national ownership and must be matched by engagement and participation at the community level. UNDP has a track record of creating participative consultative forums for all local stakeholders. In many countries, UNDP has ensured effective dialogue between national, local and community authorities, ex-combatants and the international community, in particular donors.

#### DISCUSSION FORUMS

**In Sierra Leone, UNDP funded forums to discuss demobilization and reintegration within an environment of reconciliation. These forums enabled the government, the army and civil society organizations, donors, religious and traditional leaders to develop a framework for national capacity-building in the context of peace-building. This UNDP-led process sought to lessen tensions by increasing transparency, allaying anxieties and clarifying intentions about military force and political activities. The process served as the basis for the DDR programme and for restructuring of the army.**

## 4.4 | Partnerships and collaboration<sup>20</sup>

No single actor has the financial, political and technical capacity to carry out DDR on its own. *Integration and coordination* is therefore critical. It is important to establish management structures capable of designing, planning and implementing DDR in an integrated manner, taking into account the full range of partners and counterparts. UNDP is well positioned to facilitate these partnerships, both nationally and internationally, which can help prevent duplication of effort by multiple actors, as it has the global coverage, infrastructure, resource mobilization and contracting mechanisms, the access to government, the technical competence and, usually, the donor confidence to enable it to facilitate these partnerships.

### 4.4.1 | Strong inter-agency collaboration is essential

UNDP's role as manager of the Resident Coordinator system underpins its collaboration with other agencies in DDR. The division of roles in DDR should follow the guidelines on institutional division of labour developed by ECHA<sup>21</sup> and, the forthcoming Integrated DDR Standards (see section 4.1.6). The key is collaboration at the early stages of the processes where the specific roles of agencies must be elaborated to prevent mission creep. During early post-conflict periods, international agencies come together in highly charged operating environments and often collaborate in uncharted territories. UNDP's role as manager of the resident coordinator system can help diffuse this tension, by calling for early formation of a joint DDR Task Force, including both the UN and relevant non-UN agencies.

#### COORDINATION AMONG ALL ACTORS

**In Guatemala in 1997, the "Comisión Especial de Incorporaciones" (CEI) was established to monitor and coordinate DDR policies and programmes. The Commission brought together the UN, EU, key bilateral donors, with the government authorities and demobilized ex-combatants from the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity Group (URNG).**

<sup>20</sup> See also IDDRS 02.40, *Stakeholders and Strategic Partnerships*.

<sup>21</sup> "Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of the Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants" Paper prepared by the ECHA Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. New York: UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, 2000.

The CEI met weekly to discuss strategy and programmes and to resolve any disputes. The inclusivity of the commission ensured coherence in strategy, policy and programmes. It also ensured that international assistance was tailored to meet the needs and demands of the UNRG. UNDP played a leading role within the CEI, coordinating the efforts of the international community, providing technical assistance, allocating resources to DDR programmes and contributing towards dispute resolution.

#### 4.4.2 | UNDP's role in integrated peace support operations

The complex and multi-dimensional nature of DDR programming, as well as its close relations with broader peace building, transition and recovery frameworks, places a premium on strong coordination within the UN system. Within the framework of integrated peace support operations, UNDP collaborates closely with DPKO and UN agencies such as UNICEF, ILO, WHO and others, on the planning, development and joint implementation of DDR programmes.

#### INTEGRATION IN HAITI AND SUDAN

In Haiti, the UNDP CO worked closely with DPKO to establish an integrated DDR section and programme within the UN Stabilization Force (MINUSTAH) in April 2004. In this structure the UNDP DDR Adviser also serves as the MINUSTAH Deputy Chief for DDR, and is responsible for the overall management of UN DDR planning and operations, as well as providing oversight for UNDP-specific programming (e.g. capacity development and reintegration). A similar model is also being developed for Sudan.

Increasingly, within the framework of its partnership with DPKO, UNDP is instrumental in developing the overall UN mandate for DDR within peace support operations, as well as the staffing structure, budget and operational strategy. In order to ensure coherence and unity of purpose, UNDP capacities, resources and staff are absorbed within the mission structure, and a fully integrated approach is adopted for planning purposes. Such arrangements help establish a central locus for joint programme implementation and operations, thus ensuring that a common work plan is at the heart of all activities. The integrated approach allows UNDP to tap into mission resources and capacities (military, CivPol, legal, public information resources as well as infrastructures and services), whilst preserving its institutional mandate and competencies. Where possible, the use of UNDP Trust Funds for managing resource mobilization should be promoted due to their flexibility. Because all missions are temporary, integrated DDR structures should allow for a core programming structure, made up of relevant members of the UN Country Team, to remain focused on reintegration support activities if this has not been completed by the end of the mission.

#### THE ROLE OF UN VOLUNTEERS

UNDP's United Nations Volunteers (UNV) Programme has supported the work of the DPKO in many areas of DDR since 1992. To date, more than 6,000 UN Volunteers have served in 38 different peace-keeping operations. Recognition of the particular contributions of UN Volunteers resulted in the signing by DPKO and UNV of a global MOU in 2003. Every new operation now established by DPKO involves UN Volunteers, with internationals and more recently nationals making up a significant part of the staffing. Current DDR UN Volunteers are fully integrated into DPKO's operations in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan.

#### 4.4.3 | Partnerships with local and international NGOs and multilateral agencies

Partnerships should also be built with non-governmental organizations (NGO), both local and international. Local NGOs can be empowered by their participation in the DDR process and may bring both specific know-how and a good understanding of the socio-political challenges of the reintegration process for ex-combatants. UNDP has a positive record of partnerships with international NGOs in the field of DDR in areas such as baseline assessments, capacity building, policy development and reintegration programmes.

#### INCLUDING NGOS IN PLANNING FOR DDR

**In Afghanistan, UNDP developed the reintegration programme in conjunction with international and local NGOs and other UN implementing agencies through a series of workshops in Kabul and in the regions. The DDR team visited NGOs' refugee reintegration programmes, government-run national programmes and other humanitarian initiatives to understand the Afghan context. For example, based on the experiences of the Christian Children's Fund in the Northeast region, a voluntary, community-based literacy programme was introduced to all agricultural reintegration packages nationwide.**

UNDP is also working closely with the World Bank within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) in the greater Great Lakes region of Africa, through joint assessment, monitoring and evaluation missions, the establishment of multi-partner DDR technical committees and the development of common strategies and integrated programmes. While the partnership is still in its early stages, it serves as a good example of multi-actor DDR coordination.<sup>22</sup>

### 4.5 | Resource mobilization and management<sup>23</sup>

The absence of adequate, timely and sustained funding, within a workable financial framework, is often a major impediment to DDR operations. UNDP practitioners face the following challenges:

- **A funding gap:** Most DDR programmes experience a funding gap, typically eight to twelve months, from the time voluntary contributions are pledged to the time they are received. UNDP practitioners should be particularly aware of the dangers of creating a time and resources gap between disarmament and demobilization on the one hand and reintegration on the other.
- **Uncertainty regarding the use of the peacekeeping budget:** When DDR takes place within a peacekeeping operation, the mission budget can be used to support the programme. However, lack of knowledge of what can or cannot be assumed under this source of funding, lack of clarity about the budgetary process, and member states reluctance to fund reintegration programmes from the peacekeeping assessed budget have limited the contributions of the regular budget to DDR.
- **UN fragmentation and competition for resources:** The United Nations system's fragmented (and sometimes competitive) approach to DDR programming has in the past resulted in poorly planned and synchronised resource mobilization activities and duplication of administrative structures. This has diminished donor confidence in the DDR programme and their willingness to contribute the required funds.

<sup>22</sup> For more information see [www.mdrp.org](http://www.mdrp.org).

<sup>23</sup> See IDDRS, *Module 03.31, Financing and Budgeting for DDR*.

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*“In case after case, demobilization is not accorded priority by funders. When peace operations are deployed, they must be resourced to undertake the demobilization and disarmament of combatants; this is a priority for successful peace implementation. These tasks should be integrated into the assessed budget of peacekeeping operations, under the authority of the head of mission.”*

REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE, UN 2004.

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The move towards integration across the UN will help to address some of these obstacles. In addition, a recent decision in the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly<sup>24</sup> clarified the use of the regular budget for DDR during peacekeeping operations. Resolution A/C.5/59/L.53 formally endorsed the financing of post and operational costs for disarmament and demobilization (including reinsertion activities) pending a final policy decision at its 60th session. The resolution agreed that the demobilization process must provide “transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and **can last up to one year.**”

#### **4.5.1 | The DDR programme design should take account of potential resource constraints**

External assistance is invariably required for DDR programmes. The presence of UNDP in post-conflict settings, and its key role in humanitarian and development assistance coordination, provides significant opportunities for mobilising donor funding for DDR programmes. However, low donor interest in some countries, or donors’ lack of confidence in the overall peace process, will affect levels of funding, and thus, the scope of the overall DDR programme. It is fundamental that UNDP, prior to engaging in a DDR programme, assess the prospects for funding (see also 4.1.1). Knowing the probability and extent of funding will help to minimize the potential risk of developing unrealistic expectations.

The design of the DDR programme should take account of the resources available. Sufficient resources should be available for start-up activities and for the steady funding of the programme throughout its life span. A clear and comprehensive agreement by all parties from the outset regarding the number of participants eligible for the DDR programme will greatly assist programme design and resource management (see box). Open-ended DDR creates frustration and may end up causing more conflict than it solves.

#### **DETERMINING WHO IS ELIGIBLE AT THE OUTSET**

**In Liberia, UNDP offered to channel the DDR funding through the Conflict Prevention and Recovery Trust Fund, and helped create a special management unit for this purpose. This facilitated both quick reception and disbursement of donor funds for DDR. However, criteria for joining the DDR programme were ambiguous and no parties specified the number of eligible combatants. From an initially estimated total of 20-25,000 ex-combatants, the programme has to date had to accept over 103,000 individuals. Funding for the reintegration component has barely reached the level needed for the originally estimated number.**

<sup>24</sup>See resolution A/C.5/59/L.53 for more information.

#### 4.5.2 | Trust funds allow for flexible and expeditious management

UNDP country offices should try not to limit their resource mobilization efforts to one source of financing. The use of TRAC 1.1.3 funds, which can be mobilized quickly and disbursed rapidly, has given UNDP the ability to provide limited seed-money for timely initiation and support of DDR initiatives. Non-core resources represent the mainstay of resources mobilized for DDR operations. They follow no pre-set programming arrangements and are given on a voluntary basis, though they are often earmarked to meet specific requirements.

The Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF) is a non-core resource that provides UNDP with resources that can be used for immediate crisis response as well as for strategic investment into CPR programmes. *Earmarked country funds for DDR* can be opened within the CPR TTF, allowing for both flexible and expeditious management as well as maximum accountability to the donor(s).

UNDP country offices often utilize *cost-sharing* arrangements, which place the Country Office in charge of managing donor financial support. Donor cost-sharing needs to be properly managed from the outset of programme formulation and resource mobilization.

UNDP is increasingly engaged in *multi-donor trust funds*, such as the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) for the greater Great Lakes Region.<sup>25</sup> As DDR operations become increasingly inter-agency and funded by multiple donors the use of pooled resources responds to the need for increased harmonization and alignment. Such arrangements allow for burden sharing and a “pooling of risk.”

### THE RAPID RESPONSE MECHANISM IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

The DDR process is often highly influenced by the shifting priorities of the political agenda, and requires a high degree of flexibility and creativity from DDR practitioners. In the DRC, UNDP established a **Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)** to ensure timely management and resolution of emergencies, which threaten to delay or divert the normal development of the programme. The RRM uses a ‘risk matrix’ to detect potential contingencies, a rapid disbursement system (between 72 hours and 5 days), and a pre-established network of service providers (including UN Volunteers, private sector and NGOs) based in critical DDR intervention areas. The RRM has played a substantial role in dealing with spontaneous disarmament, the Ituri DRC Operation, and the setting up of the National Commission for DDR.

#### 4.5.3 | Donor expectations should be sensitively managed

UNDP should be clear with donors about its own limitations, or divergent programme objectives. Procedures for donor consultation should be established within the programme framework, and frank and timely communication encouraged. One of the major issues faced in the design and implementation of DDR projects is that external partners are often reluctant to provide resources to DDR programmes until the government and all other parties involved in the peace agreement have shown their commitment to DDR and the peace process. This makes it difficult to plan, design, and programme activities in advance, in particular for reintegration.

## 4.6 | The role of the UNDP country office

Executing agencies are responsible for the overall management of the DDR programme, including the issuing of contracts and the procurement of goods and services associated with the provision of external assistance. If the situation calls for UNDP to play a role in DDR *implementation*, there are a number of options available to COs. However, in all cases, the main challenge will be to enhance CO capacity to respond to the extensive and demanding requirements of a DDR program.

<sup>25</sup> See [www.mdrp.org](http://www.mdrp.org).

#### 4.6.1 | What implementation modalities are available to UNDP COs?

Country offices have the following execution options available:

- As per UNDP policy, **National Execution (NEX)** is the preferred means of building national ownership and capacity. However in a post-conflict environment where government structures are often weak and timing is critical, this may not be possible or desirable. This may be particularly true for a DDR programme which should be owned by all parties to the conflict. In this context therefore, national ownership and capacity may be better built through other means.
- In post-conflict situations, UNDP is increasingly moving to **Direct Execution (DEX)** because it is seen as an independent executing agent that can stand outside of, and lend credibility to, a politically sensitive process such as DDR. In this context, capacity development must remain an objective but should be targeted according to the specificities of each DDR implementing environment.
- UNDP can contract the **UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)**, to carry out implementation activities and/or provide specific financial/ human resources management support.

#### 4.6.2 | Strengthening UNDP CO capacity

The budgets of DDR programmes are often far larger than the total budgets of COs, which often lack the systems and capacity to cope with the extra workload. This can seriously hinder the rapid and efficient response required in DDR planning and implementation. COs also need to be sensitized to the fact that senior project managers will have to be put in place to manage these DDR programmes, which can result in tensions within the CO team. The rapid appointment of an *operations manager* can provide the DDR manager with the required administrative, operational and logistical backstopping. This will allow the DDR manager to focus on the core functions related to DDR programmatic issues. It will, however, increase project costs.

Authority given to DDR managers in decentralized offices should be clearly defined so that decision-making can be responsive to the pressurised and time-restricted requirements of DDR. In addition, special attention should be given to the identification of the most responsive procurement modalities in order to fit the requirements of DDR programmes where large amounts of money need to be expended rapidly. In some cases, procurement modalities are restrictive and cumbersome requiring special authorizations to raise procurement ceilings for specific expenditure or obtain waivers in certain cases. Delays in procurements in DDR programmes can place the staff of UNDP or its partners in unsafe situations and ultimately may lead to setbacks in the peace process.

# 5



## Lessons learned and guidance for DDR programming: Implementation

This section provides guidance to UNDP practitioners on the implementation of DDR programmes, from the criteria for entry into the DDR programme through to the delivery of reintegration programmes within a broader recovery framework.

### 5.1 | Defining eligibility and participation

#### 5.1.1 | Who is eligible for benefits offered by a DDR programme?

Those eligible for DDR will usually include men, women, boys and girls who have served in regular forces or irregular armed groups, but not all of them will have borne arms. Some may have had their weapons redistributed either as a result of an incapacitating injury or because commanders may not wish to acknowledge their role as combatants, as is sometimes the case for women and children. Although most will have actively engaged as combatants, many will have carried out logistical tasks and other support activities. Wherever resources allow, efforts should be made to extend DDR assistance to all *dependents*, including women and girls who are not legal or consensual wives.

Transparent, easily understood, unambiguous and applicable *selection criteria* for the participants of a DDR programme are required to minimize the perception that any particular group is being favoured or victimized. Once selection criteria are agreed, they should be incorporated into the DDR communication plan and *widely publicized*. Selection criteria will depend on the context and/or provisions of the peace agreement and the nature of the DDR. The selection of combatants should be carefully conducted under identical and previously agreed-to procedures and criteria. The logistical and financial impact of these criteria on the overall programme should also be assessed. Once the ex-combatant is registered, the DDR programme will have taken on a relatively long-term, and expensive, commitment to this person's reintegration.

#### VERIFICATION THROUGH NATIONAL COUNTERPARTS

In Afghanistan, all ex-soldiers were verified before they entered the DDR programme. The Afghan Ministry of Defence provided a list of proposed candidates to a Regional Verification Committee (RVC) — a committee consisting of five respected civilians from each area. The RVCs verified that the candidates were bona fide soldiers. On the day of disarmament, ANBP's Mobile Disarmament Units (MDUs),



which travelled throughout the country carrying out disarmament, confirmed that the individual conformed to the RVC's verified list and that his weapon was eligible. A day pass was issued to those who had successfully cleared this process to facilitate entry into the regional office of the DDR programme.

### 5.1.2 | The transition from targeting individuals to communities

Despite concerns that ex-combatants receive disproportionate benefits in the post-conflict phase, there is a growing consensus that a focus on former combatants in DDR programmes is necessary and justified in order to build *confidence and security* in war-torn societies, thereby reducing the obstacles and blocks to broader recovery efforts.

To achieve the *security objectives* of a DDR programme, support should be given to achieve full initial socio-economic reintegration of the ex-combatants. However, in the context of the longer-term reintegration, a balance must be struck between supporting ex-combatants' specific needs and the needs of the wider community in order to prevent resentment. Any focus on the *longer-term* reintegration of ex-combatants must therefore focus on the families or caregivers of these ex-combatants and their respective communities, without which economic and social reintegration will not be sustainable.

Emphasis should be placed on *moving quickly* from ex-combatant-specific programmes to community-based and national development programmes. Failure to do so will result in ex-combatants continuing to identify themselves as belonging to a special group outside society, retarding their effective reintegration into local communities.

#### THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXCLUSION

**In Sierra Leone, during the phased and simultaneous demobilization of fighting groups, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) held back its fighters, thereby slowing down the peace process and reducing the rate of reintegration in RUF areas. In Liberia, the main militia commanders announced that they would not comply with the demobilization process until their demands for jobs were met. The DDR Commission decided to go ahead with the start of the encampment process without addressing these concerns. Armed violence against the peacekeeping forces and numerous deaths in the resulting shoot-out, were the consequence.**

### 5.1.3 | Targeting warlords and mid level commanders

The interests and expectations of key warlords and military leaders are often the cornerstones of peace processes and agreements. The short-term success or failure of such agreements can be dependent on meeting these expectations. However, a certain number of military leaders, warlords, especially mid-level commanders, may end up being left out of the incentive structure agreed to in the peace agreement. Buy-in to the pacification process by these key players should therefore be one of the first considerations of DDR planning and programme design. Either the national government, supported by the DDR National Commission, should address their concerns directly, which is by far the preferable option<sup>26</sup>, or the DDR programme will have to devise a two-tier system of benefit packages, one for these commanders, whose expectations are usually quite high, and another for the rest of the fighters.

<sup>26</sup> Due to the much higher expectations of these commanders than the rest of the fighters, the benefit packages need to be tailored almost individually, which is not only time consuming, but also a very difficult balancing act, that can easily backfire by creating jealousies among individuals or groups.

## ENGAGING COMMANDERS THROUGH A TARGETED PROGRAMME

Many commanders in Afghanistan were reluctant to relinquish their power bases and refused to hand over the lists of officers and soldiers under their command to the Ministry of Defence, which hampered the DDR programme in its early stages. Consequently, in May 2004, the ANBP began working with the Afghan government and international community to prepare a commander-specific reintegration programme. The result of the collaboration was a *Commander Incentive Programme* that acknowledged high-ranking commanders who have fully complied with the DDR process by nominating them for government appointments, redundancy payments, economic and non-economic packages. These ANBP-backed commanders are presented to a Government Appointment Panel, which decides whether to grant the package.

### 5.1.4 | Consideration of children associated with fighting forces<sup>27</sup>

The compulsory recruitment of children under 15 and their use in hostilities by both armed forces and armed groups is a war crime, and, according to a growing international consensus, the recruitment and use of girls and boys under the age of 18 is illegal and a form of child labour. Children specific DDR programmes should be sought at all times, even before a formal DDR programme is launched or peace agreements concluded.

## CHILDREN ASSOCIATED WITH FIGHTING FORCES

In his February 2000 report to the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General defined children associated with armed forces or groups as “any person under the age 18 years of age who forms part of an armed force in any capacity and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members, as well as girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage.”

Peace agreements and negotiated settlements should recognize the rights of under-age soldiers to particular benefits and entitlements. Surveys of under-age soldiers should be undertaken at the start of the demobilization process and specially targeted programmes should be developed for under-age soldiers to reintegrate them into civilian life. UNICEF specializes in supporting DDR of children. UNDP practitioners are encouraged to work closely with UNICEF on these issues. Outlined below are some key principles which UNDP practitioners should take into account when designing programmes:

- Prevent recruitment wherever possible, and ensure early demobilization of children, even before peace agreements are concluded, and DDR interventions for adults are defined;
- Minimize their encampment during demobilization, and keep them separate from other groups at all times;
- Ensure their protection during demobilization;
- Promote sustainable reintegration as far as possible within a family context;
- Facilitate their return to civilian life as soon as possible, through access to school or other learning opportunities and psycho-social counselling;
- Ensure that programmes take account of the different cultural contexts regarding children (including community systems of care, ages of initiation into adulthood etc.);
- Ensure that programmes address the specific needs of children who have suffered sexual and gender based violence;

<sup>27</sup> For more information see IDDRS 05.20 *Children and DDR*.

- Promote the physical and economic security of child heads of household and underage mothers; and
- Ensure that programmes take into account the specific needs of girls, who might prefer more informal DDR processes, to avoid the stigma of being labelled as an ex-combatant.

## PREVENTING FORCED RECRUITMENT

Forced recruitment of children and youth by guerrillas and paramilitaries is an issue of humanitarian concern in Colombia. UNDP's Reconciliation and Development Programme, REDES, is engaged in a recruitment prevention strategy in parts of rural Colombia which seeks to reduce the risks and mitigate the effects of forced recruitment on vulnerable populations. Some of the main achievements of this prevention strategy are the establishment of a youth network and a fund to promote productive, educational and cultural entrepreneurship of youth and children's groups. REDES has also helped to strengthen the capacity of local and regional authorities to address this issue.

### 5.1.5 | Addressing the needs of women and girl combatants<sup>28</sup>

Experience has shown that women and girls are almost always associated with armed forces and armed groups (both government and rebels). However, they are often not as visible or vocal and are therefore excluded from DDR processes, because they are not recognized as combatants or their needs are not taken into account. In developing DDR interventions, their presence amongst fighting forces should be presumed until proven otherwise. A gender-sensitive approach to DDR recognizes the roles of women and girls as well as men and boys in fighting forces. It is essential to utilize gender analysis and consult with women and women's groups in all stages of the DDR process, from needs assessment to programme design to identification of beneficiaries, implementation, monitoring and evaluation for the following reasons:

- Excluding women from DDR processes overlooks an important asset to peace building; and
- Women and girls associated with fighting forces have specific protection and reintegration needs.

## DDR AND GENDER: GOOD PRACTICE

- Sex-disaggregated data should be collected to develop a more accurate picture of the demographics of fighting forces.
- Weapon possession should not be sole criteria for entry into DDR as this excludes the majority of women and girls (and dependents of ex-combatants) who provided logistical and other support to fighting forces.
- The location and layout of cantonment (where used) during the demobilization process should be designed to accommodate the humanitarian and security needs of women and allow safe access to dependents.
- Ensure women's equal access to training and assistance.
- All combatants should receive training on HIV/AIDS, sex and gender based violence, and non-violent conflict resolution.

<sup>28</sup> See also IDDRS 05.10, *Women, Gender and DDR*.

Female ex-combatants, like other women in war-affected communities, face specific problems once the war has ended. They have usually acquired new roles as a result of the war, but men and/or the wider community often refuse to accept these roles in peacetime; and gender bias, violence and abuse frequently increase. In addition, women and girls associated with armed forces tend to face increased stigma and discrimination once they are reintegrated into their communities. In the reintegration process, due consideration must be given to gender roles and their transformation. UNIFEM has developed detailed guidance for addressing gender issues in DDR. UNDP practitioners are encouraged to seek advice from UNIFEM when designing DDR programmes.<sup>29</sup>

### **WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN DDR IN THE DRC**

**In the DRC, UNDP and UNIFEM joined forces in 2004 with the UN Peacekeeping Mission in DRC (MONUC) and civil society to develop a strategy for women's participation in all stages of the DDR process. UNDP and UNIFEM work jointly with the national DDR commission providing technical advice to ensure the needs of female ex-combatants, women and girls associated with fighting forces and dependants are not overlooked.**

#### **5.1.6 | Disabled combatants<sup>30</sup>**

The war-wounded are widely considered to be one of the most difficult categories of former combatants to reach and reintegrate. They are typically far away from their home community when fighting ends and without means or physical ability to return. Furthermore, they are often disabled in a way that makes it impossible for them to generate an income, unless they receive intensive retraining and psycho-physical rehabilitation.

### **WAR-WOUNDED EX-COMBATANTS PROJECT IN DRC**

**Since November 2002, a UNDP pilot project to support war-wounded ex-combatants in DRC has assisted 1870 ex-combatants. 730 have now ended their treatment and are currently in a nine-month training and re-education programme. UNDP supported the Government in establishing a standard set of legal tools for the demobilization of war-disabled (including a pension system and benefits scheme). The project, implemented under the NEX modality, has resulted in a fruitful partnership with the private sector through the support of a national telecommunications company. The project is currently being reviewed with the aim integrating it into the National DDR Programme.**

#### **5.1.7 | Involving receiving communities**

Communities play a central role in the reintegration of ex-combatants as they are the main agent of its success. Ultimately it is communities that will, or will not, reintegrate ex-combatants. The DDR programme is a means to support communities in their efforts to reintegrate some of their members. It is good practice to involve families, traditional and religious leaders, women and youth groups, and other local associations in planning the return of ex-combatants. These groups should receive support and training to facilitate the process. In particular, women who often bear the burden of reintegration of ex-combatants in families and communities, require assistance to deal with reintegration of sick, traumatized, violent ex-combatants and children.

The return of ex-combatants into communities can create real or perceived security problems. Keeping communities informed of the reintegration timetable and the resources available should be part of the overall DDR information campaign. Focus group interviews in sample communities should provide programme managers with a sense of the difficulties and issues to be addressed before the return of the ex-combatants. Mapping of "areas at risk" can also help practitioners identify priority areas of support to communities.

<sup>29</sup> See "Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration", UNIFEM, October 2004.

<sup>30</sup> For more information see IDDRS 05.51, *Disabilities and DDR*.

Due to a number of factors, such as changing expectations and difficulties in reintegrating into village life, there is a definite trend for ex-combatants to reintegrate into *urban settings*. A specific strategy needs to be prepared to support urban reintegration where ex-combatants cannot depend as much on family networks to create opportunities and encourage their return to civilian life.

### 5.1.8 | Exercising caution when supporting ex-combatant associations

The creation of former combatants' associations is often promoted as a means of ensuring adequate representation of ex-combatants in a DDR process. These associations are also considered to be an early warning and response system for spotting dissatisfaction among ex-combatants and for confidence building between discontented groups and the rest of the community. However, such associations, especially when set up nationally and in a top-down manner, can be problematic. Veterans associations can delay or prevent the effective reintegration of ex-combatants by perpetuating their identity as soldiers and their adherence to previous command structures.

UNDP should generally only support associations of ex-combatants that emerge at the grass roots level within the context of the broader community. Where national top-down associations have been formed as a result of political processes, UNDP should assist such associations to engage positively within a DDR programme.

#### THE ROLE OF EX-COMBATANTS ASSOCIATIONS

In **Guatemala**, the Fundacion Guillermo Toriello (FGT) was formed as an association of demobilized soldiers. It implemented projects for ex-combatants, and advocated the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. With limited capacity and no previous experience, its performance in project implementation was problematic. The FGT pursued political aims to the detriment of its programme commitments and the best interests of the demobilized soldiers.

In **Tajikistan**, UNDP involved former combatants in local decision-making and implementation activities aimed at stabilizing the socio-economic situation of former combatants — which benefited the community as a whole. The Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Programme (RRDP) guided former combatants in the establishment of associations and coordinated local authorities, communities and former combatants. This ensured effective dialogue and provided a role for all in the decision-making process.

## 5.2 | Launching the DDR programme

### 5.2.1 | Public information and the management of expectations<sup>31</sup>

In the aftermath of a conflict, DDR is a sensitive and volatile process. It is vital to ensure that all stakeholders feel consulted and fully informed of progress. A public information and awareness campaign should be carefully designed to address this need. This can help lessen tensions and suspicions, improving predictability for the parties involved, by clarifying and informing everyone of objectives, criteria and implementation plans of the programme. It is also crucial for raising the public's awareness and support for the DDR process, especially on the critical issue of fairness of the process itself. If well designed and implemented, a public information campaign can help *manage the expectations* of ex-combatants regarding what the DDR programme can and cannot do – which is critical for avoiding outbreaks of violence during the DDR process.

<sup>31</sup> See also IDDRS 04.60, *Public Information and Community Sensitization*.

## PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

During the early stages of DDR in Afghanistan, ANBP discovered that some commanders, who were regularly briefed on DDR activities, did not always relay accurate information to their subordinates in order to hamper the programme and maintain their power. As a result, ANBP decided to increase its public information efforts by boosting the number of face-to-face visits between its staff members and the officers and soldiers due to enter DDR. The face-to-face meetings, in addition to intensive radio campaigns, also helped to relay the DDR message to a population with a high illiteracy rate. In a survey conducted by ANBP, the vast majority of officers and soldiers said that radio was their prime source of information about the DDR process.

### 5.2.2 | Getting the timing right

The *timing* of a DDR initiative is crucial and can determine its success or failure. It is, however, generally determined by the terms of the peace agreement, by the arrival of the peacekeepers and/or resources, and by the good will of parties to the conflict. The sooner the ex-combatants are disarmed, demobilized, sent home and fully reintegrated, the more likely that they become *agents for positive change* and stability in their own societies. However, it is dangerous to proceed with DDR without the full commitment of all parties to the process: DDR must be carried out *with* all parties, it cannot be done *to* them. Furthermore and when possible, it should be coordinated with Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR), electoral processes, and broader recovery programmes.

## 5.3 | Disarmament<sup>32</sup>

Unless comprehensive disarmament is undertaken at the end of a conflict, large numbers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) will remain in the hands of ex-combatants, criminals and civilians, resulting in armed banditry and violence. The wide availability of these weapons undermines public security, and can often threaten the peace consolidation process. The presence of illegally held SALW, as well as unexploded ordnance (UXO), deployed mines, ammunition and explosive stockpiles, also represent a serious risk to the security of receiving communities where reintegration will take place. In this context, UNDP supports ongoing disarmament and arms management programmes at both the national and the community level, aimed at both ex-combatants and the civilian population, both during DDR and after DDR has ended.

### 5.3.1 | Ensuring that disarmament is included in the peace agreement

Agreeing the timing and scope of post-conflict disarmament is politically sensitive and highly context specific. It depends, for example, on whether it is undertaken after the defeat of one party, straight after a peace agreement, or as a result of a decision to downsize the existing army. It also depends on who is holding the weapons and why: whether the conflict involved civilians who momentarily took up their own arms and then returned to their livelihoods, or whether the ex-combatants were trained and armed fighters that require demobilizing. It further depends on the local traditions regarding arms possession and use, and on the evolving security situation.

A key lesson learned is that it is much easier and cheaper to collectively disarm a fighting force that has agreed to lay down its weapons as part of a peace settlement, than to extract these weapons from the hands of individual ex-combatants and civilians later, outside of a formal DDR process. Armed individuals will not be inclined to voluntarily surrender their weapons if they have reason to fear for their safety or have taken up a life of violent crime. Nor is it possible under such conditions for governments to confiscate all unauthorised weapons. It is therefore essential to ensure that disarmament of ex-combatants, and ideally the wider community, is included as a condition of the peace agreement.

Even if disarmament is included in the peace agreement a certain amount of coercion may be required (national security forces, PKO). However, UNDP practitioners should focus on developing *positive incentive mechanisms* to optimise voluntary disarmament by the ex-combatants and the civilian population.

<sup>32</sup> See also IDDRS 04.10 *Disarmament, Weapons Control and Destruction* and IDDRS 03.60, *Arms Control, Security and Development*.

### 5.3.2 | Providing disarmament incentives for ex-combatants

In some UN disarmament programmes, weapons have been 'bought back' from ex-combatants and civilians. Experience has shown that buy backs are expensive and *monetize* the disarmament process. They create a demand for weapons, attracting an even greater number to the area that the programme is trying to disarm. In addition, buy backs have tended to fuel the illicit traffic in weapons.

Within the context of DDR programmes, UNDP has successfully offered priority access to reintegration programmes in return for voluntary surrender of weapons (see box). This approach uses the *existing benefits package* as an incentive for disarmament, while avoiding the monetization of weapons that comes from traditional arms buy-back programmes.<sup>33</sup> It is therefore desirable to assure a clear and operational linkage between disarmament and reintegration support, in order to achieve the most efficient and effective results in terms of arms collection from the ex-combatants.

#### DISARMAMENT INCENTIVES

**In Republic of Congo, UNDP, working with IOM, successfully reintegrated 8,200 ex-combatants, through an individually-focused, decentralized, DDR process, in a non-PKO context. Ex-combatants that voluntarily turned in their weapons obtained priority access to the reintegration benefits, whereby over 2,300 micro enterprises were created, and the programme was able to collect and destroy over 3,200 firearms and 8,000 explosives.**

### 5.3.3 | Best practice is to destroy all weapons collected

Experience has shown that it is highly advisable to convince all actors to adhere to the principle of *automatic destruction* of all collected weapons. This may be initially harder to sell, as a security sector reform programme may recommend that some of the collected arms be converted for use by the legitimate security forces. Where weapons are retained for this purpose, the government must be seen as neutral and should have developed a clear plan and rationale of weapons retention.

UNDP practitioners should exercise extreme caution when dealing with the issue of weapons retention or redistribution to security forces. Too often, in the absence of sufficient institutional capacity or stockpile control, collected weapons find their way back onto the streets and are used in armed violence and crime. Therefore weapons collected in a DDR process should be destroyed in the absence of such capacity, particularly if their destruction will contribute to creating trust and confidence in a peace process. However, where the Government has demonstrated a commitment to security sector reform, UNDP can assist in strengthening registration and stockpile management of weapons, and BCPR can assist in this respect (see box on BCPR DDR tool-kit in section 5.4.3).

### 5.3.4 | Ensuring safety during disarmament procedures

The following principles should be adhered to in all disarmament processes in order to ensure the safety of all actors and to create a perception of transparency, fairness and security.

<sup>33</sup> A further refinement of this concept of priority access to reintegration benefits in exchange for disarmament is to grant order of entry to the DDR programme based on the *number/type* of weapons that each individual offers to turn in. This creates competitive pressure for maximum disarmament, without excluding anyone a priori: the ex-combatants with more weapons to turn in, who are clearly a security priority, are simply addressed before the others.

## Disarmament: Principles

<b>Safety</b>	Safety of personnel involved is of paramount importance to prevent death or injuries. In principle, the handling of SALW should be done by partners with military expertise, especially where a PKO is present. Where programme personnel may be asked to receive unsafe hand grenades, UXOs and other dangerous weapons from persons who do not want to turn in these items directly to the military/police-assisted disarmament teams clear guidelines should be issued to direct personnel. Training in basic and extended (where possible or applicable) weapons and ammunition safety for all programme personnel is therefore essential prior to any weapon collection activity.
<b>Transparency</b>	Transparency in the collection, storage and destruction of weapons and ammunition is crucial to ensure that weapons will not return to circulation—and that this be perceived as being the case. This is a critical confidence building measure.
<b>Safe storage</b>	Safe storage of weapons and ammunition is vital, using the highest level of security possible. For instance, containers with a double lock system with keys under the control of community, government and UNDP representatives. Weapons and ammunition should also be stored at a safe distance from schools and communities.
<b>Expertise</b>	Experts, such as NATO-trained Ammunition and Technical Officers, must be involved from the outset in the disarmament process. The Small Arms and Demobilization Unit (SADU) of BCPR can assist COs in identifying and deploying the relevant experts.

### 5.3.5 | Linking DDR to mine action programmes

Mine Action is a critical component of arms control, security enhancement, and in many circumstances a prerequisite for development. UNDP has a well-defined role to play in this process,<sup>34</sup> and there is significant scope to link programmes on DDR and Mine Action. Experience suggests that ex-combatants can make good deminers, and that involving them in clearance operations can be a good interim arrangement on the road to reintegration into their communities and the local economy. Mine clearance situates ex-combatants in civilian life, but in a professional culture, with good remuneration and an opportunity for training in areas that can help them make the full transition to sustainable livelihoods. The participation of ex-combatants in demining operations can also help restore trust between former combatants and the community.

### 5.3.6 | Linking DDR to national and community disarmament<sup>35</sup>

Even after successful disarmament during a DDR process, many illicit weapons may remain in the hands of ex-combatants, who failed to turn in all their weapons, as well as in the hands of other civilians. It is therefore usually necessary to complement the initial ex-combatant disarmament process with a wider, national arms registration, control, collection and destruction campaign.

## WOMEN, WEAPONS AND DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES

The “Weapons in Exchange for Development Programme” which UNDP, UNDDA and UNIFEM implemented together in Albania established voluntary weapons surrender in exchange for support to community-based development incentives. Women became active agents driving the decision-making process within their families and their communities in order to change the cultural attitudes towards weapons possession. The number of weapons in circulation decreased significantly. When the project finished in

<sup>34</sup> Contact BCPR Mine Action Unit for further information regarding UNDP’s role in this field.

<sup>35</sup> BCPR’s Small Arms Demobilization Unit has extensive experience in the field of community disarmament and can provide advice to Country Offices on best practices and approaches in community disarmament.



2002, around 7000 weapons and 300 tons of ammunition had been collected in the two pilot projects areas. An impact assessment demonstrated that the active engagement of women increased the results of weapons collection efforts in the two target districts.

There are many types of small arms control/disarmament campaigns, and the selection of a particular approach, and the design of the corresponding programme, will depend on a certain number of key contextual factors. Chief among them are:

- Who is holding the illicit weapons, and why?
- What *positive incentives* can be put in place to promote control or disarmament? For instance, an amnesty for registration and surrender of illicit weapons, weapons in exchange for development, weapons in competition for development, etc;
- What *negative incentives* can be put in place to promote control or disarmament? For instance, government searches and seizures, penalties for illicit weapons holding; and
- What role will women play in the disarmament programme?<sup>36</sup>

The baseline assessments (outlined in section 4.2.3) will help UNDP practitioners decide on the most appropriate approach for their country. BCPR can provide technical support to the CO in subsequent programme design.

In all cases, good governance, effective reform of the security sector, improved public security and greater opportunities for political participation and economic advancement will contribute to reducing the demand for illicit weapons holdings.

### **WEAPONS FREE VILLAGES**

In the Solomon Islands, UNDP supported a Weapons Free Village Campaign to encourage communities to play an active role in ridding their villages of illegal weapons. The programme undertook an intensive awareness campaign, in close cooperation with local institutions such as churches, traditional leaders and civil society groups. By 2004, 1010 villages (63 percent of the target communities) in 14 wards were declared weapons free. The ceremonies, where communities publicly made their commitment to “weapons free status”, were promoted widely through media coverage, including live radio broadcasts and the print media.

## **5.4 | Demobilization<sup>37</sup>**

The objective of demobilization is to assist ex-combatants to return to civilian life in a secure, reconciliatory and peaceful environment. Demobilization is a multifaceted process, dealing with the following aspects of ex-combatants’ changes in status.

<sup>36</sup> Women’s active involvement in awareness-raising and weapons collection programmes has often been instrumental to the success of civilian disarmament programmes.

<sup>37</sup> See also IDDRS 04.20, *Demobilization*.

## Key Elements of the Demobilization Process

<b>Legal</b>	In the context of a formal army, the ex-combatant has to be discharged and given civilian status and an identity card. In some situations, further sensitization and training will be required on legal issues relating to possession of weapons, the breaking of laws, and the use of violence etc.
<b>Psychological</b>	Ex-combatants need to sever their formal ties to their command structures. Encouraging them to focus on their future life as civilians, providing civilian clothing and addressing their basic needs for a short period after demobilization will increase their autonomy and reduce the chances that they will return to their former way of life for survival.
<b>Health</b>	Both physical and mental health should be assessed and addressed before they can return to their communities for reintegration.
<b>Economic</b>	Their economic prospects need to be addressed and they should be made aware of the reintegration package, potential opportunities and limitations.

The demobilization process serves to register and count ex-combatants, establish a profile of their extended family situation, their education and work experience as well as what future capacity development may be required. During demobilization, the socio-economic data of each combatant should be analysed to assist with reintegration planning. Every ex-combatant will be provided with a DDR Programme ID card. Medical screening, orientation and briefing will also be conducted in order to prepare them for their discharge. UNDP provides support to this process as a first step in the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. The demobilization process should ideally take place at the same time as, or as soon as possible after, combatants have been registered and disarmed.

### 5.4.1 | Timing and sequencing

The timing and scheduling of the demobilization process must be realistic and strictly adhered to in order to build confidence in the peace processes. It should be of short duration but sufficient time should be taken to properly orient the ex-combatants on essential issues before they return to their communities. There is usually little time to plan and prepare for demobilization and for this reason the process should be made as simple as possible. The inability to prepare cantonment sites in time or an inadequate deployment of peacekeepers can delay demobilization and create an unfavourable security environment. Therefore, demobilization should not start until pre-agreed conditions of readiness have been attained, the area(s) of demobilization secured, and a consensus has been reached by the stakeholders on the appropriateness of beginning of DDR activities.

### 5.4.2 | Cantonment as a security requirement

Although cantonment provides a logical approach to the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants, experience suggests it can be a negative process. Cantonment often creates a negative mindset amongst the ex-combatants and easily becomes a focal point for crime and discontent. Camps are also seen as a source of food and resources for surrounding populations, creating logistical problems for camp management. Significant (often negative) media attention is also placed on the encampment process. Cantonment is also expensive – especially when taking into account the needs of special groups such as women, child combatants and dependents.

Cantonment is essentially a security requirement and not technically a mandatory requirement for the DDR process. Consequently, it should only be considered as an option when the security context indicates that it is necessary. When it is being considered as an option, the disposition of the fighting forces should be determined. It has been shown that formal forces are used to barracks whereas informal forces see encampment as a loss of freedom and this can have negative consequences. Where the size of the fighting forces is small, other options should be considered such as mobile registration procedures and localized disarmament projects. Where cantonment is deemed necessary, it is essential to keep the period of encampment short.

### **CANTONMENT IN SOMALILAND**

The Mandhera encampment in Somaliland had a capacity for 1,200 ex-combatants but held about 5,000. After six months the encampment was abruptly closed because it was badly planned, poorly resourced and raised unrealistic expectations of massive training and employment. Widespread unrest among the demobilized followed until they dispersed and returned to their militias which were potential sources of instability. In addition to the setbacks for the peace process and security in Somaliland, the Mandhera encampment posed a substantial financial burden because the facility was completely dependent on external financial resources.

### **MOBILE REGISTRATION IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS**

In the Solomon Islands, UNDP supported the police in demobilizing 1000 Special Constables (SC), mostly ex-combatants. A registration list was compiled by a mobile team who applied eligibility criteria, collected personal data and undertook sensitization in the areas of SC relocation. The team met with small numbers of SC at a time; in front of their communities, which minimized security risks. Subsequent to registration, small numbers were demobilized in their villages. These ceremonies played an important reconciliation role. Compiling the list also gave the programme team time to prepare relevant reintegration activities, because expectations were analysed during registration. Weapons collection was done after demobilization, at the community level, by the Government, with support from a regional PKO.

#### **5.4.3 | Registration and profiling: the management information system (MIS)**

Proper registration is key to establishing the nature and size of the target group for a DDR programme. If appropriate, this can be carried out in the absence of demobilization centres by using mobile registration units through a network of DDR offices, with mobile outreach capabilities.

The collection of sex disaggregated personal and socio-economic data (including information on special needs) provides baseline information for the planning, implementation and subsequent monitoring and evaluation of ex-combatants during their reintegration. Data on ex-combatants' profiles needs to be cross referenced with information on reintegration opportunities and services (see section 4.2.5). Given the quantity of data needed to register, design and monitor reintegration programmes a good **management information system (MIS)** is a critical operational requirement.

## ENSURING TRANSPARENCY THROUGH BIOMETRIC REGISTRATION

UNDP in the Democratic Republic of Congo has commenced registration of ex-combatants using advanced biometric technology that recognizes the iris of the eye for instant identification, verification, and traceability. The technology provides for rapid registration in situ and practically eradicates the problem of double counting (whereby individuals will register for the DDR more than once). User-friendly software, specially designed for both DDR and restructuring of the army operations, also allows for the immediate printing of a disarmament identity card with photo, and a collection of a socio-economic profile and military data. Local data operators working for the DRC Government's Commission for DDR, CONADER, have been trained by UNDP and the system is now managed entirely by national counterparts.

The lack of readily available commercial or institutional software packages for this purpose has meant that every DDR programme has had to build its own database and information management system, placing a heavy burden on their financial and human resources during the critical start-up period. The reinvention of this software has often delayed the beginning of project activities in situations where security-related issues do not permit delays. Furthermore, creating a new system for each programme failed to assure that experiences gained from previous programmes were effectively integrated into new MIS systems.

BCPR has developed a generic MIS, which can be tailored for the specific needs of different DDR programmes.<sup>39</sup> This ready-to-use software can easily be adapted to respond to the specific needs of different DDR projects. This should minimize implementation delays and provide savings for future DDR projects. This DDR software is part of a wider package of support that BCPR can offer to country offices (see box below).

## THE BCPR DDR TOOLKIT

BCPR is currently developing the following tools to assist country offices in the implementation of DDR programmes:

- **A DDR and weapons management information system which consists of:**
  - i) an integrated software package for DDR programme management;
  - ii) a weapons registration and stockpile management and destruction package linked to the DDR software to ensure that arms collected through DDR can be verified against stated national stockpiles; and
  - iii) a detailed procedures and training manual.
- **A DDR and SALW roster, to facilitate the identification and rapid deployment of DDR and SALW technical advisers.**
- **An On-line UN DDR Resource Centre is being developed by the UN DDR Working Group to serve as a reference tool for practitioners on all elements of DDR policy and programming (see annex 4.1).<sup>38</sup>**

### 5.4.4 | Resettlement and transitional subsistence support

Demobilization is usually accompanied by the provision of benefits for the ex-combatant and other participants. Commonly, some sort of transitional subsistence support (TSS) is provided for the immediate and basic needs of the combatant and his/her dependents. However, because the material benefits of DDR have often been over-emphasized, DDR has been considered as a *commodity*, and regarded as an entitlement, rather than a process. Cash-based TSS packages have contributed to this misperception.

<sup>38</sup> See [www.unddr.org](http://www.unddr.org) for more details.

<sup>39</sup> The MIS is available through the Small Arms and Demobilization Unit of BCPR.

## THE RISKS OF CASH PAYMENTS

In the early stages of DDR in **Afghanistan**, the ANBP gave a cash payment to ex-soldiers in two instalments of \$100. Commanders in some regions extorted the cash payment from their soldiers, often using violence to get the money. In response, the Afghan Ministry of Defence advised ANBP to suspend the cash payments. ANBP instead directed the payments into the ex-soldiers' reintegration packages through various means, including increasing their weekly stipend or providing extra equipment.

To help ease the transition from military to civilian life, soldiers were given the following transitional support package: a medal of honour, a certificate of honourable discharge for services, a shalwar kameez and a severance package including 126 kilograms of food consisting of wheat, lentils, cooking oil and salt.

When designing DDR programmes, UNDP practitioners should pay special attention to *refocusing and repackaging benefits*, especially those of the transitional phase. The tendency has been to *monetize* the TSS. Although this is meant to provide ex-combatants and their dependents with a means to subsist whilst waiting for reintegration assistance, cash payments have many drawbacks, especially if provided in large instalments. Small payments over a longer period are a more effective way of assuring a peaceful resettlement process. Furthermore, these packages should be linked to work or services performed by the ex-combatant, for their benefit and that of the community. Stop-gap, or quick-impact projects (QIPS) have an important role to play in this, as is discussed in 5.5.1 below.

UNDP practitioners should consider providing TSS which provide ex-combatants, and their dependents, with food, civilian clothing and personal items, household goods, building materials, work tools, agricultural inputs, and some basic services like medical assistance. In addition to the TSS, and in order to address the possible resistance of communities to receive returning ex-combatants, or ward off accusations that combatants are receiving disproportionate benefits, it may be useful to consider issuing a "reintegration voucher" to ex-combatants. This can be given by them to their community of return, for use in locally-devised activities, aimed at enhancing the communities' capacity to receive ex-combatants and to improve local security conditions.

## COMBINING SMALL PAYMENTS, TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

In the **Solomon Islands** a transitional safety-net allowance of \$36.95 per month was offered to 1,114 demobilized Special Constables (former combatants serving in the Police Reserves), for a period of six months. During the transition period, the Special Constables were provided with business start-up training, personal counselling and technical assistance in the formulation of a Micro-Grant Project that amounted to \$425 per Special Constable. Given the significant resources and technical support offered, high participation levels were achieved, and the Special Constables cooperated in their disbandment, thereby reducing criminal activities and decreasing the drain on scarce public resources.

## Transitional Subsistence Support: Basic Principles

<b>It is emergency support</b>	The TSS is primarily an emergency support measure and not a payment for participation in the conflict.
<b>It should not be linked to the handover of weapons</b>	The TSS should not be directly linked to turning in of weapons, so that the monetization of weapons can be avoided.
<b>Equity with other war affected groups should be assured</b>	The nature and size of any benefits paid should be equitable between men and women and with benefits allocated to other groups, such as internally displaced persons (IDP), returnees, affected communities, and commensurate with local economic indicators (e.g. civil service salaries).
<b>Support should be based on a sound assessment of needs and resources</b>	The TSS should be appropriate to the socio-economic context, based on the assessed needs of the ex-combatants and their dependents during the transitional phase. It should also be affordable for the DDR programme. The more money spent on TSS, the less money invested in reintegration support.
<b>Cash payments should be minimized</b>	Direct cash payments should be proportionately the smallest part of any benefit package. Food and other goods and services (tools, seeds, counselling, etc) are generally a better option.
<b>The TSS should be linked to participation in stop-gap-projects</b>	Participation in community-based stop-gap projects for short-term livelihood support should be linked to the receipt of this transitional support package, particularly the cash component.

### 5.4.5 | Information, counselling and referral services<sup>40</sup>

The backbone of any DDR programme should be the information, counselling and referral system, which provides vital briefing and orientation for ex-combatants, preparing them for a return to civilian life. It is essential to start this process during demobilization, but the services should be provided throughout the lifespan of the reintegration component of the programme.

During demobilization, pre-discharge orientation should include information on opportunities and support services available through the reintegration programme, and referral support to help ex-combatants access these opportunities and services. Ex-combatants should also be provided with counselling on their expected change in role and status in society, as well as advice on political and legal issues, accommodation support services, their civic and community responsibilities and on reconciliation initiatives.

Often ex-combatants do not know how to undertake simple activities that are easily understood by their peers, and do not have the confidence to either request assistance or find out for themselves. Making choices is frequently a new experience for ex-combatants, and even for their dependents, as they are used to command structures and collective lifestyles rather than personal decision-making. Appropriate counselling can play a significant part in enabling demobilizing combatants to acquire the confidence, "life-skills", and aptitude required to face everyday problems, challenges and opportunities. Where possible, specialized, confidential counselling should be offered, to avoid peer pressure and promote the independence of each ex-combatant. These services are a crucial way to support ex-combatants and their families during the difficult transition from demobilization to reintegration.

Once settled in the receiving communities, the information, counselling and referral service should continue to be provided, through as wide a network of offices as possible. These services can help ex-combatants clarify any uncertainties about the reintegration process, whilst allowing them to make *informed decisions* about

<sup>40</sup> For more information see also the IDDRS Module 04.40, *Reintegration of Ex-combatants*.

the most appropriate route to reintegration, taking into account their personal circumstances, the potential reintegration opportunities and the various support services they can count on.

Information, counselling and referral services should build upon existing national employment services, which normally fall under the ministry of employment. In countries where these services are weak or non-existent, the reintegration programme should support the initiation or strengthening of these national services. Parallel temporary structures should be avoided whenever possible, as using national structures will ensure sustainability of an essential structure that countries emerging from armed conflict will need in the future for the whole of the civilian population.

Information, Counseling and Referral: Rationale and Services		
	Rationale	Services
<b>Information</b>	To ensure that individual ex-combatants understand the reintegration process and the opportunities available to them. Information will also help to manage ex-combatants' expectations.	Information collected during the pre-registration survey and registration process is cross-referenced with the reintegration opportunities mapping. This should provide information on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• education, training opportunities and services;</li> <li>• job offers and referral to prospective employers; and</li> <li>• other economic reintegration opportunities.</li> </ul> This information, which serves as the basis for future counselling and referral, needs to be kept updated and be easily available to the counsellors.
<b>Counselling</b>	To help ex-combatants identify and extend the range of available opportunities open to them and to assist in a smooth transition from military to civilian life.	Counselling services during demobilization: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• specialized counselling on reintegration options based on each ex-combatants' skills, experience, expectations and opportunities of return.</li> </ul> In resettlement community: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• provision of transitional support services;</li> <li>• access to social services, particularly health and education;</li> <li>• problem-solving assistance;</li> <li>• assistance in developing business plans for micro-enterprise ; and</li> <li>• link between the ex-combatant and the supervisory and monitoring services of the DDR programme.</li> </ul>
<b>Referral</b>	To refer ex-combatants to support services – either within the reintegration programme or externally.	Referral within the DDR Programme to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• health screening and support service;</li> <li>• reintegration assistance grant approval mechanism; and</li> <li>• advisory and monitoring services</li> </ul> External referral to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• social services: health, education, pensions;</li> <li>• job opportunities;</li> <li>• business development services; and</li> <li>• education, training and technical advisory services.</li> </ul>

#### 5.4.6 | Health counselling, HIV/AIDS and psycho-social reintegration support<sup>41</sup>

Demobilization provides an opportunity to brief ex-combatants on key health issues. Military personnel are one of the known high-risk groups for HIV/AIDS, as well as other diseases that spread among those living in close quarters/difficult conditions. The demobilization and reintegration process can therefore contribute to the spread of disease. Conversely, it also provides an excellent opportunity to raise awareness among this key target group. In many cases counselling on substance abuse should also be addressed at this stage. UNDP practitioners are encouraged to work with UNAIDS on this issue.

A further concern is that of mental health: many combatants have been victims or perpetrators of horrendous violence. This may have left deep emotional and psychological scars that may be reflected in depression, apathy or rage. Post-war trauma, especially in combination with substance abuse, is likely to affect the reintegration process and capacity for the non-violent resolution of conflict. Psycho-social reintegration support and counselling is therefore a critical, but often overlooked, component of DDR. UNDP practitioners are encouraged to work with the World Health Organization on these issues.

### 5.5 | Transition from Demobilization to Reintegration

#### 5.5.1 | Use of 'stop-gap' projects

The transition from demobilization to reintegration can be a challenging time for ex-combatants struggling to come to terms with their new identity and role in society. *Stop-gap projects* are short-term interventions that can help ensure a smoother transition from demobilization to reintegration. Stop-gap projects implemented through community-based activities in sensitive and strategic areas, can help reintegrate ex-combatants into the community by creating short-term jobs, whilst they wait to enter longer-term reintegration programmes.

Innovative approaches can enable the incorporation of important issues, including demilitarisation, reconciliation, education and training into public works programmes which can greatly enhance their impact. As with educational programming for former-combatants it is important to incorporate non-combatants and local unemployed into such projects and to *minimize exclusive targeting* wherever possible. However, the use of these projects should not be a substitute for longer-term reintegration and recovery programmes.

#### STOP-GAP PROJECTS IN SIERRA LEONE

A potentially volatile and dangerous situation was averted when thousands of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone were meaningfully employed in short-term projects to rebuild their communities. UNAMSIL's "Stop-Gap Programme" employed some 6,000 ex-combatants as well as 1,500 community members in labour intensive, quick impact community infrastructure and agricultural development projects. These projects were implemented in a sociable environment of communal meals and organized sport. The fact that the former combatants, together with the community, rebuilt infrastructure destroyed during the war had a positive impact. These projects also became the starting point for the creation of several Community-Based Organizations (CBOs).

#### 5.5.2 | Reducing the gap between D, D and R

The best way to avoid falling into the trap of using stop-gap projects so often, and for so long, that they finally become the *de-facto* reintegration mechanism, is to reduce the time between demobilization and

<sup>41</sup> See also IDDRS 05.40 HIV/AIDS and DDR.



reintegration support. This can best be done by starting the profiling of ex-combatants as soon as possible (through pre-registration surveys), and immediately *developing the reintegration opportunities mapping* based on the identified profiles: educational level, previous work experience, expectations, etc.<sup>42</sup> With the reintegration opportunities and services mapping completed, the reintegration support network (information, referral and reintegration counselling services) can be established to accompany the demobilization process and assure the continuity of reintegration support. This will reduce the transitional period between demobilization discharge and the start of reintegration activities, and stop-gap projects can be limited to those that make sense from the perspective of the *community's immediate needs*, such as rebuilding roads and basic services.

## 5.6 | Reintegration<sup>43</sup>

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*“ The reintegration process represents a particularly complex part of the DDR continuum ... If a reintegration process is to succeed, it is essential that it draws upon local input, and that it support a broader national strategic plan for reconciliation, reconstruction and development.”*

THE ROLE OF UN PEACEKEEPING IN DDR, SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 2/2000/101

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The key objective of reintegration is to enhance national and community security and recovery by supporting ex-combatants in their efforts to find a new role in society and the economy, through sustainable, peaceful livelihoods for them and their families. Reintegration opportunities should not be considered as an entitlement for ex-combatants but as an opportunity to facilitate their transition to civilian life.

### 5.6.1 | The linkage to the national reconciliation, recovery and development strategy

Crisis and post-conflict countries (CPCs) are typically characterised by weak economies, rampant unemployment and fledgling institutional capacities. The reintegration of ex-combatants in these contexts should be placed within the overall framework of the enhancement of social sustainability, which should focus on the reintegration of all those affected by exclusion. Such a framework should also (re)create confidence in local authorities and institutions, and facilitate acceptance of ex-combatants by local communities in their receiving areas. It is necessary to recognize that reintegration is a two-way street: communities need to be convinced of the benefits of receiving ex-combatants, and they also need to have the capacity to absorb these individuals without creating perceptions of inequality or economic distortions.

The reintegration of former-combatants should therefore be seen as one component of a wider mosaic of recovery related challenges in post-conflict circumstances and needs to be integrated into a broad strategic framework. This should include other aspects of post-conflict reconstruction such as: political reintegration (reconciliation, human rights and justice); the strengthening of national and local institutions, public safety and security and the early introduction of development perspectives into humanitarian and relief efforts.<sup>44</sup>

### 5.6.2 | Reintegration?

Ex-combatants and their societies have often been significantly transformed by wars, especially where conflict has lasted a long time. In some post-conflict countries, many ex-combatants have no experience, nor memory, of pre-war peaceful patterns of life. *Reintegration* is in some cases a misnomer, as not all ex-combatants

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<sup>42</sup> UNDP has partnered successfully with both IOM and ILO, both in reintegration support mapping and the related services development activities.

<sup>43</sup> See also IDDRS Module 04.40, *Reintegration of Ex-combatants*.

<sup>44</sup> See *The Role of UNDP in Reintegration Programmes*, Evaluation Office, New York, January 2000.

return to their area of origin. Often their limited skills have more relevance and marketable value in other areas, mainly in urban settings (as security guards, mechanics, drivers, and similar combat-derived skills). Villages from which ex-combatants came may no longer exist after a war or, ex-combatants may be associated with groups that have committed atrocities in or near their own communities, and they may not be able to return home. In addition, ex-combatants often lack basic working skills and have no assets and work experience to speak of. Therefore, while other war-affected groups, such as returning refugees and IDPs may far outnumber them, ex-combatants will usually need special support if they are to succeed in their transition from military to civilian life.

In these conditions, socio-economic reintegration is often particularly difficult for female ex-combatants, because of limited economic possibilities, limited rights and access to productive resources, stigma and discrimination and trauma due to gender-based violence. UNDP practitioners should work to ensure that female beneficiaries have a voice in determining the types of opportunities they are awarded, benefit from equal training and employment opportunities and are protected from social marginalization.

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*“ Experience has shown, time and again, that we need to make a decisive effort to reintegrate ex-combatants into society – an effort that recognizes the fundamental human need for dignity and self-respect. This must involve immediate support as soon as ex-combatants give up their arms, and concrete measures to guarantee them secure livelihoods as well as a better future.”*

SECRETARY-GENERAL’S STATEMENT TO THE SUDAN DONORS CONFERENCE, APRIL 2005

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### **5.6.3 | Rebuilding relations with communities and families**

Successful reintegration depends to a considerable extent on the support that the ex-combatants receive from their families and communities. Relations between combatants and other community members are usually anything but “normal”. Former combatants often return to extremely difficult social environments, where they are likely to be perceived as perpetrators and additional burdens on the community, rather than as an asset. Activities specifically targeting ex-combatants, without clear benefits for the rest of the community, can reinforce local animosities.

Societies emerging from conflict usually have few opportunities for income generation and limited absorption capacity within the employment market. In this context, activating local economies through public works programmes that both help to rebuild war damaged infrastructure and create employment is particularly appropriate for ex-combatants, their families and their communities. However, for the many ex-combatants who often lack basic working skills, micro-enterprise will not be a solution in the short term, or before they get training support.

Effective reintegration will also be influenced by the way communities, authorities and ex-combatants can together build a safe environment for all. Developing public works programmes and providing civic education for ex-combatants will not suffice. Conflict prevention and resolution measures, together with confidence building between ex-combatants, communities, local authorities and security forces should be supported in order to help create a more secure environment. Community participation in the DDR process and ex-combatants participation in community-based reintegration activities can also play a key role in the post-conflict transition.

#### 5.6.4 | Context-specific approaches to reintegration

As seen in 4.2.3, the design of a DDR intervention, and in particular the reintegration component, requires an analysis of the political, socio-economic and security context of the specific post-conflict situation. Depending on the nature and type of conflict, the manner of its resolution and the post-conflict pacification needs and priorities, it is possible to identify three main types of reintegration strategies. These strategies are discussed in the table below.

Approach	Rationale	Objective	Characteristics	Activities	Example where applied
<b>Short-term stabilization</b>	Draw ex-combatants away from fighting or criminality until a peace mission is deployed, or security sector or political reform is completed.	Provide <i>rapid</i> transitional support for resettlement and <i>short-term</i> income-generation opportunities to all potentially disruptive ex-combatants.	<i>Low cost</i> per ex-combatant. Only viable when ex-combatants <i>do not</i> represent a long-term security threat.	Information, counselling and referral services. Transitional support schemes (food, clothing, transportation, other) Short-term labour-intensive projects.	Mozambique
<b>Ex-combatant focused reintegration</b>	Provide ex-combatants with tailored, <i>individually-focused</i> , sustainable solutions for long-term reintegration.	Engage ex-combatants in <i>sustainable micro projects</i> to reduce the long-term security risks they present.	Higher cost per ex-combatant. Can create feelings of unfairness within community. To be used when ex-combatants represent a <i>long-term threat to security</i> .	Information, counselling and referral services. Micro project development through grants. Training, technical advisory and related support services.	Niger Solomon Islands Rep. of Congo
<b>Community-based reintegration</b>	Provide <i>communities</i> with tools and capacities to support reintegration of ex-combatants, together with IDPs, refugees, and other vulnerable groups.	Support ex-combatant reintegration as a component of <i>wider, community-focused reconciliation and recovery</i> programmes.	<i>Highest cost</i> per ex-combatant. May not address ex-combatants concerns directly. Addresses needs of community as a whole.	Community projects. Peace-building and reconciliation activities. Local security enhancement activities.	East Timor

The specific context of a DDR intervention in a given country may require a mix of the above reintegration strategies. In Central African Republic, for example, the DDR programme combines an individually-focused reintegration strategy for ex-combatants with an approach which addresses the receiving communities' main priorities, both in terms of enhancing their absorptive capacity and addressing their most pressing security issues, other than the ex-combatants themselves. The merits of each approach are explored in the following sections.

#### 5.6.5 | Short-term stabilization strategies

The 'short-term stabilization' approach calls for a reintegration strategy that does not specifically address long-term sustainability. In this scenario, stop-gap projects combined with an extended Transitional Subsistence Support to cover the resettlement period, are usually seen as a sufficient response. This approach is applicable in scenarios where it can reasonably be assumed that ex-combatants will reintegrate through their own networks, that they already possess the means for their reintegration (social capital, access to land), and/or that they do not represent a threat to peace. This is rarely the case in post-conflict contexts.

### 5.6.6 | Ex-combatants focused reintegration strategies

The second type of reintegration strategy, which focuses on the needs of ex-combatants, is characterised by the need to develop *individually focused long-term reintegration solutions*. This approach is most applicable when ex-combatants are perceived to be a continuing threat to long-term security, and therefore their sustainable reintegration is key to enhanced security and consolidation of the peace process. In these circumstances, the requisite mix of the following reintegration tools should be applied:

- **Promoting employment in existing enterprises.** In terms of long-term sustainability, the promotion of employment opportunities in existing enterprises should be the preferred option for ex-combatant reintegration programmes, as the risk of failure is lower than with the start-up of a new micro enterprise. This can be done through *wage, training and equipment subsidies*, given by the DDR programme. These subsidies should be subject to the following conditions:
  - i) wage subsidies should be partial and limited in duration;
  - ii) newly hired ex-combatants should not displace existing labour; and
  - iii) the employer should demonstrate a willingness to use the DDR programme to expand the business which will assure the ultimate sustainability of the ex-combatant's placement.
- **Promotion of micro and small business start-ups.** In many post-conflict situations there are very few functioning enterprises with the capacity, and/or willingness, to engage in rapid workforce expansion. Therefore, while the recovery and expansion of the private sector should be promoted, it is often necessary to focus on *new micro enterprise creation* for most ex-combatants. The development of micro enterprise start-up business plans should be undertaken by ex-combatants with the guidance and support of the DDR programme team, as outlined in section 5.4.5 *Information, counselling and referral services*.

Programme managers should place emphasis on providing *tailored support* to ex-combatants and their families, wherever possible, to prevent commanders from extorting a proportion of their previous group members' reintegration assistance. Tailored support also equips ex-combatants with the capacity to decide for themselves and to act alone, thereby breaking their dependence on the group structure. Tailored support does not mean that reintegration projects cannot involve more than one ex-combatant, but they should each make the decision to participate in the micro-enterprise individually, without undue outside pressure. Recent evaluations have shown that the bigger the group the lower the ratio of success in income-generating project sustainability, which is due to the increased management requirements of multi-member projects.

- **The provision of micro-grants or credits.**<sup>45</sup> The main tool for funding the creation of these micro-enterprises should be micro-credits or grants which, as recent experience indicates, should be disbursed to the ex-combatants only on the basis of a clearly established start-up business plan, and should be paid in instalments.<sup>46</sup> The instalments should, as much as possible, be given in-kind, avoiding large cash payments, which have a high risk of being misused and are difficult to monitor effectively. Training and technical assistance services are crucial to the success of the start-up, together with direct, on-the-ground, supervision and monitoring by the DDR Programme.

Credits, rather than grants, have regularly been used in reintegration programmes. However, these programmes have rarely been successful, mainly because ex-combatants are one of the least able groups of society to take on the obligations of credit schemes, especially in the early phases of their reintegration. Grants are therefore a more appropriate instrument and microfinance programmes for ex-combatants should be discouraged. Offering 'credit' to individuals that cannot repay or through

<sup>45</sup> Although microfinance can be successfully launched in post-conflict environments, ex-combatants should not be the focus of these programmes. For guidance on when to use grants versus loans/credit, see for example, *Recapitalising Liberia: principles for providing grants and loans for microenterprise development*, Forced Migration, May 2004, online at <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR20/FMR2006.pdf>

<sup>46</sup> See for example UNDP programmes in Niger, Republic of Congo and the Solomon Islands.

institutions that do not have the capacity to ensure repayment can undermine the local credit culture and hence the sustainability of other financial institutions if the population comes to see credit as something that does not have to be repaid.

Offering grants to ex-combatants in a wider recovery environment which offers micro-credit to other groups may be seen as problematic. UNDP practitioners should therefore work to ensure equity between the benefits received by ex-combatants and other target groups. Offering special treatment to ex-combatants may trigger resentment among other groups who may view exclusive benefits to ex-combatants as an unjustified reward to the perpetrators of conflict. To address concerns regarding relative equity between ex-combatants and other target groups, *one-time* grants may be considered for these groups as well.

However, UNDP practitioners should also be guided by the overarching principle of *balancing equity with security*. While adherence to the principle of equity will increase the chances of reconciliation and sustainable reintegration, the security situation often dictates that, in the short term at least, a specific focus on ex-combatants is required in order to assure enhanced security. The key issue in these cases is to ensure that the receiving communities are adequately *consulted and understand and accept* that targeted support to ex-combatants will enhance their own security. In this sense, reintegration support for ex-combatants must not be considered as an *entitlement* for ex-combatants, but rather as an *investment* in security for the population at large.<sup>47</sup>

- **Training as a reintegration tool.** Training should generally be regarded as a tool for reintegration and not as reintegration itself. DDR programmes often send ex-combatants on training courses, and assume that they will be reintegrated upon completion of the course. In the majority of cases, this does not happen, and the resulting frustration can lead to heightened security risks, thereby undermining the objective of the DDR programme. Ex-combatants are often provided with a menu of training courses at the time of initial registration and asked to make their choices with limited advice and no opportunity to consult their families or peers. These choices may have no bearing on the demands of the economy, the probability of sustainable employment, or the capacity of the ex-combatants and/or their family members to effectively benefit from the training that is provided.

The socio-economic profiling of the ex-combatants should first be correlated with the reintegration opportunities mapping (see 4.2.5) so that sustainable individual reintegration options can be accurately identified and evaluated, and the required financial, training and technical advisory services can be developed to support them.

- **Technical advice, monitoring and supervision.** Initial training should be short, as the learning process will be more effective and efficient if carried out on-the-job, and as challenges arise. The DDR programme should provide ongoing technical advice as well as monitoring and supervisory services to each micro project. *Advice, monitoring and supervision* will help to keep ex-combatants on track and assures the necessary flexibility to adapt original business plans to the changing context of individual micro enterprises. These factors are key to ensuring the survival and success of micro projects.
- **Public sector job creation** to support reintegration is frequently a political expedient forced on governments when reintegration programmes fail to provide sustainable employment options for former-combatants. Whilst incorporation of ex-combatants into public service may be a significant aspect of overall reconciliation and political integration strategies, it can only be sustainable when economic circumstances allow for expansion of public services, and as such should be addressed within overall economic development frameworks.
- **Education and scholarships.** Young ex-combatants, especially those under 15, should be reintegrated into formal education. Other ex-combatants who have initiated their tertiary education, can be offered scholarships to finish their studies. Youth should have priority in these cases. In some

<sup>47</sup> See also IDDRS Module 04.40, *Reintegration of Ex-combatants*

countries where the conflict has lasted a long time and combatants have received little or no schooling, emphasis should be placed on “catch-up” education to ensure that this group is not trapped into life-long poverty.<sup>48</sup>

### 5.6.7 | Community-based reintegration

The third approach to reintegration links the disarmament and demobilization directly into a wider, community-based recovery strategy, and ex-combatants are not specifically targeted for livelihood support.<sup>49</sup> This approach is most appropriate where ex-combatants do not represent a security threat to their communities, or at least, no more than other war-affected groups, as in a war of national defence or liberation. The most common example of this approach is *Area Based Development (ABD)*.<sup>50</sup> ABD addresses overall social and economic recovery whilst also facilitating reintegration. The common features of ABD programmes are:

- They are based on well-defined *geographical areas* and attend to the needs of the *overall population* in need rather than pre-defined categories of target beneficiaries;
- They are genuinely *participatory* and are driven by beneficiaries' needs and demands;
- They are largely managed by *local* institutions and organizations and under systems which are decentralized without sacrificing accountability; and
- They require high levels of *inter-agency cooperation*.<sup>51</sup>

The geographical areas are selected on the basis of (i) the high density of war affected populations; (ii) the need for rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure (roads, bridges, schools, health posts, water sources); (iii) the need for initiating peace maintenance activities; and (iv) discussions with the parties to the conflict, government, United Nations agencies and other important partners.<sup>52</sup> ABD programming has become “almost a UNDP trademark” as the multi-sectoral response to post-conflict economic and social rehabilitation, and is widely regarded as providing an effective form of support to reintegration of war-affected communities.<sup>53</sup>

There have been many circumstances where addressing the reintegration of ex-combatants within the overall framework of recovery has led to favourable results. The main drawback of ABD programming in relation to DDR concerns the dangers of *geographical targeting* leading to the exclusion and marginalization of certain armed groups who fall outside the areas targeted by the ABD programme.<sup>54</sup> Thus the application of ABD programming to DDR requires that special attention be paid to geographical and political coverage. Furthermore, by not targeting the ex-combatants specifically, in countries where they represent a real and immediate security risk, ABD can fail to address the security objective of DDR programmes. In addition, any attempt at ABD programming must also address the issue of resource mobilization upfront because the resources needed for this type of reintegration of ex-combatants are significantly higher than with more targeted approaches.

<sup>48</sup> See also IDDRS 05.20, *Children and DDR* and IDDRS 05.30 *Youth and DDR*.

<sup>49</sup> Other specific support services may still be warranted, especially in terms of mental and physical health services.

<sup>50</sup> ABD initially achieved prominence in UN integrated missions in Central America and subsequently formed the centrepiece of reintegration programmes aimed at war-affected populations in Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, Eritrea, Guatemala, Mozambique, Philippines, Somalia and Tajikistan among others.

<sup>51</sup> *An Overview of Area-Based Development Programmes*, UNDP/BCPR, Geneva, 2002, p 4. This *Overview* contains a useful review and summary of the experience of ABD programming.

<sup>52</sup> *The Role of UNDP in Reintegration Programmes*, Evaluation Office, New York, January 2000, p 20.

<sup>53</sup> *The Role of UNDP in Reintegration Programmes*, Evaluation Office, New York, January 2000, p 20. UNOPS (RESS) has mentored the development of this approach and adapted it to over 25 post-conflict situations.

<sup>54</sup> One example of such exclusion can be found in the UNOPS executed Somali Rehabilitation Programme (SRP) in which the entire eastern sector of Somaliland was effectively excluded from the programme, reinforcing existing political and security tensions by failing to provide a reintegration framework for a DDR programme which did operate in the eastern regions.



# 6

## Linking DDR to wider peace consolidation and recovery<sup>55</sup>

Reintegration should be viewed as only one component of a *wider recovery strategy* that includes many other aspects of post-conflict rehabilitation. In order to ensure the security of both ex-combatants and their communities, DDR should take place *alongside* other post-conflict peace and security consolidation measures, and be *integrated* into wider recovery and development support interventions, such as:

- Addressing human rights violations;
- Restructuring and reform of the security forces;
- Enhancing public security by building the capacity and accountability of civil police;
- Enhancing political and civil security by supporting elections, an independent judiciary and strengthening the rule of law;
- Addressing the needs of vulnerable populations, such as IDPs, returnees and other direct victims of the conflict;
- Promoting peace and reconciliation initiatives at both the national and local levels;
- Promoting good governance through greater accountability of public institutions and the strengthening of civil society; and
- Developing economic security through transparent access to land, credit and trade.

### 6.1 | Addressing human rights violations

Conflict can provide the pretext for gross human rights violations. Confidence in the justice system and perceptions of security can be affected by how past and ongoing human rights violations are dealt with. The establishment of amnesties and transitional justice programmes, as part of the broader peace building process, help parties attempt to deal with crimes and violations perpetrated during the conflict. They can promote reconciliation, drawing a line between the past period of conflict and a more peaceful future. Transitional justice processes vary widely and will reflect historical specificities and root causes of conflicts. These processes seek justice and truth through national reconciliation and may include amnesty provisions for those involved in political and armed struggle. Generally, truth commissions are temporary fact-finding bodies that investigate human rights abuses within a certain period and present findings and recommenda-

<sup>55</sup> See also IDDRS 02.20, *Stabilization, Peacebuilding and Recovery Frameworks*.

tions to the government. Some truth commissions include a reconciliation component to support dialogue between factions within the community.

During the negotiation of peace accords and political agreements, parties may condition their involvement in DDR programmes on the provision of amnesties for weapons possession or less serious crimes. These amnesties will generally seek to absolve participants in the conduct of political and armed struggle to be free from prosecution. While amnesties may be agreed for violations of national law, the United Nations is bound to uphold the principles of international law and thus UNDP practitioners will not be in a position to support DDR processes that do not comply with these principles. The United Nations does not support amnesty for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.<sup>56</sup> However, the United Nations system is able to support the establishment of transitional justice processes to address such violations and seek to ensure proper links with DDR and the broader security sector reform process.<sup>57</sup>

## 6.2 | Linkage to security sector reform

DDR and security sector reform programmes are often linked. The sequencing and linkages of DDR and SSR will depend on the particular circumstances of each country. Some elements of SSR may only start after the demobilization of ex-combatants has been completed. In other cases, demobilization may be the result of decisions taken during reform of the security sector. Both efforts need to be timed carefully in order to complement each other. Key SSR decisions can impact on DDR, for example the size of the new army and other security forces or the extent of new recruitment, both of which may determine the number of ex-combatants that will participate in a DDR process. UNDP practitioners should give particular attention to the recruitment of ex-combatants into the national security forces. In some cases, decisions on eligibility criteria for recruitment into the armed forces as part of security sector reform may have a defining influence on eligibility criteria for DDR beneficiaries.

Other key elements of SSR that should be coordinated with the DDR process include:

- SALW stockpile management, control and/or destruction;
- police training and reform, particularly through community policing; and
- the development of democratic oversight mechanisms for the reformed security forces.

## 6.3 | Political reform, good governance and the strengthening of civil society

In post-conflict situations, *political reform* is usually a critical part of effective reconciliation, the advancement towards good governance and the return to peace and stability. One of the key elements of these processes and a particular focus of UNDP's work in this field is the *strengthening of civil society*. The DDR process must be explicitly linked at the very least in strategic terms, but also usually in programmatic terms, to the initiatives that are undertaken in these areas.

<sup>56</sup>See The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 3 August 2004, S/2004/616.

<sup>57</sup>See IDDRS 03.40, *National Institutions for DDR*.



## 6.4 | IDPs, returnees and conflict affected groups

As indicated above, DDR is undertaken primarily as a security-enhancement intervention, in order to allow for post-conflict recovery and development to take root. In this sense, DDR *supports but does not substitute* recovery interventions addressed specifically at vulnerable groups like IDPs, returnees and conflict-affected groups. However, it is both possible and desirable to design DDR programmes in such a way as to maximize support to other conflict affected groups.

All DDR interventions have components that are potentially positive for other vulnerable groups. For instance, setting up training or health centres for ex-combatant services usually requires upgrading the basic infrastructure, which, if well planned through adequate consultation with the communities and in coordination with local and national authorities, can directly benefit other vulnerable groups. The level of sustainability of ex-combatant reintegration is directly linked to contextual factors such as public security, access and communications, basic social services and the local and national economic environment. *Within the funding constraints of the DDR programme*, and being careful to avoid under-investing in the central objective of ex-combatant reintegration, these key contextual factors can, and should, be addressed, through participatory planning processes that define priorities from the local perspective, and draw from local experience and resources in the design and planning of specific activities.

## 6.5 | Promoting peace and reconciliation

Civilian resentment at the special treatment of ex-combatants can become an impediment to successful and lasting reintegration. A key objective of the DDR programme must therefore be to ensure that all stakeholders understand that DDR is not about rewarding ex-combatants (except in the very specific case of wars of liberation, where ex-combatants are perceived as heroes), but rather about protecting the civilian population from further insecurity and abuse. As outlined in section 4.3, ensuring local and national ownership of the DDR process can help allay fears by creating a clear understanding of the aim of DDR.

Beyond this central issue, there may well be a need for specific interventions, at the national and local level, regarding dispute resolution mechanisms, access to justice, and reconciliation efforts that need to happen in parallel to DDR. As civil society and women's groups are often heavily engaged in reconciliation and reintegration activities prior to a UN intervention, these issues will require a participatory planning process to define priorities and allocate scarce resources within the limited scope of what the DDR programme can do, while assuring clear linkages to parallel efforts.

### PEACEBUILDING IN SIERRA LEONE

**In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, UNV and UNDP set up a national UN Volunteer scheme focusing on community peace building initiatives. 10 National UN Volunteers worked to identify and support micro-projects in all regions of the country, targeting youth and youth leaders, cultural and sports activities, peace camps, etc. These projects were able to bring divided communities together around common values and interests.**

## 6.6 | Land access and other key economic security issues

Disputes over land and access to water or mineral resources are among the *root causes* of many conflicts. Regardless of the political compromises with which these conflicts are settled, DDR programmes must take these underlying conflicts into consideration when planning for the process, especially with regards to ex-combatant reintegration. Where land and property rights are often restricted for women and girls, UNDP reintegration interventions should take this factor into account. However, it cannot be the task of DDR programmes to advance land reform, for example, or mineral rights. These are national policy issues with consequences for all segments of society, and will therefore require specific political and socio-economic reform processes to address them. UNDP DDR practitioners must be aware of the issues, and refrain from making things worse through their interventions. DDR programmes should also be responsive to ongoing reform processes.



# 7

## Exit Strategy

It is necessary to clearly define, from the start, a *DDR exit strategy*. This strategy should address the time and resource limits of each phase of the process, and the specific modalities for winding down and closing the programme or, transferring certain capacities, such as the information, counselling and referral services, to established public and/or private institutions. In the latter case, a *capacity development component* should be included in programme design, to assure a smooth transition process. Capacity development should focus on discreet activities that are relevant to *other* target groups within the context of socio-economic recovery and development, not within a DDR context. *Ideally, DDR should be a one-time intervention, done correctly the first time, and never to be repeated again.* Otherwise, no matter what safe-guards are put in place, DDR can become an incentive for people to participate in future conflicts.



# 8

## DDR: A checklist

When embarking on a DDR programme, it is recommended that UNDP practitioners revisit the checklist below which summarises the lessons learned and guidance outlined in this Practice Note.

<b>Goal</b>	Ensure that the programme is designed to contribute to security, in order to foster the conditions for recovery and development.
<b>Framework</b>	Where possible, include provisions for DDR in the peace agreement.
<b>Inclusion</b>	Support participatory planning and priority setting by all parties to the conflict and the stakeholders in the peace process.
<b>National ownership</b>	Promote national ownership, and as much national implementation as possible.
<b>National commissions</b>	Support the early establishment of National Commission(s), with clear targets, criteria and procedures, and buy-in from all actors.
<b>Partnerships</b>	Ensure inter-agency collaboration from the outset.
<b>UN Roles</b>	In a PKO context, follow ECHA guidelines and the Integrated DDR Standards.
<b>Context</b>	Clarify the context, objectives and expected results of the proposed DDR intervention and assess pre-conditions for UNDP participation.
<b>Assessments</b>	Conduct conflict and security assessments and pre-registration surveys of potential participants before designing the programme.
<b>Mapping</b>	Carry out a detailed reintegration opportunities and services mapping.
<b>Linkage</b>	Ensure that DDR is linked to security sector reform and is regarded as part of the wider recovery framework.
<b>Integration</b>	Ensure that the DDR programme is incorporated into the MYFF, CCA and UNDAF and the overall UN country support framework.
<b>Monitoring</b>	Include monitoring, evaluation and impact indicators in programme design.

<b>Funding</b>	Work towards securing full funding early on in the programme, and budget for sustainable reintegration programmes.
<b>Participants</b>	Develop clear, unambiguous criteria for entry into the DDR programme.
<b>Special groups</b>	Pay special attention to children associated with fighting forces, women combatants, supporters and dependents throughout the DDR programme.
<b>Disarmament incentives</b>	Implement incentive mechanisms for disarmament, by linking voluntary disarmament to reintegration benefits.
<b>Receiving communities</b>	Ensure early linkage between the DDR programme and assistance to receiving communities;
<b>Cantonment</b>	Assess whether cantonment is necessary or desirable.
<b>Transition</b>	Undertake disarmament and demobilization as quickly as possible, include a community support dimension in the TSS, and use stop-gap measures to ensure a smooth transition to reintegration support.
<b>Reintegration</b>	Plan for reintegration at the outset and launch the programme as quickly as possible. Involve both the ex-combatants' family and the wider community in the planning and implementation of reintegration interventions.
<b>Exit strategy</b>	Define a clear exit strategy from the beginning of the DDR intervention.

## 1. Key Documents

### 1.1 | UN documents

The following UN DDR related documents have direct relevance to this Practice Note:

- *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)*, Inter-agency DDR Working Group, available via [www.unddr.org](http://www.unddr.org) from February 2006.
- *The Role of the United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. S/200/101. 11 February 1999
- *Role of UNDP in Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations*, Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme, (DP/2001/4), 15:34.
- *The causes of conflict and the promotion of peace and sustainable development in Africa*. Report of the UN Secretary-General. A/52/871 – S/1998/3/18. (1998)
- *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment*, Lessons Learned Unit of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (1999)
- *Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of the Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants*, Paper prepared by the ECHA Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. New York: UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs. 2000
- Background paper *Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of the Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants*. Drafted as Preparation for the ECHA DDR Working Group Paper. 2000
- *Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, UNIFEM, October 2004. <http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/ddr/gettingitright.pdf>.
- *SEESAC Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards (RMDS)*, October 2003. This web-based resource was developed by the joint UNDP/Stability Pact programme, the South Eastern European Clearing House on Small Arms (SEESAC). It provides standards and guidelines on a wide range on weapons management issues. [http://www.seesac.org/resources/rmds\\_dev.htm](http://www.seesac.org/resources/rmds_dev.htm).

### 1.2 | Non-UN documents

An extensive list of non-UN documents will be available via [www.unddr.org](http://www.unddr.org) from February 2006 (see 4.1 below). The following are seen as particularly useful.

- *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*. Colin Gleichmann, Michael Odenwalt, Kees Steenken, Adrian Wilkinson, 2004. This book provides a comprehensive overview of all DDR operations and is designed as a training aid for middle and upper level management staff in specialized organizations that are involved in DDR programmes. It is not an academic book on peacekeeping operations, DDR or development projects. It brings together significant know-how from different professional fields and covers all the components of DDR. It explains solutions to many common problems in DDR programmes.
- *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration*, Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), April 2002.
- *Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Post-war and Transition Countries—Trends and Challenges of External Support*. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). 2001

- *Position Paper: Linkages between Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants and Security Sector Reform*. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) October 2003.
- *Recapitalising Liberia: Principles for Providing Grants and Loans for Microenterprise Development* Forced Migration, May 2004, online at <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR20/FMR2006.pdf>
- Supporting Microfinance in Conflict Affected Areas, CGAP Donor Brief, December 2004

The websites of the following NGOs working on DDR are also recommended: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.

## 2. Resource persons

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### 2.1 | BCPR

The following personnel are the BCPR Cluster Heads and provide the focal points for DDR-related issues:

- **Small Arms and Demobilization Unit:**  
Peter Batchelor, [peter.batchelor@undp.org](mailto:peter.batchelor@undp.org)
- **Transition Recovery Unit:**  
Anne-Marie Cluckers, [anne.marie.cluckers@undp.org](mailto:anne.marie.cluckers@undp.org)
- **Strategic Planning Unit, including peace-building and JSSR:**  
Sam Barnes, [sam.barnes@undp.org](mailto:sam.barnes@undp.org)
- **Mine Action Unit:**  
Sayed Aqa: [sayed.aqa@undp.org](mailto:sayed.aqa@undp.org)
- **Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Unit:**  
Andrew Maskrey, [andrew.maskrey@undp.org](mailto:andrew.maskrey@undp.org)
- **Operations Support Unit:**  
Thomas Ole-Kuyan, [thomas.ole-kuyan@undp.org](mailto:thomas.ole-kuyan@undp.org)

### 2.2 | DDR advisers

DDR technical advisers (based in SADU and TRU, BCPR) are important resources. UNDP BCPR maintains an integrated roster of consultants that can be drawn upon as required. The roster provides a list of vetted consultants that can be used in DDR initiation and implementation. See <http://www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/roster.htm>.

## 3. Partner agencies

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Since early 2005, 14 departments and agencies have come together to form the UN DDR Working Group. The working group aims to improve the Organizations' performance in the area of DDR by strengthening coordination, developing Integrated DDR Standards and providing training and guidance to UN policy makers and programmes. The agencies of the UNDDR Working Group are: ILO, IOM, UNDDA, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNDP, UNDPKO, UNDPPI, UNDPPIA, UNIDIR, WFP and WHO. More information on partner agencies can be found at [www.unDDR.org](http://www.unDDR.org).

In the field, UNDP also works closely with UNV. UN Volunteers play a key role in implementing a range of DDR related activities in both peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping operations.



## 4. Web resources

### 4.1 | UN Resource Centre on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration –[www.unddr.org](http://www.unddr.org)

The UN Resource Centre on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration provides comprehensive, up-to-date information on DDR for practitioners at Headquarters and in the field. It contains general facts and current information on DDR programmes and activities conducted by UN agencies and departments across the globe and will house the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS). In addition, the Resource Centre provides access to reports and evaluations of DDR experiences, current DDR news and events listings, profiles of DDR-relevant UN agencies and external partners, and information on DDR funding and resource mobilization.

The Resource Centre's extensive bibliography covers the following main categories and gives access to full text whenever possible:

- **Policy and Guidelines:** Includes the IDDRS and other basic policy documents of the UN and its sub-agencies on DDR.
- **Analysis (General/Theory, Case Studies):** Includes general and theoretical documents on DDR and case studies reflecting the concrete experiences of DDR programmes.
- **Topics:** Includes reports on topics of special or current interest in the area of DDR, such as children, gender, HIV/AIDS, and trauma.

The UN DDR Resource Centre will be publicly launched with the IDDRS in early 2006. UNDP practitioners may have access to the website prior to the launch upon request to BCPR.

### 4.2 | UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Practice Network

The Crisis Prevention and Recovery Practice Network (CPRP Net) facilitates knowledge sharing and capability building throughout UNDP by compiling comparative experiences and lessons learned, conducting expert referrals, and sharing news on crisis prevention and recovery issues. To subscribe to the network, please contact the Knowledge Network Facilitator, Gita Swamy, at [gita.swamy@undp.org](mailto:gita.swamy@undp.org). If you have a query or you want to share a good practice related to DDR within the organization, post it on the Practice Network. The link to the workspace is <http://intra.undp.org/bcpr/workspaces/cpr/index.htm>.

### 4.3 | UNDP portal on intranet

The UNDP Intranet provides substantial information on DDR-related donors, UN and other agencies, Thematic Trust Fund details and general information on DDR and related programmes and activities. The intranet can be accessed at <http://intra.undp.org/index.shtml>.

### 4.4 | Other UNDP Practice Notes

In addition to this Practice Note, other UNDP Practice Notes are available at [www.undp.org/policy/practicenotes.htm](http://www.undp.org/policy/practicenotes.htm)

## 5. Other resources

### 5.1 | UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPRTTF)

The CPR TTF provides UNDP with resources that can be used for immediate crisis response as well as for strategic investment into prevention and recovery programmes. TTFs encourage donors to contribute resources for a practice area of the organization, for specific service lines of the practice, regions, countries, or any combination thereof. As such, the TTF complements the TRAC 1.1.3 core funds. All projects funded by the TTF must directly relate to one of the Service Lines of the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. They are:

- **Service Line 1:** Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
- **Service Line 2:** Recovery
- **Service Line 3:** Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice
- **Service Line 4:** Small Arms Reduction, Disarmament and Demobilization
- **Service Line 5:** Mine Action
- **Service Line 6:** Natural Disaster Reduction
- **Service Line 7:** Special Initiatives for Countries in Transition

Criteria considered during the project appraisal process include strategic goals linked to the Service Lines, partnership frameworks with humanitarian and development agencies, absorption capacity at the country level, integration of TTF funded programmes into the larger UNDP country portfolio, and use of BCPR's technical expertise in response to specific peace-building and transition opportunities. In addition to applying for TTF resources, Country Offices can mobilize additional resources through the TTF Country Window for which the Associate Administrator has delegated signatory authority and Trust Fund management responsibilities to Resident Representatives. Country Offices in need of additional resources for crisis-related programmes under the above service lines can contact the relevant thematic expert in BCPR.

### 5.2 | Gender resources

- UNIFEM Gender and DDR Checklist: at <http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/ddr/ddr.htm>
- UNIFEM, 'Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration' at <http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/ddr/gettingitright.pdf>
- Women Waging Peace, Policy Commission Studies on Women in DDR in Sierra Leone and El Salvador at [www.womenwagingpeace.net](http://www.womenwagingpeace.net)
- 'Where are the Girls?': Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique, Rights and Democracy [www.ichrdd.ca](http://www.ichrdd.ca)
- 'From Child Soldier to Ex-Fighter' Female Fighters, Demobilization and Reintegration in Ethiopia, Institute for Security Studies
- 'Gendering and Demilitarization as a Peace Building Tool', Bonn International Center for Conversion, Dr. Vanessa Farr, at <http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper20/paper20.pdf>
- Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children, 'Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Gender-Based Violence in Sierra Leone' at [http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/sl\\_ddr03.pdf](http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/sl_ddr03.pdf)
- 'Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs', Nathalie de Watteville, World Bank Africa Region Working Papers Series, at [http://www.mdrp.org/ddr\\_docs.htm](http://www.mdrp.org/ddr_docs.htm)
- UNDDA, 'Gender Perspectives on Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration' at <http://disarmament2.un.org/gender/note4.htm>
- DPKO Gender Resource Package, August 2004, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/>
- Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, at [http://www.un.org/events/res\\_1](http://www.un.org/events/res_1)





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