Sixty-second session
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Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. By resolution 61/72 of 6 December 2006 on “Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus”, the General Assembly appealed to all interested States to determine the size and nature of their surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, whether they represent a security risk, if appropriate, their means of destruction and whether external assistance was needed to eliminate the risk. Furthermore, it encouraged States in a position to do so to assist interested States within a bilateral framework or through international or regional organizations, on a voluntary and transparent basis, in elaborating and implementing programmes to eliminate surplus stockpiles or to improve their management. The Assembly also encouraged all Member States to examine the possibility of developing and implementing, within a national, regional or subregional framework, measures to address accordingly the illicit trafficking related to the accumulation of such stockpiles. Finally, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States regarding the risks arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus and regarding national ways of strengthening controls on conventional ammunition and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session.

2. In the same resolution the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts to consider, commencing no later than 2008, further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, and to transmit the report of the group of experts to the General Assembly for consideration at its sixty-third session.

3. Pursuant to the request referred to in paragraph 1 above, on 30 January 2007, the Office for Disarmament Affairs sent a note verbale to Member States requesting their views on the subject. To date, replies have been received from the following States: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nicaragua, Portugal, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Spain and Turkey. Also, in its capacity as European Council Presidency, Germany submitted the views of the European Union. The replies are reproduced in section II below. The full texts of the replies received will be posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, at http://disarmament.un.org/cab/Ammunition.htm. Additional replies received will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Member States

Bangladesh

[Original: English]
[31 May 2007]

“1. Member States may identify and declare any stockpile of ammunition as ‘surplus’, if:

a. It is an addition to the Member State’s security needs;

b. It is unmanageable in respect of Member State’s ability of safe custody; and
c. It involves safety and security risks to humankind and environment.

2. **Risks arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus**: Surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, if inadequately manned, pose potentially significant security and safety risks. The importance of those are as follows:

   a. The population and environment close to ammunition depots are at risk by such stockpiles.

   b. Scattered stockpiles in the aftermath of war remain vulnerable, and pilferage from these stockpiles especially to terrorists and other criminal groups cannot be ruled out.

   c. Stockpiles of ammunition that are stored in exposed places and with inappropriately equipped storage facilities may result in greater risk to communities.

   d. Surplus stockpiles may jeopardize the security of the neighbouring countries thereby destabilize international peace. They also cause the risk of explosion, pollution, and diversion.

3. **National ways of strengthening control on conventional ammunition**: Some ways of strengthening control on conventional ammunition at the national level are as follows:

   a. Member States should recognize that proper national control over their stockpiles of conventional ammunition is essential in order to prevent loss.

   b. Member States should ensure physical security of ammunition in order to reduce the risks of pilferage, unwanted and uncontrolled proliferation.

   c. If a Member State declares presence of surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition, it should intimate or notify the United Nations Standing Committee as well as its neighbours.

   d. Member States should agree on ‘minimum standard’ on preservation and safety regulations of conventional ammunition, and should ensure that their own stockpiles are subjected to proper national inventory accounting control procedures and measures.

   e. Member States should ensure proper destruction of surplus stockpiles in an environment friendly manner through national monitoring system. Member States may seek technical and financial assistance of the United Nations Standing Committee in this regard.

   f. Member States should provide accountability of ‘surplus’ stockpiles of conventional ammunition through a ‘United Nations Register for Stockpiled Conventional Ammunition’.

   g. Member States should undertake capacity-building programmes of national institutions to continue longer-term, safe, efficient and effective destruction of ‘surplus’ ammunition.

   h. Member States in a position to do so should assist interested Member States to determine the risks related with their surplus stock and to develop trained manpower to deal with the surplus stock of ammunition.”
Bolivia

[Original: Spanish]
[9 July 2007]

1. The production, import, reloading and general supply of all types and calibres of conventional ammunition, whether for the armed forces, the police, institutions or individuals, are very limited.

2. In the case of the armed forces, resources must be permanently managed to ensure at least that usual needs are met.

3. Supplies of sporting and hunting calibre ammunition come from imports and reloading, with permanent controls on trade and storage.

4. As Bolivia has no surplus stockpiles, there is no risk connected with the storage of conventional ammunition.

5. The absence of surplus stockpiles means there are no elimination programmes, so there is no opportunity to assist other States in this regard.

6. Bolivia’s current situation means that the issue of illicit trafficking related to the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus must be addressed domestically before regional or subregional proposals are made. Accordingly, it favours adoption of the appropriate measures in the Regulations on the Weapons Act, which are close to being approved.

7. The risks attached to accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus should be viewed more from the standpoint of diversion to illicit trafficking than from the standpoint of explosion or pollution.

8. As the ultimate world voice, the United Nations is the best forum for dealing with the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus.

The General Assembly requested the establishment of a group of governmental experts to consider, commencing no later than 2008, further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, and the consideration of the experts’ report at its sixty-third session. The deadline for the establishment of the group of experts is prudent and sufficient, and Bolivia hopes to have specific legislation in place by that time.

Bolivia suggests proceeding with the inclusion of the issue in the provisional agenda of the sixty-third session.

Conclusions

A. Bolivia is not exempt from the risks of accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus. At the national level, the risk may be associated with the diversion of the armed forces’ reserve supplies.

At the regional and subregional levels, this phenomenon is a threat to security, as Bolivia is aware of accumulations of surpluses in many neighbouring States. Mainly because of its geographical location, Bolivia could become a point of transit and consumption for illicit trafficking in those surpluses.
B. The issue must be addressed immediately, considering that Bolivia was one of the States which voted in favour of resolution 61/72 on 6 December 2006 and has planned the Regulations on the Weapons Act accordingly.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

[Original: English]
[30 April 2007]

At the moment, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina use 23 locations for keeping and storing ammunition and explosives. A total of approximately 35,000 tons of ammunition and explosive ordnance is stockpiled. The estimation is that approximately 25,000 tons of ammunition and explosive ordnance is surplus to the requirements of the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In view of the fact that the total number of military personnel was reduced by an additional 10,000 members in the last reform, the safeguarding of storage facilities by the armed service, which in reality is the sole security method used, poses a big security problem (facilities lack any additional protection systems like electronic equipment, video surveillance, etc.).

Only five perspective locations for ammunition storage have been determined by the Presidency Decision on the Strength, Structure and Locations of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to reduce the number of storage locations to the number determined by the Presidency Decision, measures must be taken to dispose of surplus Armed Forces ammunition and explosives as soon as possible.

Keeping in mind the fact that the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted documents concerning equipping the Armed Forces with basic weapons systems and military equipment, as well as training, the path is open for comprehensive plans to be designed for the future disposal of surplus weapons and ammunition.

The dynamics of designing the disposal plans will depend on solving the issue of the transfer of property ownership from entities to the State. Respecting the current situation and the priorities defined for the surplus weapons disposal process (first of all ammunition and explosives), we decided to make a disposal plan exclusively for unstable ammunition and explosives in this phase.

Furthermore, 5,745.5 tons of unstable ammunition have been identified as being in the possession of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Minister of Defence has already taken a decision on its destruction. Based on this decision, a two-year plan for the disposal of unstable ammunition has been proposed and is to be realized in cooperation with the UNDP office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the Small Arms and Light Weapons Control and Reduction Programme. We emphasize that cooperation in activities regarding the realization of the plan for the disposal of unstable ammunition is not limited to the UNDP office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but is open to other international organizations present in the country and involved in this issue.

In order to improve the security level of military ammunition and comprehensive explosive storage facilities, and with the aim of finally closing
certain locations, we gave priority in 2006 to the disposal of unstable ammunition. Activities for the destruction of unstable ammunition began in the second part of 2006 and 852 tons of unstable ammunition had been destroyed at industrial facilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of 2006.

More dynamic and efficient disposal of the remaining ammunition surplus depends on the capacity of industrial facilities to demilitarize ammunition using the delaboration method. The existing capacity of these industrial facilities is limited (it is only possible to destroy approximately 2,200 tons of ammunition per year). The Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina believes that the investment of significant financial resources in industrial facilities development in order to expand their ammunition disposal capacity would reduce the risk of possible unwanted consequences from uncontrolled detonation. Once again, we emphasize that, regardless of the existing difficulties, all military storage facilities are under the full control of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus the possibility of any kind of theft or misuse is reduced to a minimum.

Czech Republic

[Original: English]
[30 April 2007]

The main risks arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus include the risks resulting from lack of control, and the risks of theft, loss, diversion, explosion and pollution. Surplus stockpiles jeopardize the security of local communities as well as neighbouring countries. Member States should assess whether parts of their national stockpiles should be considered to be in surplus.

Member States’ ammunition stockpiles should be commensurate with the Member States’ legitimate security needs. The appropriate controls should be in place, including a national supervision and inspection system as well as quality and quantity monitoring. The army, police and other armed services should have in place internal standards governing the acquisition and disposal of ammunition. For example, when considering the procurement of new ammunition, the Police should take into account its current operational needs and the condition and age of its existing ammunition stockpiles.

Stockpiles of ammunition and explosives should be regularly inspected and particular attention should be paid to their size and compliance with security and safety regulations. The inspections should be carried out according to approved schedules, and whenever there are any indications of diversion. Any shortcomings found by the inspectors should be immediately eliminated. Observance of laws and regulations should minimize the risk of explosion, pollution or diversion.

Member States should determine the size and nature of surplus stockpiles, whether they represent a security risk, their nature of destruction, and whether external assistance is needed to eliminate the risk. Ammunition requirements should be regularly reviewed, taking into account the service life of the ammunition and the conditions of storage. The ammunition should be regularly tested and inspected to determine appropriate disposal or treatment options. Member States should dispose of ammunition, which is in surplus or unfit for use in an environment-friendly manner. Environment-friendly destruction of surplus ammunition should be an
ongoing process; for example, whenever a weapon or weapon system is taken out of service with the armed forces, its ammunition should be disposed of as well. Member States should duly supervise the disposal of surplus stockpiles of ammunition. The destruction of any ammunition, especially chemical ammunition, should be carried out by authorized experts.

A programme to eliminate surplus stockpiles or to improve their management should be part of an overall efficient stockpile management policy. Stocks should be inspected frequently and carefully and reduced according to the current operational needs. Any surplus stock should be physically destroyed. Only ammunition that is really necessary and meets all standards, namely in terms of age and technical fitness, should be retained.

Member States in a position to do so should assist interested States in elaborating and implementing programmes to eliminate surplus stockpiles or to improve their management.

Member States in a position to do so should assist other countries in developing programmes to eliminate surplus stockpiles, to determine the risks related to their stock in surplus or to improve their management.

Member States should examine the possibility of developing and implementing within a national, regional or subregional framework, measures to address the illicit trafficking related to the accumulation of surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition.

To prevent the hoarding of and illicit trading in ammunition originating from surplus stocks, Member States should strictly enforce the internal standards, laws and regulations applicable to acquisition and disposal of equipment, consistently supervise any transactions involving police equipment and apply tight sanctions for violators. Member States should keep track of any ammunition originating from surplus stocks, in order to prevent illicit trafficking.

Germany¹

[Original: English]  
[26 April 2007]

On 6 December 2006 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 61/72 entitled “Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus” which had been tabled by France and Germany.

A. Risks arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus

Germany is convinced that the problems caused by ammunition stockpiles in surplus in all their aspects deserve the urgent attention of the international community. Deficient administration and insufficient security of public ammunition stockpiles worldwide represent a major source of illegal ammunition transfer. At the same time, aged and insufficiently secured stockpiles endanger both the civilian population and the environment.

¹ Germany’s full report can be viewed at www.new-york-un.diplo.de/.
Combined with conventional weapons from which it is fired, ammunition plays a decisive role in the escalation and prolongation of armed conflicts between States and within States, as well as in the spread of organized crime. Explosives and ammunition are also increasingly being used in unconventional explosive and incendiary devices which pose a serious danger to the civilian population, including to civilian aid workers, as well as to soldiers in peacekeeping missions. Huge ammunition stockpiles, the continuing high rate of production, and the increase in illicit trade lead to a complex source of significant security risks which are not limited to certain locations or regions but which assume a global dimension due to international terrorism and transnational organized crime.

B. National ways of strengthening controls on conventional ammunition

Germany’s ammunition stockpiles fall under the responsibility of the Federal Ministries of Defence (Federal Armed Forces), the Interior (police forces) and Finance (customs administration). The following rules and procedures apply to the Federal Armed Forces; equally strict provisions govern ammunition held under the responsibility of other official bodies. Details are described in the full version of this report (footnote 1).

Ammunition stocks are calculated on the basis of operational need and expenditure rates. Ammunition is normally traced using IT-databases from the time it leaves the factory to the time of use or disposal. It is stored in specially constructed and secured depots. Ammunition found to be in surplus is destroyed as a matter of principle.

The operational requirements for ammunition used in the Federal Armed Forces are calculated on the basis of expenditure rates, proceeding from the maximum simultaneous force posture for a given operation and the kind of operation.

Ammunition is verified during its entire lifetime so that it can be traced from leaving the factory to use or disposal. It is stored in Federal Armed Forces depots with “igloos” (storehouses covered with earth) which are checked regularly by military security personnel. Its transport, loading and unloading is subject to special security measures.

The dangers posed by ammunition and handling risks are recognized through threat assessments and risk analyses and assessments. Exact knowledge of the chemical and physical effects of intended or unintended detonation of ammunition is used to calculate these risks and to develop corresponding protection measures. Scientific and technical issues are discussed and coordinated within NATO’s “Ammunition Safety Group”. Guidelines and standards produced there form the basis of the Federal Armed Forces’ security standards and infrastructure guidelines.

Ammunition found to be surplus as a result of the requirements assessment is taken out of service using IT-based procedures and transferred to the Armed Forces Defence Technology and Procurement Administration (BWB) for disposal. The destruction of surplus or unusable ammunition is usually carried out by commercial firms. Destruction takes place immediately after the end of the process of removal from service and transfer of responsibility to the armaments industry. Contracts for ammunition destruction are awarded under a “negotiated competitive procedure”. The call for tender does not contain guidelines for the method of destruction. The firms propose a concept oriented towards their infrastructure; this concept is
examined by the BWB and, when approved, a contract is concluded. In Germany there are sufficient firms able to destroy the full spectrum of ammunition in an economical and environmentally sound way. For each type of ammunition there are several firms able to destroy it in accordance with the relevant regulations.

Ammunition is basically not reused. Only in rare exceptional cases is small-calibre ammunition sold to friendly nations or transferred to national producers for recycling, e.g. as exercise ammunition.

C. Germany’s contribution to international efforts in ammunition administration and storage

Germany’s bilateral and multilateral engagement aims at assisting partners to effectively improve ammunition administration and storage and to reduce ammunition stockpiles, above all in order to counter the related danger of illegal transfer.

Germany’s efforts within the United Nations are aimed at anchoring the topic of ammunition and ammunition stockpiling on the international agenda, thus contributing to the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms, including by tabling, in 2005 and 2006, the resolution entitled “Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus” in the United Nations General Assembly.

Germany’s efforts within the OSCE have focused on the establishment of best practice guidelines on issues such as “transporting conventional ammunitions by land” and “marking, record-keeping and traceability of conventional ammunition”.

Germany also plays an active role in multinational seminars, symposia, workshops and other events promoting international discussion and conceptual development in the fields of ammunition storage, transport, use and management.  

Germany (on behalf of the European Union)

[Original: English]
[2 May 2007]

The member States of the European Union have consistently paid due attention to the issue of ammunition. This is particularly true with regard to the EU’s positions taken in the context of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. The EU’s Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and their Ammunition which was endorsed by its Council of Ministers in December 2005 inter alia underlines the importance of addressing the issue of ammunition. At the same time it promotes close international cooperation with regard to the management and security of stockpiles of conventional arms and ammunition:

15. ... the challenge for an EU strategy on SALW is to respond to these threats and to ensure that its security policy and its development policy are consistent, while fully exploiting the means available to it at multilateral and regional levels, within the European Union and in the EU’s bilateral relations in order to frame an action plan which will:

(a) Foster effective multilateralism so as to forge mechanisms, whether international, regional or within the EU and its Member States, for countering the supply and destabilizing the spread of SALW and their ammunition. The Union must strengthen its export control policies and activities in coordination with its partners;

(b) Meet requests by States seeking to reduce their surplus stocks of SALW and their ammunition, either under a stockpile reduction policy or by participating in DDR operations.

Arms and ammunition

International efforts to control the effects of trafficking, proliferation and misuse of arms have generally not paid the same attention to the issue of ammunition. Arms have often been disassociated from their ammunition. In particular with regard to small arms and light weapons, a number of important agreements have been adopted in recent years, while the issue of their ammunition has often been neglected. This is particularly true for the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. However, when this Instrument was considered by the United Nations Open-ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons its report A/60/88 of 27 June 2005 recommended to specifically address the issue of ammunition:

27. The Working Group recommends that the issue of small arms and light weapons ammunition be addressed in a comprehensive manner as part of a separate process conducted within the framework of the United Nations.

Ammunition stockpiles

Massive quantities of ammunition are held in insecure locations at considerable risk of loss, capture or diversion. These quantities of ammunition contribute to the risks of trafficking and proliferation and to the prolongations and intensification of armed conflict. At the same time, recent incidents at ammunition storage depots illustrate the resulting threat to security, health and the environment. Safe handling of ammunition poses specific requirements, since they contain explosive materials. Safe destruction of ammunition requires specialist skills and facilities. While different types of conventional ammunition, munitions or explosives have different requirements, the basic issues, priorities and skills required to promote the management and security of stockpiles are similar for most categories of concern: munitions for major conventional arms, SALW ammunition, bombs, IEDs, unexploded ordnance.

Many of the insecure and unsafe ammunition stockpiles are surplus stocks. This applies to military stockpiles, but also to the quantities of ammunition held by police and other agencies. The individual State needs to define surplus stockpiles and take a decision on how to deal with them. Stockpiles needed for national security purposes are to be separated from stockpiles that are insecure or in surplus.
Stockpiles needed for national security purposes need to be safely stored; stockpiles that are insecure and in surplus must be destroyed.

**Guidelines and principles**

Guidance documents on management and security of stockpiles of conventional ammunition are essential, also as a prerequisite for international assistance. The Member States of the European Union have endorsed such documents in the institutional frame of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition FSC.Doc 11/03 of 17 November 2003 and the ongoing work on a Best Practice Guides on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition deserve to be mentioned. However, no such best practice guidelines have been developed and endorsed at the global level.

**International cooperation**

International efforts with regard to the management and security of arms and ammunition stockpiles have increased recently. However, in comparison to the urgency of the problem posed by ammunition stockpiles, the scale of such cooperation appears to be limited. Due to the nature of ammunition, specific resources and cooperation programmes are required, so that surplus ammunition can be destroyed in a rapid, safe and transparent way. Training, advice on infrastructure improvements, advice on technical and administrative measures as well as record-keeping are key elements of such cooperation. The scale of the problem of insecure and unsafe ammunition stockpiles is so urgent that efforts to promote good practice need to be complemented by programmes which address the greatest risks on an emergency basis.

**Group of Governmental Experts**

In order for the Group of Governmental Experts to address the above issues in a convincing and comprehensive manner, the Expert Group needs to take a broad look at the issues related to ammunition as well as the management and security of their stockpiles. Such a wide approach, considering past work and progress made in other forums, would allow the Group to make a meaningful contribution to addressing the dangers resulting from ineffective and inefficient management and security of stockpiles of conventional ammunition.

**Guatemala**

[Original: Spanish]
[14 May 2007]

The Ministry of Defence has provided the following information on the steps that it has taken in order to prevent the existence of conventional ammunition in surplus:

1. The Chief of Defence Staff has issued an Obsolete Materiel Destruction Plan (covering explosives and ammunition), which establishes procedures for the destruction of obsolete materiel contained in the various arsenals of the Republic’s military commands, including its decommissioning and destruction in accordance
with the specific plans of that Service; this is now being handled by the War Materials Service in cooperation with the Army Corps of Engineers.

2. This Plan will be implemented in three phases: (a) Phase 1: inspection and classification of obsolete hazardous materiel; (b) Phase 2: Transport of the explosives and destruction in the appropriate area; (c) Phase 3: Decommissioning of the ammunition.

With respect to national measures to strengthen controls of conventional arms, the following proposal is hereby submitted for possible adoption by States:

1. Establish monitoring measures in order to ensure traceability; this is the approach taken by the international ammunition trade with a view to the registration and monitoring of conventional ammunition from the manufacturer to the end-user through adequate marking of both the secondary packaging (packages and boxes) and the base of the cartridges; an appropriate, internationally recognized code, such as the following, would be established:

   (a) On the secondary packaging: class, calibre, identification of the manufacturer, brand of ammunition, lot number, date of manufacture and country of origin; and

   (b) On the base of the cartridge: the calibre, date and country of origin;

2. Monitor the national defence industry’s compliance regarding marking of the ammunition produced in order to establish adequate control over the type and quantity of ammunition circulating in the national territory; and

3. Develop regulations, consistent with existing international controls, governing the minimum and maximum quantity of ammunition that can be exported or imported by physical and legal persons.

Hungary

The Republic of Hungary, like many other European countries, has accomplished a significant reduction of armed forces in the last decades. This process resulted in a large amount of surplus ammunition. Marketability of these materials, due to strict international regulations, is limited, as is the available military storage potential. The only feasible solution is to dispose of these ammunition surpluses using national means and capabilities in a controlled and safe manner.

From 2000 onwards, the disposal of redundant ammunition in Hungary was carried out within the military, but this process proved to be slow due to the limited capabilities. In 2004 a decision was made to involve the civilian industrial potential in this process: two national firms have taken over the disposal, using contemporary technology. They are responsible for the safe disassembly and destruction of ammunition surpluses at a rate of 8-10 thousand tons per year, taking into consideration the most recent and strict rules of environmental protection.

The cost of the disposal process is covered in the defence budget.
Japan

[Original: English]
[17 May 2007]

• The risks arising from accumulating conventional ammunition stockpiles depend mainly on their volume and the ways of management. Japan has detailed ammunition management systems as well as small arms and light weapons, and the practical measures are: to have laid down licensing systems for manufacturing and importing arms and explosives, and to strictly control these activities, and to punish people in its territory who violate these restrictions.

• Stocks of SALW held by the Self-Defence Forces and the Police are strictly controlled including their storage and inspection. In addition, old SALW and those impossible to repair are disposed of under close scrutiny and strict procedures.

• Japan participated in the Workshop “Stockpile Security of Small Arms and Light Weapons including Manpads”, jointly organized by ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), Thailand, and Australia in October 2006, and introduced its experience of stockpile management gained through small arms collection projects in Cambodia.

• As for the stockpile management of conventional ammunition, in addition to rule-making efforts such as best practices, the process of implementing internationally common rules, perhaps through assistance projects, is indispensable. Furthermore, building the relationship of trust between donors and recipients created and solidified through projects is needed.

• When discussions are held on the international cooperation in the field of stockpile management for ammunition, it is necessary for the people with the experience and know-how of projects on the ground to join those discussions.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[17 April 2007]

The Ministry would like to point out that it is not in possession of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus and that there is no danger of this occurring. The Ministry would also like to underline that Lebanese laws and regulations provide adequate national controls to ensure the security, safety and management of conventional ammunition stockpiles in order to eliminate the risk of explosion, pollution or diversion of those stockpiles.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[30 April 2007]

In accordance with national and international norms concerning ammunition-related activities, for reasons of security, budget and the environment, Mexico has
no surplus conventional ammunition; its inventories contain only the quantities strictly necessary to their assigned functions.

Mexico considers that surplus ammunition is an inseparable part of the larger problem of the accumulation, transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The accumulation of conventional ammunition in surplus makes it possible for this type of war material to be diverted for use by criminals and criminal gangs, encouraging crime and undue violence.

The existing marking systems are too diverse for effective tracing and monitoring. Mexico has therefore stressed the importance of the proposal that manufacturers should be required to mark cartridges in a clear, secure and easily recognizable manner using an alphanumeric code, agreed among States, that indicates the manufacturer, country of origin, code and year of production, series/lot number, exact type of ammunition and any other characteristic that will allow it to be traced in order to identify the seller and buyer on the basis of purchase and sale registers.

This process should include the prohibition of any transfer of ammunition that is not properly marked. And since, generally speaking, no such centralized registries are accessible at the national or international level, there is a need for complete, accurate manufacturers’ and suppliers’ registries of all ammunition that is transferred or may subsequently be retransferred from the territory of a country.

In that regard, it is extremely important to take steps to monitor the production, sale, trafficking, use and stockpiling of conventional ammunition in order to combat this problem. However, there is wide variation in the effectiveness and scope of the methods currently in use. For that reason, States which do not yet have them should implement, adopt or introduce into their legislation regulations governing the manufacture, sale, purchase, stockpiling and possession of conventional cartridges and should criminalize these activities when conducted without the permits required by law.

In Mexico, Section 4, Sole Chapter of the Federal Firearms and Explosives Act regulates and restricts possession of cartridges according to their calibre, as well as criminalizing and penalizing the manufacture, sale, possession and clandestine import or export of cartridges in the following terms:

• Anyone in possession of cartridges in quantities larger than those permitted (art. 85 quat) is punishable by:
  
  (a) One to four years’ imprisonment and a fine equivalent to 10 to 50 days’ pay at minimum wage if the arms are among those covered by articles 9, 10 and 11 (a) and (b) of the Act; and
  
  (b) Two to six years’ imprisonment and a fine equivalent to 25 to 100 days’ pay at minimum wage if the arms are among those covered by the remaining paragraphs of article 11 of the Act.

• Anyone involved in smuggling into the national territory ammunition that is intended for the exclusive use of retired, reserve or active duty members of the Army, Navy or Air Force is subject to 5 to 30 years’ imprisonment and fines equivalent to 20 to 500 days’ pay at minimum wage (art. 84).

• The penalties mentioned in articles 83 quat and 84 are increased by half if the guilty party is a current or former public servant employed by any department
of the police, by a private security firm or as a retired, reserve or active duty member of the Army, Navy or Air Force (art. 84 ter).

• Anyone who sells ammunition acquired without verification of its legal origin is subject to 2 to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine equivalent to 20 to 500 days’ pay at minimum wage (art. 85).

• Anyone who manufactures or exports ammunition without the proper permit is subject to 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine equivalent to 100 to 500 days’ pay at minimum wage (art. 85 bis).

Furthermore, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence, within their respective spheres of competence, are required to supervise and work in coordination with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit to verify and, if necessary, increase customs controls at border points, ports and airports so as to safeguard security and safety and eliminate illegal trafficking, clandestine stockpiling, potential explosive hazards and pollution.

Nicaragua

[Original: Spanish]
[29 May 2007]

The Republic of Nicaragua presents no risk arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus because it uses only the conventional units for each type of armament and the operational reserves established in its national defence plans.

Portugal

[Original: English]
[16 May 2007]

Portugal recognizes the importance of effective and efficient management of ammunition stockpiles. The absence of strict security control favours illicit trafficking (especially in the context of small arms and light weapons) and consequently contributes to the escalation and prolongation of armed conflicts between and within States, as well as to the spread of terrorism and organized crime.

Furthermore ammunition stockpiles kept in unsafe conditions pose a threat to the safety and health of populations and to the environment, as demonstrated by recent incidents at ammunition storage depots.

Portugal actively participates at international forums where the issue of the security of ammunition is discussed, specifically in the United Nations and the OSCE. Portugal is fully committed to the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. At the OSCE, efforts are particularly concentrated in the draft of the OSCE Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Stockpile Management and Security.

At a bilateral level, Portugal is willing to provide assistance to third countries dealing with problems caused by surplus ammunition.
Portuguese military ammunition stockpiles fall under the responsibility of the Ministries of Defence (Armed Forces), Home Affairs (National Guard and Police forces) and Justice (Judiciary Police and Prison Services). Military type ammunition is acquired abroad and imported, solely by the official entities identified above or by previously authorized private companies for official end-users only, and in accordance with an International Import Certificate issued by the Ministry of Defence.

After arrival in Portugal, ammunition is transported, under escort, in accordance with the procedures established by the NATO Safety Principles for the Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives — AASTP-2 and, upon arrival at the end-user’s premises, stored in accordance with the procedures established by the Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives — AASTP-1, within fenced and guarded ammunition storage areas, subject to access controls.

Ammunition quantities to be obtained and stored are calculated by the end-users as a function of their training and operational activities.

Exports of military ammunition are rare, but if they occur, exporters (the official entities identified above or previously authorized private companies) have to obtain an International Export Certificate, issued by the Ministry of Defence only after due consideration of several factors, including the eight criteria of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

Ammunition for civilian use is imported, transported, stored and, occasionally, exported only by previously authorized private companies, in accordance with the applicable national legislation and under the supervision of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Surplus ammunition is, as a matter of principle, destroyed.

Portugal considers that the issues of ammunition as well as management and security of stockpiles need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner and therefore strongly supports the Group of Governmental Experts to be established in 2008.

**Russian Federation**

[Original: Russian]  
[7 May 2007]

Significant amounts of ammunition become available every year as a result of the physical ageing and obsolescence of ammunition, the reductions made in the Russian Federation’s armed forces and the implementation of a number of international agreements on the reduction and elimination of weapons.

This gives rise to a number of problems, which are mostly related to securing ammunition stockpiles against fire and explosions, ensuring their safe recycling, providing for environmental safety in the storage and recycling process and establishing conditions to minimize the seriousness of consequences should emergency situations arise.

In order to address these problems, in 2005 the Russian Federation adopted and is successfully implementing the 2005 to 2010 special federal programmes for industrial recycling of weapons and military equipment and for restructuring
stockpiles of missiles, ammunitions and explosive substances, and making their storage and operating systems safe from explosions and fire.

Measures are being carried out within the framework of these special federal programmes for the construction, reconstruction and major overhaul of ammunition storage facilities which take into account modern safety requirements in all areas. Activities are also being carried out for the practical recycling of ammunition and for the creation of the necessary productive capacity.

**Senegal**

[Original: French]  
[27 April 2007]

At present, the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons is the only instrument that contributes to small arms control in West Africa. Thus, all acquisitions of arms and ammunition are subject to a prior request for an exemption, addressed to the Executive Secretariat of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The exemption will be granted if there is no objection from member States.

In accordance with the recommendations of ECOWAS, a National Commission, established in 2000, is responsible, inter alia, for defining effective strategies to combat the illegal proliferation and circulation of small arms and light weapons. Once ratified, the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, signed on 14 June 2006, will eventually replace the Moratorium.

Senegal has no conventional ammunition in surplus.

**Serbia**

[Original: English]  
[30 April 2007]

Different-type ammunition stockpiles in surplus, property of the Army, Air Force and Air Defence of Serbia, amount to 23,859 tons. Due to insufficient storage space, 9,640 tons of these quantities are stored in open-air facilities; they are a burden to military storage capacities and represent security and other risks. In pursuance of the needs of the armed forces of Serbia, groups “D”, “E” and “F” of surplus ammunition (without a propellant charge, without a primer and with a solid propellant charge) have been identified in the amount of 23,149 tons, as well as group “G” (smoke and illumination projectiles) in the amount of 710 tons.

To identify the risks and improve safe storage of explosives and surplus ammunition, the armed forces of Serbia use the globally harmonized system of classification of the United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals.

With respect to the prevalent risk types, the surplus ammunition and explosives in the armed forces of Serbia have been classified into risk class 1. For the purpose of storage and transportation, a risk class is divided into 5 risk groups.
and 12 compatibility groups according to the expected risks in case of an accident. The accumulation of stockpiles and the lack of quality storage facilities account for the presence of risk group 1.1 (air wave strikes, high-velocity fragments and heat effect) and group 1.2 (dispersion of heavy and light fragments and incendiary or unexploded shrapnel that may explode at the point of subsequent impact).

The basic problem is a rundown storage infrastructure, lack of electronic facility protection and storage process monitoring and the shortage of maintenance funds. All ammunition and explosives, whether surplus or aged, likely or unlikely to be used, require the same treatment in respect of condition monitoring: technical inspection, powder and rocket fuel chemical stability examination and monitoring, test shooting and the elimination from the defence system altogether. Proper surplus ammunition maintenance is an additional financial burden and there exists no technological process of safe ammunition delaboration and no equipment and technological lines for “G” group ammunition in the armed forces of Serbia.

In order to reduce and eliminate accidents, environment pollution and sabotage risks, the armed forces of Serbia address the problem of surplus ammunition through delaboration, destruction or sale through authorized agents. The related problems have been presented within the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse, with the aim of ensuring donations for the purchase or design of technology, construction and equipment of facilities for environment-friendly delaboration of ammunition containing phosphorus and hexachloroethane “G”-group mixtures and for the destruction of group “D”, “E” and “F” ammunition.

To streamline the existing, or build and equip new facilities for the destruction of special ammunition stockpiles in surplus in the armed forces of Serbia from group “G”, as well as those from groups “D”, “E” and “F”, Serbia would appreciate if appropriate donation requests were made through relevant international organizations.

Spain

[Original: Spanish]
[11 May 2007]

1. The risks arising from the accumulation of stockpiles of ammunition in surplus

The problems can be considered from two points of view: (a) those arising from ensuring the physical security of the magazines or storage sites for ammunition and the ammunition itself; (b) those arising from the possible diversion of excess production that is not used.

The accumulation of conventional ammunition in surplus is closely linked to the earlier processes of manufacture, storage and authorization to acquire ammunition. The use of firearms to commit criminal acts and, therefore, the possession of ammunition for the commission of such acts, should be seen not as a consequence of the accumulation of ammunition in surplus in general terms, but as a consequence of over-generous regulations regarding the amount of ammunition that holders of different weapons licences are authorized to store. In some circumstances, such regulations may encourage the diversion of ammunition in storage (and, therefore, legally held) to criminal sectors. In certain countries or geographical areas that are not subject to effective intervention and control, it may
also encourage diversion to criminal circles or the clandestine supplying of other conflict areas. Additional inspections are therefore needed to verify compliance with the limits established. On the other hand, it has been noted that imposing the same limits on the amount of ammunition that can be acquired and stored by devotees of Olympic shooting has encouraged the practice of illegally reloading ammunition. The manufacture of “home-made” ammunition, through unauthorized reloading, is probably the main way in which ammunition enters the black market. It also encourages another criminal activity, that of trafficking in the explosive substances (powder and percussion caps) needed to make such ammunition. In the case of Spain, such trafficking usually takes the form of smuggling such substances from neighbouring countries.

At the international level, close attention should be paid to the work and development of the future group of governmental experts which will consider further steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the issue of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus and the negotiation of a future international arms trade treaty, which should certainly refer to the issue of ammunition.

2. National measures to strengthen controls on conventional ammunition

2.1 Administrative control

Regulation is needed for the requirements and conditions of manufacture, circulation, storage, trading and possession of ammunition and control of the entire commercial process for ammunition (manufacture, storage, distribution and use).

2.2 Warehousing and storage

Specific regulations are needed for warehousing in order to cover: gunsmith’s shops, security companies, target ranges, shooting galleries and companies specializing in the safe keeping of firearms, private individuals, target-shooting and hunting. Different security measures are required for each type of warehousing, with a complete listing of the cases in which storage is authorized and the various cases in which the manufacture of ammunition is permitted, establishing specific restrictions for such cases. The aim is to make storage sites secure and prevent the accumulation of ammunition in surplus in authorized storage sites by limiting the amount of ammunition that can be possessed or stored (distinguishing between metallic and non-metallic cartridges) and limiting the amount of ammunition that can be acquired and the amount that can be placed in storage.

2.3 Diversion

It is essential to adopt national measures to strengthen controls on the export of conventional ammunition as defence materiel. There should be an administrative body responsible for granting, where appropriate, administrative authorizations for import and export license applications by companies or private individuals for items subject to control. It is also desirable to extend the controls to include all types of firearms (including all firearms for hunting and target-shooting, their components and ammunition).
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a regional organization which Turkey is a member, has taken concrete steps with regard to problems arising from accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus. The document adopted at the 407th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum on 19 November 2003, concerning the stockpiles of conventional ammunition is a major implementation instrument for Turkey. Turkey’s current national implementation with regard to conventional ammunition stockpiles is in compliance with that document, as well as with the OSCE best practices. Turkey will continue to take the required measures set out in those documents, with the understanding that any security deficiency in conventional ammunition stockpiles may not only pose a serious threat to human and environment security, but also create a situation which could be easily exploited by terrorist or organized crime groups.