Letter dated 17 October 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, and in accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1761 (2007), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Johan C. Verbeke
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire
Annex

[Original: French]

Letter dated 21 September 2007 from the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004)

The members of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Group prepared pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1761 (2007).

(Signed) Grégoire Bafouatika

(Signed) Abdoul Wahab Diakhaby

(Signed) Claudio Gramizzi

(Signed) Lipika Majumdar Roy Choudhury

(Signed) Oumar Dièye Sidi
Summary

During its investigations, the Group of Experts observed a lack of understanding on the part of certain Ivorian political authorities who believed that, with the signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement on 4 March 2007, their mission was out of step with the current reconciliation process. A similar attitude was detected, in particular in the military under the command of the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FDS-CI), during the embargo inspections carried out by the impartial forces, for which permission is being refused with increasing frequency.

To illustrate the difficulties encountered by the impartial forces in carrying out surveillance of the embargo on arms and related materiel, the Group also noted the discrepancy between the weapons lists provided by FDS-CI and the Defence and Security Forces of Forces nouvelles (FDS-FN) and their real capacities. A case concerning RGD-5 grenades noted during an inspection is included as an example.

The experts investigated an order for Imperial Armour equipment by the National Police. The Group was able to obtain some information on the delivery of this equipment, although it did not have the full cooperation of the police authorities who, after categorically denying having received the equipment, agreed, at the experts’ insistence, to submit an incomplete purchase order, together with a sample of the shipment.

The experts were interested in the status of the Ivorian air fleet in general and the Mi-24 (TU-VHO) helicopter grounded since October 2006 in particular, and in the presence of foreign technicians.

In the area of natural resources management, the Group held meetings, for the first time, with the heads of three out of four quasi-Government agencies in the coffee and cocoa sector (Coffee and Cocoa Regulatory Authority (ARCC), Coffee and Cocoa Marketing Exchange (BCC), and Financial Regulation Fund (FRC)), arranged through the efforts of His Excellency the Ambassador of Côte d’Ivoire to the United Nations, and confirms the lack of transparency in the management of revenue in the coffee and cocoa and hydrocarbons sectors.

The Group conducted investigations into the application of individual sanctions. In this connection, it focused, in particular, on a case involving the violation of the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 1572 (2004).

The Group also continued its investigation into possible violations of the embargo on diamond exports. It uncovered evidence of persistent activity in the Tortiya and Séguela mining areas. Also, many dealers confirmed the use of Malian smuggling rings to move Ivorian diamonds out of the country.

The experts welcome the cooperation of the Kimberley Process and its efforts to encourage participating States to introduce further improvements in their internal control systems.
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## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCC</td>
<td>Coffee and Cocoa Regulatory Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>First BASA</td>
<td>First ground-to-air artillery battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>First BB</td>
<td>Armoured battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCC</td>
<td>Coffee and Cocoa Marketing Exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>FACI</td>
<td>Forces aériennes de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>FAFN</td>
<td>Armed forces of the Forces nouvelles</td>
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<tr>
<td>FANCI</td>
<td>Forces armées nationales de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCFA</td>
<td>CFA francs</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDS-CI</td>
<td>Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>FDS-FN</td>
<td>Defence and Security Forces of Forces nouvelles</td>
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<td>FN</td>
<td>Forces nouvelles</td>
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<td>FRC</td>
<td>Financial Regulation Fund</td>
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<td>RGD</td>
<td><em>Ruchnaya granata degtyareva</em> (Degtyareva hand grenade)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNEPCI</td>
<td>Société nouvelle de presse et d’édition de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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I. Introduction

1. By resolution 1761 (2007) of 20 June 2007, the Security Council extended the mandate of the Group of Experts until 31 October 2007. Pursuant to this resolution, on 9 July 2007, the Secretary-General appointed five members of the Group of Experts (S/2007/415): Mr. Grégoire Bafouatika (Congo), an expert in civil aviation, Mr. Abdoul Wahab Diakhaby (Guinea), a diamond expert, Mr. Oumar Dièye Sidi (Niger), a customs expert, Mr. Claudio Gramizzi (Italy), an arms expert and Ms. Lipika Majumdar Roy Choudhury (India), a finance expert.


3. The experts’ mission began on 23 July 2007. During its mandate, the Group visited Côte d’Ivoire, Belgium, Bulgaria, the United Arab Emirates, France, Ghana and Togo. Beginning on 28 July 2007, the Group went on a field mission that lasted until 19 September. Priority was accorded to Côte d’Ivoire, where the Group maintained a permanent presence and visited a number of villages located in both the Government-controlled zone and the zone controlled by the Forces nouvelles.

4. The Group kept the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1572 (2004) informed of its activities by submitting its monthly report on 22 August 2007. It also developed better relations of cooperation with UNOCI and Licorne, particularly with regard to embargo surveillance measures.

II. Developments in the situation in Côte d’Ivoire

5. Although the tension abated after the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement on 4 March 2007 (S/2007/144), the process of emerging from the crisis has not significantly progressed beyond symbolic acts. This, moreover, was highlighted in the Final Communiqué of the second meeting of the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee of the Inter-Ivorian Dialogue, held on 4 September 2007, which stresses that much remains to be done in the political, security, economic and humanitarian sectors.

6. The attack on the Prime Minister, Mr. Guillaume Soro, on 29 June 2007, is a concrete example of the latent fragility in the security situation and the possibility that isolated episodes could still hamper the peace process as a whole. It is the view of the Group that such potential threats could hang over the country as long as two basic conditions remain unfulfilled. The first is the integral execution of the programme to disarm combatants and dismantle militias, as provided in article 3.2 of the Ouagadougou Agreement. The second is redeployment of the Government administration in the zones controlled by the Forces nouvelles, together with the restoration of Government authority over all its troops.

7. This transition phase has also witnessed a resurgence of cases of abuse of authority, such as arbitrary arrest and detention, ill treatment and extrajudicial killings. For example, on a visit to the northern part of the country, the Group obtained written evidence of an episode that ended in the death of one person as a result of torture inflicted by FDS-FN troops during an arrest. These incidents
occurred in the Office of the FN secretary-general, in Bouaké, on 29 and 30 August 2007, at the very time and place that the experts were being received by the secretary-general and the chief of staff of the FN armed forces.

III. Arms

8. In view of the limited duration of the Group’s mandate and minimal cooperation by some of its interlocutors, the experts were able to investigate only a limited number of cases relating to the current embargo on arms and related materiel. The primary purpose of the investigations they did carry out was to conduct additional research into the cases presented in the Group’s previous report (S/2007/349). The experts did not detect any violations of the embargo on the supply of military equipment during the current mandate.

A. The needs of the National Police of Côte d’Ivoire

9. During his meeting with the experts on 16 August 2007 in Abidjan, the Director-General of the National Police of Côte d’Ivoire reiterated the need to equip his officers with law enforcement equipment, in particular 9-mm calibre pistols, so that they may fulfil their duty to protect persons and property, to maintain law and order, to accompany the redeployment of the government administration into the country’s northern zone and to provide security during the upcoming elections.

10. According to the Director-General of the Police, between 6,000 and 8,000 police officers out of a total force of 16,000 currently do not own a regulation hand weapon. In addition, the Ivorian police force is completely out of 56-mm grenades for Cougar-type grenade launchers and 40-mm tear gas grenades.

B. Follow-up to the cases investigated during the previous mandate

1. The Imperial Armour case

11. The Group conducted additional research into the shipment of protective equipment for the National Police of Côte d’Ivoire by the company Imperial Armour mentioned in the report contained in document S/2007/349 (paras. 56 to 62). Because their initial requests for information from officials of the National Police led nowhere, the experts decided to seek the cooperation of the Ministry of the Interior and National Security, Ivorian customs and the Ministry of Defence, which is responsible for all purchases of equipment for the various elements of FDS-CI.

12. Following an initial meeting with the Group and at the latter’s insistence, the Director-General of the National Police of Côte d’Ivoire — or rather the Deputy Director-General with responsibility for law enforcement, Divisional Commissioner Brédou M’Bia, on his behalf — carried out the checks requested by the Group of Experts with regard to this equipment. On 4 September 2007, the Deputy Director-General provided the experts with a copy of the invoice relating to the purchase of the equipment, minus the information relating to the commercial value of the items (invoice no. 174 of 20 November 2006, see annex II), and a helmet (see photo 1) that was among the equipment ordered. The experts were able to determine that the quantities of items (helmets, shields, and arm and leg protectors) indicated in the
invoice correspond to those mentioned by the manufacturer at a meeting with the experts in May 2007. They were also able to confirm that the helmet in question (a non-bulletproof protective helmet) was non-ballistic in nature and bore the name of the manufacturer.

Photo 1
Non-bulletproof anti-riot helmet manufactured by Imperial Armour and given to the experts by Divisional Commissioner Brédou M’Bia on 4 September 2007

13. The Deputy Director-General of the National Police said that it was impossible for the Group to physically inspect all the helmets since they had been distributed, upon receipt, to the various police checkpoints. He also said that he was unable to provide the Group with proof that the armoury of the National Police had received the imported equipment or with any other document besides the one already provided.

14. When questioned about the existence of a second contract that had apparently been the subject of negotiations between the National Police and Imperial Armour, the Deputy Director-General admitted that negotiations had taken place. However, the talks had never gone beyond the initial stage because the Ivorian authorities had refused to release the funds needed to finalize the purchase for fear that, as had happened with the contract concluded with Tusk Trading Pty Ltd, the order would fall through.

15. On 4 September 2007, the Ivorian Customs Administration provided the Group with a copy of customs declaration no. 70301700368E of 10 January 2007 concerning imports of protective headgear by the Ministry of National Security from Imperial Armour. The experts were unable to obtain the documentation on which this customs declaration was based. Moreover, despite several attempts, the experts were unable to determine whether or not the forwarding agent in question (Transit interarmées) had submitted any other customs declarations mentioning this supplier.

16. Based on the information obtained, the Group is not in a position to set aside all its doubts concerning the real nature of the equipment in question (particularly with regard to the reference to “bulletproof” found in the air waybill presented in report S/2007/349) or to conclude that the delivery made to the Ministry of National Security (National Police) between late 2006 and early 2007 concerned only protective equipment to be used solely for maintaining law and order. The Group considers that further checks with the National Police of Côte d’Ivoire, the Ivorian customs and the exporter are still needed.
2. The Tusk Trading case

17. While stressing that their dealings with Tusk Trading Pty Ltd were necessary (see reports contained in documents S/2006/964 and S/2007/349), National Police officials reiterated that they do not intend to push for the contract to be concluded until such time as the current sanctions regime is lifted or a specific exemption is granted to that effect by the Security Council Sanctions Committee.

18. During their mandate, the experts were also interested in the financial movements in the Tusk Trading Pty Ltd account into which the State of Côte d’Ivoire had made its payment (see reports contained in documents S/2006/964 and S/2007/349). According to information obtained by the Group in this regard, it would seem that on 17 May 2007 the entire sum that had been paid into the account by the Ivorian authorities was transferred to other accounts by Vandenbosch, implying that he would be free to use those funds as he wished.

C. Case study: Bulgarian-made RGD-5 grenades

19. This case illustrates the difficulties inherent in monitoring effectively the embargo on military supplies owing, in part, to the ineffectiveness of the instruments available to the impartial forces and the experts. Worse still, the equipment lists submitted to UNOCI by FDS-CI and the Armed forces of the Forces nouvelles (FAFN), on 29 March 2005 and 15 February 2006 respectively, did not mention all the equipment that was in their possession when the embargo was imposed. Furthermore, these lists only briefly describe the arms in question and do not mention, for example, their individual identification numbers.

20. A batch of four crates of RDG-5 hand grenades was observed for the first time during an embargo inspection conducted at Akouedo camp (Abidjan) in June 2006. On the basis of the information contained in outer markings on these crates, the experts were able to determine both the country of manufacture (Bulgaria) and the year of production (2004). Following verification, the experts were also able to determine that these products were not explicitly mentioned on the equipment list sent by the military authorities of FDS-CI to UNOCI. In order to carry out further checks on this equipment, of which the date of arrival in Côte d’Ivoire is unknown, the experts travelled to Bulgaria from 8 to 14 September 2007.

21. As a result of the cooperation of the Bulgarian authorities responsible for controlling exports of military equipment and dual-use items at the national level, the experts were able to determine that the grenades in question were part of a consignment of 2,000 grenades that had been exported, with the authorization of the Bulgarian Government, and received by the Ivorian authorities in October 2004, i.e. before sanctions were imposed under Security Council resolution 1572 (2004).

22. The experts were able to access the documentation relating to this transfer, in particular, the end-user certificate submitted by the Ivorian authorities and dated 16 August 2004, the export permits granted by the Bulgarian authorities on 8 September 2004, the customs declarations relating to the export of these items dated 2 October 2004, the air waybills accompanying the export, and the certificate of delivery of the equipment signed by the Ministry of Defence of Côte d’Ivoire on 21 October 2004.
23. Other weapons not mentioned on the equipment lists were also observed. During the embargo inspections in which they participated, the experts were able to observe, for example, 9Sh119 sights for Fagot 9M111 anti-tank missiles. However, owing to the limited duration of the Group’s mandate, the dearth of information contained in the markings on these weapons and the fact that it was difficult to identify immediately the country of manufacture, the experts were unable to investigate this case further. The experts are of the view, however, that consideration should be given to pursuing these investigations at a later date.

D. Cross-border movements of weapons and concerns regarding the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process

24. Given the porous nature of the borders of Côte d’Ivoire and the availability of weapons in the subregion in general and in Côte d’Ivoire in particular, the experts consider the illicit trafficking in firearms to be a worrying phenomenon. Furthermore, efforts to disarm and disband militias have, for the moment, been only partially effective.

25. During the ceremony held in Guiglo on 19 May 2007, which was heralded by the Ivorian authorities as the launch of the process of disbanding pro-Government militias, only 138 of the 1,027 weapons destroyed were actually serviceable. The disappearance of 472 weapons (the difference between the weapons actually recovered by UNOCI following the ceremony and those announced by the authorities during the ceremony), including an 82-mm mortar, remains a matter of concern.

26. Furthermore, during the “Flame of Peace” ceremony organized in Bouaké on 30 July 2007, only 1,606 of the 2,121 weapons initially earmarked for destruction were actually burned. According to the list obtained by the experts, the vast majority of these weapons were old and probably not in working order. By contrast, the 515 weapons that were initially listed in the batch of weapons earmarked for destruction but ultimately kept by FAFN were in good working order. An unspecified number of working “Mle 55” 120-mm mortars were also observed during embargo inspections and initially earmarked for destruction, but UNOCI has since lost all trace of them.

27. Given the great quantity of working weapons that are known to have disappeared and the threat that they represent, the Group is of the view that the two cases mentioned above should be investigated further.

IV. Monitoring of the embargo

28. The experts worked closely with the UNOCI embargo cell, exchanging information with it on a continuous basis and accompanying it during the following four embargo inspections: 8 August 2007 (first ground-to-air artillery battalion of Akouedo), 20 August 2007 (Abidjan airbase), 23 August 2007 (Armoured battalion of Akouedo) and 11 September 2007 (first ground-to-air artillery battalion of Akouedo). During the first of these inspections, the inspection team was denied access to the site.
29. The Group notes that a number of military units continue to refuse to allow the impartial forces to conduct inspections, despite the fact that the UNOCI embargo cell gives advance notice to the Operations Planning and Monitoring Centre (CPCO), which has oversight of the institutions scheduled for an embargo inspection. The units of the Republican Guard, to which access has never been granted since the embargo was imposed, are a prime example (see annex III).

30. Such refusals have been on the increase since the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement on 4 March 2007, particularly among FDS-CI. For example, during the period from 1 January to 30 August 2007, 26 of the 177 inspections scheduled for FDS-CI were refused, 22 of them between 1 April and 30 August alone. During the same period, 5 of the 133 inspections planned for the units of the Forces nouvelles were refused, 3 of them between 1 April and 30 August 2007.

31. In its report S/2007/349, the Group of Experts mentioned the absence of inspections by the impartial forces of the port facilities in Abidjan and San Pedro. As yet, no institution responsible for inspecting maritime freight has been installed at these ports, which therefore continue to be porous in nature. At the same time, embargo-monitoring capacity at Abidjan and Yamoussoukro airports was seriously weakened by the dismantling of Licorne-held observation posts on 1 August and 13 September 2007 respectively.

32. The recruitment by UNOCI of a customs consultant, as recommended by the Group in its previous reports, would enable the embargo cell to adopt a more targeted approach to embargo inspections at port and airport facilities. On 31 July 2007, following a meeting with the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Group was informed that the recruitment process for such a consultant had begun.

33. The embargo cell is pursuing its training programme for police units, military observers and troops of the military contingents. This training module was initiated by the consultant on the arms embargo, whose contract expired on 18 May 2007.

34. In its report S/2007/349, the Group of Experts noted that the BIVAC scanner installed at the port of Abidjan has been in operation since March 2007. With the establishment of a team responsible for inspections at this port and with the help of the customs consultant, it should be possible to use this scanner to inspect containers targeted for embargo inspections. However, in order for it to be even more effective, the future members of this team should be trained in image reading.

35. The Group of Experts is of the view that neither the modus operandi established by the impartial forces and the Ivorian parties, nor the instruments available to UNOCI and Licorne for the monitoring of the implementation of the embargo on supplies of arms and related materiel, are very effective. Currently, advance notice is given for all inspections carried out by the impartial forces. The experts believe that from time to time random checks should be carried out.

36. On 3 September 2007, following his audience with the Group, the Director-General of Ivorian Customs, Col. Gnamien Konan, stated that UNOCI and Ivorian customs should draw up a cooperation agreement with a view to establishing a “specific monitoring unit” responsible for monitoring implementation of the embargo on military equipment. Such cooperation would ensure, in particular, that UNOCI had real-time access to information about deliveries of equipment.
V. Verification of the capacity of the Ivorian fleet

37. The Group continued its investigation into the use of the FANCI air fleet and flights that could constitute a threat to peace. It also monitored international air movements to Côte d’Ivoire and domestic flights.

38. As indicated in the previous report of the Group of Experts (S/2007/349), there have been no Mi-24 helicopter (registered as TU-VHO) flights since 26 October 2006. It became clear from the experts’ inspections that no maintenance has been done on the aircraft since the previous mission. To determine whether it is airworthy, however, would require the opinion of an aeronavigability expert based on a thorough technical inspection of the aircraft.

39. In an interview with the Group of Experts, the second in command of the Côte d’Ivoire air force, Colonel Adou Bahiro Denis, reiterated that all the aircraft comprising the Ivorian fleet that are capable of flying are utilized for civilian purposes only. This is the case of the Antonov 12, which is often utilized to transport cargo and two Puma helicopters (model IAR-330) that transport the President of the Republic and his staff. According to the Colonel, owing to their technical characteristics, these aircraft cannot be equipped with weapons (particularly since they do not have the necessary stabilization systems to fully ensure their safe use).

40. Nonetheless, according to the information obtained in the past, a sighting system had been placed on one of these helicopters. This equipment is, for the time being, dismantled. Moreover, rocket pod mounting brackets that can be adjusted to this aircraft are available in the hangar where the Mi-24 is kept and have been observed in a number of embargo inspections conducted at the Abidjan Airbase. Other rockets used on the Mi-24 which could be used on this IAR-330 were observed by the Group at the Akouédo Camp and at San Pedro.

41. According to Colonel Adou, all the ammunition stored in the same hangar as the Mi-24 does not pose any danger, as it has supposedly been deactivated and the firing devices are stored separately. However, a report dated 27 February 2007, prepared by the UNOCI demining team that participated in the embargo inspection at the Abidjan Airbase, recommended that “in order to eliminate all risks of explosion, active rockets should be moved and deactivated (or destroyed) and ammunition should be evacuated to a regulated ammunition depot”.

VI. Foreign technical assistance

42. Information pointing to the presence of three Slav technicians in Abidjan was received by the Group. These technicians were allegedly staying in Abidjan in late April/early May and late May/early June 2007. Two of the names provided to the experts, Mr. Feodosiy Kalovskiy and Mr. Sergiy Romanchuk, have already been mentioned in earlier reports (S/2006/964 and S/2006/735). The Group identified the third person (Mr. Niadziuzny) as being one of the members of the Antonov 12 crew. Nothing came of investigations into certain airlines and the Border Police Department of Côte d’Ivoire.

43. In the interview he gave to the Group, the FANCI second-in-command, Colonel Adou Bahiro Denis, repeated the version of the facts furnished to the
previous Group of Experts, namely, that the foreign technicians left Côte d’Ivoire at the end of 2006. Since that time, their presence at the Abidjan Airbase has never been detected.

44. In an interview in Abidjan on 28 August 2007, General Mangou, FANCI Chief of Staff, indicated that since the departure of these technicians towards the end of 2006, Côte d’Ivoire has not received foreign assistance. According to the General, since an order was issued to halt the Mi-24 helicopter overflight exercises, the presence of these technicians was no longer justified. In that same interview, General Mangou nonetheless expressed the view that the army is not yet in any position to provide experts with either a detailed list of the technicians present in Côte d’Ivoire in 2006 or any evidence to confirm their departure. He also suggested to the experts that they should contact the Ministry of Defence, as the armed forces could only stand to benefit from technical cooperation agreements negotiated by States.

45. At the working meeting with the Minister of Defence and his staff, held in Abidjan on 28 August 2007, the Ministry staff did not wish to answer questions about foreign technical cooperation provided to the Côte d’Ivoire national army. They denied having any knowledge of the situation prior to their entry on duty in the Ministry (March 2007) and said that to go back to issues that predated the signature of the Ouagadougou Agreement would run counter to the current peace process.

46. The Minister nonetheless authorized his staff to share any knowledge they had in their replies to the experts. To that end, he named a focal point, Colonel Major Kuié Nicolas, who is responsible for communicating to the Group the findings of verifications conducted in response to experts’ concerns. Despite the transmission of a written detailed written request, containing, in particular, authorization to meet Mr. Kapylou (see report contained in document S/2007/349, para. 41), and the Group’s insistence, this did not materialize. Although it had some information, the Group was unable to establish whether foreign technicians and instructors were in the territory of Côte d’Ivoire.

VII. Natural resources and management of Forces nouvelles

A. Coffee and cocoa sector

47. Unlike the Group’s prior mandates, it was able to meet with representatives of three of the four quasi-Government agencies in the coffee and cocoa sector: the Coffee and Cocoa Regulatory Authority (ARCC), the Coffee and Cocoa Marketing Exchange (BCC) and the Financial Regulation Fund (FRC). These meetings were made possible through the efforts of His Excellency Ambassador of Côte d’Ivoire to the United Nations, Mr. Alcide Djadje. As a result, the experts gained a better understanding of the functioning of this sector.

48. These meetings, however, shed no light on how the parafiscal revenue collected by these agencies was utilized. According to the agency heads, such data can be provided only by officials in the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

49. The Group was nonetheless able to conduct investigations at three banks with branches in Côte d’Ivoire, where some of the accounts belonging to these agencies
are domiciled. Each one has several accounts in different banks; moreover, funds are frequently transferred from one bank to another while cash is only withdrawn occasionally, making it difficult to trace financial operations. However, the Group’s analysis of bank movements produced no evidence of an immediate linkage between these transactions and military expenses.

50. Despite these difficulties, greater attention should be devoted to this area in future. To this end, the banking authorities of Côte d’Ivoire and of any other countries concerned would have to cooperate closely with the experts.

B. Hydrocarbons

51. The Group met with the Oil Committee (a body accountable to the Ministry of Mines and Energy) and some private actors in the hydrocarbon distribution sector. It was not possible for the Group to obtain information on the management of revenue from this sector, which is the source of the country’s leading export (1,569 billion CFA francs in 2006) and accounts for 17 per cent of the gross domestic product.

52. The Group’s efforts to obtain information from the Ministry of the Economy and Finance on the utilization of the levies and taxes generated by the coffee and cocoa and hydrocarbon sectors have been fruitless.

C. Financial management of Forces nouvelles

53. In its visits to Bouaké, the Group noted that, although redeployment of the Government administration is under way, Forces nouvelles continues to run the northern part of the country. Duties and taxes are collected according to a tax rate schedule. The Director-General of the Central gave no indication as to how this revenue is utilized and directed the Group to the National Secretary in charge of the Economy and Finance of Forces nouvelles, whom the experts could not manage to see.

VIII. Individual sanctions

A. Follow-up

54. In following up the verification of the financial assets of the persons targeted by Security Council sanctions, the experts reiterated their requests to the banks that had not responded during the Group’s previous mandate, namely, two French banks, Banque de la Poste and BNP Paribas (Mr. Eugène N’Goran Djoué Kouadio admits to having had an account there), and a Burkina Faso bank, Société Générale des Banques du Burkina (SGBB) (where Mr. Martin Kouakou Fofié had an account). No response had been received by the time the Group’s mission was ending. Experts therefore submitted another request for verification of any financial assets Mr. Charles Goudé Blé might have in the United Kingdom, where Mr. Goudé Blé was a student. Following this initiative, the Group was informed that the matter is currently under investigation.
B. Meetings with individuals subject to sanctions

55. The Group of Experts met with three individuals subject to individual sanctions in order to speak to them, hear their reactions and inform them of the procedures established by the Security Council concerning a request for the removal of individuals from the sanctions list (resolution 1730 (2006)).

56. Thus, the Group met with Mr. Kouadio in Abidjan on 10 August 2007, with Mr. Fofié in Bouaké on 5 September 2007 and with Mr. Blé in Abidjan on 7 September 2007. The three individuals said they are living off their close relatives or, depending on the circumstances, their organization. They feel they were unfairly targeted by the sanctions and said they do not wish to take any initiative to request their delisting, claiming that an explicit request to that effect is already contained in the Ouagadougou Agreement.

C. Direct and indirect assets

57. The Group tried to obtain information on other financial assets and economic resources under the direct or indirect control of these individuals by requesting, in particular, the cooperation of the Ivorian authorities. By the end of the mission, it had received no reply.

58. The Group was particularly interested in the royalties to be paid to Mr. Blé, the author of a book entitled “Ma part de vérité”, which was sold in Côte d’Ivoire. The experts were able to obtain a copy of the contract signed between Société nouvelle de presse et d’édition de Côte d’Ivoire (SNEPCI), the State-owned publisher of the work, and Mr. Blé. According to this contract, the “author undertakes to bear the cost (50 per cent upon placing the order, 50 per cent upon delivery) of publishing and producing this work”. Mr. Blé put about 7 million CFA francs towards the publication of the work. As stipulated in the contract, the royalties would amount to 65 per cent of gross sales. In this connection, a check for 11,244,316 CFA francs has already been remitted to Mr. Blé; this amount corresponds to sales in 2006 (see annex IV). Sales revenue for Mr. Blé’s book came to about 15 million CFA francs for the period from 1 January to 1 September 2007.

59. In a meeting with the experts, the Director-General of SNEPCI confirmed that Mr. Blé had been given a check at a public ceremony held on 4 September 2007. Mr. Blé said that he intended to donate his 2006 royalties to disadvantaged youth under a project coordinated by an entity with which he claims to be closely associated.

60. The experts believe that the act of a State-owned entity publicly handing a check to a person targeted by Security Council sanctions is a violation of the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 1572 (2004).

IX. Embargo on diamond exports

61. The Group visited the Séguéla and Tortiya diamond mines. It also went to Ghana, Antwerp and Dubai.
62. In Abidjan, the experts met with some members of the Cabinet of the Minister of Mines and Energy, with whom they exchanged views on the implementation of the embargo on diamond exports and on possible export channels. In order to ascertain whether diamonds of Ivorian origin were being shipped to Mali, the Group focused its investigations on the diamond-mining area of Côte d'Ivoire with a view to identifying the individuals and networks that might be ferrying diamonds into Mali.

A. Principal diamond-mining sites in Côte d'Ivoire

63. While visiting the northern zone, the Group noted a strong resurgence in mining activities at the sites in Séguela and the surrounding area and in Tortiya.

1. Séguela and surrounding area

64. On a visit to Bobi on 14 August 2007, the Group met with the village chief at his home, where several envelopes containing weekly diamond production sheets were in full view. The experts also met with workers at the Bobi dyke site, where several hundred persons were at work. Continuous activity was also observed at another site about 2 kms from the Bobi dyke.

65. While visiting the Séguela region, the experts met Mr. Aboudou Koné, who was identified by certain interlocutors as Mr. Siaka Coulibaly’s representative in this area (see reports contained in documents S/2006/735, S/2006/964 and S/2007/349), Mr. Sékou Sidibé (see reports contained in documents S/2006/735, S/2006/964 and S/2007/349) and brothers Ali and Daouda Diallo, friends of Mr. Coulibaly’s family, who maintained that they “only knew about the diamond business”.

66. When the allegations against him were set before him, Mr. Koné said that he no longer had any business dealings with Mr. Coulibaly, even though he acknowledged meeting him on all his trips to Bamako.

67. The Diallo brothers, whom the experts met in their office where a lamp for the examination and assessment of diamonds was lit, also said that they go to Mali every month. They said that on those trips, they see Mr. Coulibaly, who is apparently a friend of theirs.

68. When the experts met with Mr. Sidibé, he claimed yet again that he was no longer a diamond dealer; as proof, he showed experts a document authorizing him to purchase cashew nuts, which had been issued to him by the Central (Forces nouvelles management body).

2. Tortiya

69. On 2 September 2007 the Group visited the village of Tortiya, where it found nearly 100 people engaged in production activity. During their visit, the experts had the opportunity to see a quantity of diamonds that had just been mined.

70. During their stay in this locality, the experts met with Mr. Djadje, who is allegedly, according to a number of village residents, the representative of Mr. Sékou Sidibé and one of the major diamond collectors present in the locality.

71. The experts also interviewed Mr. Marius Sauvage, the owner of the “La Paillote” hotel and a former miner who had worked for the Watson and SODEMI companies. Notices hung on the doors of all the rooms in the hotel, as well as the hotel brochure, indicate that Mr. Sauvage is not only a hotelier but also a diamond dealer.
72. The experts found another dealer, Mr. Mohamed Fawaz, in the act of dealing diamonds. Questioned by the experts, he acknowledged that he financed diamond mining activities in Tortiya and sold the output only on the local market; as evidence of his activities, Mr. Fawaz gave the Group three small diamonds valued at about 15,000 CFA francs.

Photo 2
Detail of the brochure for the “La Paillote” hotel in Tortiya. Among the souvenirs offered are small glass vials with gold stoppers, containing local diamonds.

73. According to the President of the Association of Diamond Dealers of Tortiya, there are 15 main buyers in Tortiya who finance all artisanal mining activity in the region. According to him, these individuals buy and sell locally. The President also provided the Group with two small stones valued at approximately 5,000 CFA francs.

Photo 3
The five stones received by the experts in Tortiya. The telephone card in the photo gives an indication of the size of these diamonds.
74. The experts turned the five diamonds over to UNOCI on 20 September 2007 at a meeting in Abidjan with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

75. All the individuals interviewed in Séguela and Tortiya unanimously acknowledged that most of the diamonds mined in Côte d'Ivoire are sent to Mali, but did not give details on the identity of the exporters or buyers. The Group was unable to pursue investigations in this direction owing to the limited duration of its mandate.

B. Neighbouring countries: Ghana

76. The Group visited Ghana to ascertain the measures taken by that country pursuant to Security Council resolution 1643 (2005) on Côte d'Ivoire and to gauge the progress made in implementing the recommendations of the Kimberley Process review mission, in which the Group participated as an observer from 26 to 30 March 2007.

77. During their stay, the Group members met with the chief governmental and private stakeholders involved in diamond production and trading. They also visited the Akwatia mining region, where they met with dealers. It became apparent from this visit that Ghana has made remarkable efforts that have enhanced the credibility of its internal control system and its diamond import/export regime. In time, this should help to curb fraud and cross-border smuggling.

C. Trading centres: Antwerp and Dubai

78. On 23 and 24 July 2007 the Group visited Belgium, where it met with representatives of the World Diamond Council and of the Kimberley Process secretariat, among others, to discuss issues concerning diamond activity in Côte d'Ivoire and illegal diamond exports to major markets.

79. The experts visited the United Arab Emirates from 7 to 13 September 2007. During their visit they interviewed the authorities of the Dubai Diamond Exchange, with whom they raised issues concerning the internal control system in force in that country and the import/export regime, as well as statistics on external trade in diamonds. In addition, they visited one of the largest of the eight diamond-cutting facilities in Dubai, that of International Diamond Laboratories, and the jeweller Lindi Oro. According to its Director-General, the supply channels used are subject to rigorous controls and do not allow the infiltration of diamonds from conflict areas. Any such infiltration could hurt their global reputation, which is their main selling point.

80. With respect to the possibility that the United Arab Emirates market could be infiltrated by uncertified diamonds of African origin, which was raised in the Group’s preceding report (S/2007/349, para. 123), the Group pursued its investigations but was unable, for the moment, to obtain conclusive results. Nonetheless, the authorities of the Dubai Diamond Exchange acknowledged that the transactions at Gold Land (a gold and diamond shopping centre) are extremely fluid and hard to monitor, and said that they would remain mindful of the danger this represents.
X. Recommendations

81. In addition to the recommendations set out below, the Group believes that those contained in its preceding report (S/2007/349) remain valid.

A. Arms

82. The Group recommends that UNOCI physically inspect the law enforcement equipment purchased by the National Police from Imperial Armour.

83. While acknowledging the law enforcement equipment needs of the National Police, the experts wish to remind the Ivorian authorities that they must abide by the exemption procedures established by the United Nations.

84. With a view to more effective monitoring of the arms embargo, the Group recommends that UNOCI require the armed forces (Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire and Defence and Security Forces of the Forces nouvelles) to provide it with an inventory of all the arms in their possession and, to the extent possible, with identifying information for each weapon.

85. The experts recommend that Ivorian stakeholders and the international community make every effort to implement programmes to disarm combatants and dismantle militias, as provided for, inter alia, in the agreement reached in March 2007 on direct dialogue between the Ivorian parties. These programmes would effectively limit the emergence of obstacles to the ongoing peace process and would help to create a more favourable security climate.

B. Monitoring of the embargo

86. Given the persistence of hindrances to embargo inspections, the Group deems it necessary to remind the two parties’ military authorities (those of FANCI and FAFN) that the impartial forces cannot fulfil their monitoring mandate without these authorities’ cooperation. This recommendation applies in particular to Republican Guard units.

87. The experts also call upon the Sanctions Committee to urge the civilian authorities of Côte d’Ivoire to cooperate more fully with the Group of Experts to enable it to discharge its mandate, especially with regard to the exchange of information and documentation.

88. To ensure better follow-up to its monitoring activities, the Group recommends that UNOCI provide its embargo cell with sufficient human resources, taking into account the frequent rotation of the Operation’s personnel.

C. Individual sanctions

89. The Group recommends that the Ivorian authorities freeze any funds representing royalties belonging to Mr. Charles Blé Goudé, pursuant to the provisions of resolution 1572 (2004).
D. Diamonds

90. The Group calls upon the authorities of all the countries bordering Côte d’Ivoire to strengthen their internal controls over the production, certification and export of diamonds.

91. The experts also call upon the Ivorian authorities to take all appropriate measures to prevent the export of Ivorian diamonds and to strengthen border inspections.

E. General recommendations

92. The experts request the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) to remind all the States concerned, particularly those of the West African subregion, of their obligation to report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement the sanctions imposed on Côte d’Ivoire, in accordance with paragraph 14 (b) and (f) and paragraph 15 of resolution 1572 (2004).

93. The Group calls upon those Member States and public and private institutions that have not always responded to its information requests to transmit their replies as soon as possible.

94. The experts believe it is important to ensure broad awareness, in Côte d’Ivoire and in neighbouring countries, of the scope of Security Council decisions on the sanctions regime applicable to Côte d’Ivoire. This will help to reduce misunderstandings and diverging interpretations.
Annex I

Meetings and consultations

Belgium

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Multilateral agencies

Kimberley Process secretariat (provided by the European Union); World Diamond Council.

Bulgaria

Government

Interdepartmental Commission on Export Control and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Directorate-General for Customs; National Police hazardous goods monitoring office.

Côte d’Ivoire

Government

Oil Committee; Force aérienne de Côte d’Ivoire (FACI) command; National Police Headquarters; Customs Administration; Chief of Staff of the Ivorian armed forces; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Mines and Energy; Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs; Société nouvelle de presse et d’édition de Cote d’Ivoire (SNEPCI); management section of the Société d’Exploitation et de Développement Aéroportuaire, Aéronautique et Météorologique (Airport, Aeronautical and Meteorological Management and Development Corporation — SODEXAM).

Forces nouvelles

Chief of staff of the armed forces of the Forces nouvelles and office of the Forces nouvelles secretary-general.

Diplomatic missions

Embassy of France; Office of the Permanent Representative of the European Union.

Private sector

Air France; Coffee and Cocoa Regulatory Authority (ARCC); Bank of Africa; Banque nationale d’investissement (BNI); Coffee and Cocoa Marketing Exchange (BCC); Emirates; Ethiopian Airlines; Financial Regulation Fund (FRC); Groupement Professionnel des Exportateurs de Café et de Cacao (Coffee and Cocoa Exporters Group — GEPEX); Nestlé; Oryx Gaz; Petro Ivoire; Société générale de banque, Côte d’Ivoire (SGBCI); Shell-CI; Total.
Multilateral agencies
World Bank; Licorne forces; United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI); office of the Agency for the Safety of Air Navigation in Africa and Madagascar.

Civil society
Publiez ce que vous payez (NGO).

Individuals
Charles Goudé Blé
Eugène N’Goran Djoué Kouadio
Martin Kouakou Fofié

United Arab Emirates
Government
Dubai Diamond Exchange

Private sector
Gold Land; Lindi Oro; International Diamond Laboratories.

France
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ghana
Government
Ghana Customs and Excise; Ghana Consolidated Diamonds (GCD); Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines; Precious Minerals Marketing Co. (PMMC).

Private sector
B.C.B. International; Beatrice Diamonds; Complex Diamonds; Peri Diamonds.

Multilateral agencies
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Togo
Multilateral agencies
UNDP

Private sector
Africa West Cargo
Annex II

[Original: English]
MESSAGE

FM: CEMA/CPCO (Operations Planning and Monitoring Centre)

TO: UNOCI/UNOCI embargo cell

INFO: MINIDEF (ATCR)-CEMA (ATCR) - COSUP GEND-GR-PCIAT

LICORNE

BT

UNPROTECTED

URGENT

No. 27[-digit illegible]9/EMA/CPCO/COND date 16/09/07

SUBJECT: UNOCI INSPECTIONS OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD

TXT:

1. By fax of 15 September 2007, the UNOCI embargo cell scheduled an inspection of the Abidjan Republican Guard units for Monday, 17 September 2007, at 1000 hours.

2. You are reminded that until further notice the presidential compound is not covered by such inspections.

BT

(Signed) Lt. Colonel Kokou
Annex IV

Extract of page 1 of contract

Fraternité Matin

SNPECI

CONTRACT FOR PUBLICATION AT THE AUTHOR’S EXPENSE

Between the undersigned:

SNPECI, a State company with capital amounting to 175,000,000 CFA francs, located at Boulevard Général de Gaulle, 01 P.O. Box 1807, Abidjan 01, tel. 20 370 666, duly represented by its chief executive officer Mr. Honorat DE YEDAGNE,

party of the first part,

and

Charles Blé Goudé, 23 P.O. Box Abidjan 23, tel.

Hereinafter referred to as “the author”,

party of the second part.

Extract of article 3 (page 2 of contract)

Article 3 Author’s obligations

The author undertakes to bear the cost of publishing and producing this work (50 per cent on placing the order, 50 per cent on delivery).

The sizes, presentation and sale price of the volumes shall be established jointly by the two parties, taking into account their common interest.

Extract of article 5 (page 3 of contract)

Article 5 Publisher’s remuneration

4.1. Rates

The author undertakes to pay the publisher 35 per cent of gross sales for the purpose of promoting and marketing the work.

Extract of article 9 (page 4 of contract)

Article 9 Accounts

The accounts for the total royalties payable to the author shall be finalized on 31 December of each year. The royalties shall be paid to him at his request, within three months of the finalization of the accounts. The publisher shall supply the author simultaneously with a statement of account and an inventory of the number of copies in stock. The inventory shall also indicate the number of copies sold by the publisher, the number of unusable copies withdrawn from commercial distribution and the number of copies which were destroyed, were damaged or disappeared, as provided for in article 5 of this contract.
Extract of page 5 of contract
Done in Abidjan on 14 June 2006,
in two originals

THE PUBLISHER
(Signed) Honoré Dé Yadagne

THE AUTHOR
(Signed) Charles Blé Goudé