Letter dated 9 April 2010 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, and in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1893 (2009), I have the honour to transmit herewith the midterm report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire.

I would appreciate it if the present letter and the attached report were brought to the attention of the members of the Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti
Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire
Annex

Letter dated 18 March 2010 from the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004)

The members of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire have the honour to transmit herewith the midterm report of the Group prepared pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1893 (2009).

(Signed) Grégoire Bafouatika
(Signed) James Bevan
(Signed) Ilhan Berkol
(Signed) Noora Jamsheer
(Signed) Joel Salek

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<td>CFAO</td>
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<td>FANCI</td>
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<td>FDS-CI</td>
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<td>PETROCI</td>
<td>Société nationale d’opérations pétrolières de la Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>SODEMI</td>
<td>Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
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I. Introduction

1. In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 14 December 2009 (S/2009/646), the Secretary-General announced his appointment of the members of the Group of Experts as follows: James Bevan (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, arms expert and Coordinator), Grégoire Bafouatika (Republic of the Congo, aviation expert), Ilhan Berkol (Turkey, customs expert), Noora Jamsheer (Bahrain, diamond expert) and Joel Salek (Colombia, finance expert). A consultant, Manuel Vazquez-Boidard, and a Political Affairs Officer of the United Nations Secretariat, Manuel Bressan, assisted the Group.

2. The Group of Experts commenced its work on 11 January 2010. During the reporting period, its activities included meetings with Member States, international and regional organizations and Government authorities in Côte d’Ivoire to obtain information relevant to the Group’s investigations. Members of the Group visited Belgium, Burkina Faso, France, Guinea, Liberia, Mali and the United States of America, in addition to conducting field visits throughout Côte d’Ivoire. During the second part of its mandate, the Group intends to intensify its field-based investigations within Côte d’Ivoire, in addition to visiting a number of Member States in pursuit of information relevant to its investigations.

3. The Group believes that the political assessment provided by the previous Group of Experts (see S/2009/521, paras. 26-44) remains a valid evaluation of the impediments to Côte d’Ivoire’s recovery from crisis.

4. Political tensions escalated following the dissolution on 12 February 2010, by President Laurent Gbagbo, of the Government of Côte d’Ivoire and the Independent Electoral Commission. Despite these heightened tensions, which resulted in riots and deaths, the Group believes that the underlying reasons for the political deadlock remain the same.

5. Put simply, political leaders in the north and the south appear unwilling to reunite the country because they benefit, politically and economically, from a divided country. These are advantages that might be lost in the event of free and fair elections.

6. The electoral process has proved an effective tool for convincing key elements within the international community, including the United Nations, of the willingness of Ivorian leaders’ willingness to reunify Côte d’Ivoire. In reality, however, it has also provided a means for the Government of Côte d’Ivoire and the Forces nouvelles leadership to slow reunification.

7. The Group believes that the 12 February dissolution of the Government and the Independent Electoral Commission is the most recent in a succession of technical obstacles used by Ivorian leaders to postpone national elections. The violence that followed that event gives further weight to assertions by the previous Group of Experts that political tensions will persist, if not exacerbate, while the country remains divided (see S/2009/521, paras. 26-29).

8. As political tensions grow, as they have done so in the early months of 2010, the Group is concerned that the demand for arms and related materiel will escalate, whether among the two parties to the conflict or the civilian population more generally. Access to the sources of finance, including diamonds and other natural resources, which might be used to purchase arms and related materiel, is as
important now as it has been since the imposition of the sanctions regime in November 2004.

II. Investigation methodology

9. The Group prioritized field-based investigations, but also reviewed evidence provided by States and national, regional and international organizations and private companies.

10. The Group sought incontrovertible documentary evidence to support its findings, including the physical evidence provided by the markings applied to arms and ammunition. When evidence of this specificity was not available, the Group required at least two independent and credible sources to substantiate a finding.

11. The Group conducted investigations in each of its mandated fields of investigation to evaluate potential violations of relevant Security Council sanctions. The Group’s findings through States, individuals and companies were, to the extent possible, brought to the attention of those concerned to give them an opportunity to respond.

12. The present document is the midterm report of the Group, provided pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1893 (2009). In order not to compromise a number of ongoing investigations, the Group has elected not to disclose specific details of its enquiries in this report.

III. Cooperation with stakeholders

13. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1893 (2009), the Group maintained the level of cooperation of previous Groups with the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and Force Licorne, and exchanged information on measures taken to monitor the sanctions regime and possible violations thereof.

14. The Group appreciates the timely responses it received from various Ivorian Government ministries for its requests for meetings. It notes, however, that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire has yet to comply with the demands of paragraph 5 of resolution 1893 (2009) by allowing either the Group of Experts or UNOCI access to sites and military installations of the Republican Guard (see paras. 24-26 below). It has also observed reticence on the part of several ministries and Government-controlled companies to provide information requested by the Group, including the Ministry of Mines,1 the Société nationale d’opérations pétrolières de la Côte d’Ivoire (PETROCI), the Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d’Ivoire (SODEMI) and the Société ivoirienne de raffinage.

15. The Group also appreciates having met representatives of the Forces nouvelles military and political leadership. It notes, nonetheless, that certain Forces nouvelles units appear increasingly reluctant to present weapons for inspection by either the Group of Experts or UNOCI (see paras. 27-28 below). The Group is also concerned that it has not received an adequate explanation of the budgetary arrangements of the

1 This is in relation to financial investigations. The Ivorian Ministry of Mines is cooperating in relation to the diamond investigations.
La Centrale, the Force nouvelles treasury, despite meeting representatives in Bouaké on 26 January 2010 and numerous requests for information by previous Groups of Experts.

16. The Group welcomes efforts by authorities in neighbouring countries to facilitate its visits. In particular it notes the efficiency with which authorities in Burkina Faso arranged a comprehensive schedule of meetings (see annex I). The Group, however, wishes to note that efficient organization in the scheduling of meetings is not a substitute for transparency; specifically the information-sharing called for in paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 1893 (2009).

17. In contrast to the experiences of the previous Group of Experts during its 2009 visit to Guinea, the Group welcomes increasing transparency on the part of several Guinean ministries. The Group hopes to cooperate closely with the relevant ministries throughout the remainder of its mandate, particularly in relation to the trade in rough diamonds.

18. The Group is concerned by the unwillingness of certain Member States to cooperate with its requests for information. Despite repeated requests for information, several Member States have yet to provide important documents necessary for the Group’s investigations.

19. In general, private companies cooperated well with the Group’s requests for information, although the Group awaits information from several firms, including in the armament and petroleum industries.

20. The Group intends, in its final report, to compile a list of all entities (including Member States, international organizations and private companies) that have not responded in an adequate and timely manner to the Group’s requests for information.

IV. Monitoring of the embargo

21. The Group expresses its great appreciation for the consistent support provided by UNOCI and, in particular, the embargo cell. The embargo cell has proved to be an invaluable asset in all of the Group’s fields of investigation and provides critical administrative support in the area of transport and logistics.

22. While the Group notes considerable efforts made by UNOCI to support its investigations, it remains concerned that a number of crucial recommendations made by previous Groups of Experts remain unaddressed. In particular, the Group notes that the embargo cell continues to operate without a formal budget agreed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In addition, the Department has yet to allocate an arms expert to the embargo cell, as recommended by the previous Group of Experts in its midterm report (see S/2009/188, para. 129).

V. Arms

23. During the first part of its mandate, the Group inspected arms and related materiel of Forces de défense et de sécurité de Côte d’Ivoire (FDS-CI) and Forces
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de défense et de sécurité des Forces nouvelles (FDS-FN) in Abidjan, Bondoukou, Bouaké, Daloa, Korhogo, Man, Odienné and Séguéla. It also continued investigations into suspected shipments of arms and ammunition into the north and south of the country, some of which appear to be relatively large. Owing to the Group’s ongoing investigations, it will defer a full report of these cases until its final report to the sanctions Committee.

A. FDS-CI and FDS-FN cooperation

24. The Group notes that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire continues to deny the Group of Experts and UNOCI access to inspect the sites and equipment of the Republican Guard. This issue has been documented extensively in paragraphs 49 to 53 of the report of the previous Group of Experts (S/2009/521).

25. In this connection, the Group is particularly concerned by statements made by Alcide Djédjé, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the United Nations, to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on 29 October 2009, in which he stated “[…] It has to be made clear that the Group of Experts is not entitled to enter presidential sites. The Group of Experts will never have access to the presidential sites because that is not part of its job”. 3

26. The Group of Experts interprets those statements as a contradiction of the Security Council resolutions and a public denial of the mandate of the Group, under paragraph 5 of resolution 1893 (2009), to have unhindered access “to equipment, sites and installations referred to in paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 1584 (2005), and to all weapons, ammunition and related materiel, regardless of location, when appropriate without notice and including those under the control of Republican Guard units”.

27. The Group also notes a general decline in the willingness of certain Forces nouvelles units to allow inspections of arms and related materiel. This decline is evident in the UNOCI monthly statistics on embargo inspections (November 2009-March 2010) and from the Group’s recent interactions with the units concerned.

28. There are three issues in this regard. First, many Forces nouvelles military sites and installations are empty of personnel and weapons at the time of (pre-announced) inspections by UNOCI. Second, a number of Forces nouvelles units deny access on the grounds of not having been notified in advance of inspections. 4 Third, Forces nouvelles units that are armed and present at a location often refuse to allow inspection of their weapons because they claim to belong to a different military unit, which they maintain is not subject to the inspection in hand.

29. The Group believes that all three problems would be ameliorated if UNOCI immediately ceased to provide a 48-hour prior notice of inspections to FDS-CI and FDS-FN units. It has communicated these observations to UNOCI for consideration.

30. A schedule of unannounced inspections would give the Group of Experts and UNOCI the flexibility to inspect arms and related equipment “regardless of

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3 Interview with BBC radio journalist, Bessan Vikou, broadcast on 29 October 2009.
4 UNOCI sends faxes to FDS-CI and FDS-FN 48 hours in advance of inspections, which are often not communicated to the units scheduled for inspection. The units subsequently refuse access to sites on the grounds of not having been notified.
location”, as called for in paragraph 5 of resolution 1893 (2009). This would also include weapons deployed on the streets and in ostensibly non-military sites, such as the private compounds of Force nouvelles zone commanders, where many heavy weapons are stored (see S/2009/521, paras. 55-58).

31. The Group acknowledges that, should UNOCI enact the above-recommended changes, the rate of inspection refusals would increase. However, the Group believes that this would provide a more realistic indicator of the willingness of each party to comply with the sanctions regime. At present, UNOCI reports inspections as “successful” according to the criteria of having gained full access to a site or military installation. These criteria do not take into account whether or not, on the day of inspection, the site contains weapons or related materiel. The Group believes that the “successful” criteria cannot be used if parties are given prior notice of inspection because of the potential for the relocation or caching of arms and related materiel.

32. The Group also notes that Ivorian parties do not draw a distinction between UNOCI and the Group of Experts. FDS-CI and FDS-FN units frequently deny access to the Group of Experts, claiming that they require 48-hours notice in advance of inspection. The Group therefore concludes that the UNOCI practice of providing notice before inspections impedes the Group ability to conduct its investigations “without notice” and as mandated by resolution 1893 (2009).

B. Suspected arms and ammunition transfers

33. The Group has identified several types of ammunition in the hands of FANCI units that do not fit the profile of types that were in use with FANCI before the imposition of the arms embargo in November 2004. The Group has contacted ammunition manufacturers and is awaiting information regarding to whom the companies initially sold the munitions.

34. The Group is also investigating a potential link between trafficking in certain non-military commodities into the north of Côte d’Ivoire and the large transfers of weapons and ammunition into that region, which the previous Group of Experts reported in paragraphs 124 to 151 of its report (S/2009/521).

35. The Group continues to monitor arms and ammunition used by the civilian population of Côte d’Ivoire and has requested information on specific weapons and lots of ammunition from manufacturers in this regard.

C. Outstanding issues

36. The Group is concerned that the authorities in Burkina Faso have done little to investigate the transfers of arms and ammunition from the territory of Burkina Faso to northern Côte d’Ivoire reported by the previous Group of Experts (see S/2009/521, paras. 145-151) and pursuant to the previous Group’s recommendation in this regard (see S/2009/521, para. 501).

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5 The practice of providing prior notice of inspection necessitates providing a fixed location for an impending inspection, which necessarily constrains UNOCI’s ability to inspect immediately any suspicious arms and related materiel that might be seen outside of formal storage facilities.
37. During meetings with the Group in Ouagadougou in February 2010, Burkinabé officials were unable to convince the Group that investigations were under way and noted that, unless the Group provided specific information, it would be difficult for them to investigate the transfers.

38. The Group intends to review the sensitive information it has at its disposal and, where feasible, provide it to the relevant authorities in Burkina Faso. However, the Group believes that Burkinabé authorities are better placed to conduct investigations in Burkina Faso than the Group itself, whether from the perspective of access or resources. It concludes that the challenge to conducting investigations appears to be one of political will rather than technical capacity.

VI. Finance

39. The Group is mandated, by paragraph 7 (b) of Security Council resolution 1727 (2006), to investigate “the sources of financing, including from the exploitation of natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire, for purchases of arms and related materiel and activities”.

40. In this regard, the Group notes that, while the Government and Forces nouvelles may portray themselves as taking firm steps towards the reunification of the country, in reality, economic interests within each party impede accomplishing this purpose. There remains a risk that significant funds could be used to purchase arms and related materiel. During the first part of its mandate, the Group focused its finance-related investigations on a range of industries in Côte d’Ivoire, including gas and petroleum; mining (gold, manganese, nickel and copper); and agriculture (in particular, the production and export of cocoa). The Group also investigates other finance-related issues that may have a bearing on the embargo on arms and related materiel; for instance, the possible diversion of national revenues.

A. Major industries

1. Gas and petroleum

41. The Group has launched extensive field investigations that aim to profile this important sector of the economy. To date, it has addressed numerous letters requesting information in this regard, including to the Ivorian Ministry of Mines, to three partially or wholly State-owned companies and to six private businesses. The Group awaits responses from the majority of the entities contacted and notes, in particular, the unwillingness of Ivorian entities to provide information; notably, the Société nationale d’opérations pétrolières de la Côte d’Ivoire (PETROCI).

2. Gold

42. Paragraphs 199 and 200 of the final report of the previous Group of Experts (S/2009/521) noted the existence of a new gold mine in Tongon, which is located around 60 km north of Korhogo, in Zone 10 of the Forces nouvelles-controlled north of Côte d’Ivoire. This mine has an estimated annual yield of 3.16 million troy ounces.
43. The Group understands that production is due to commence in the fourth quarter of 2010\(^6\) and has addressed letters to State-owned and private companies in order to determine the project’s revenue-generating capacity and possible taxes paid to the region’s Forces nouvelles zone commander, Martin Kouakou Fofié. Mr. Fofié is one of the three individuals listed by the sanctions Committee on 7 February 2006 as subject to a travel ban and an assets freeze (see paras. 134-136 below).\(^7\)

3. **Manganese, nickel and copper**

44. Private companies are currently conducting manganese exploration in four different locations in both Government- and Forces nouvelles-controlled areas. A major nickel- and copper-mining project is located 600 km north-west of Abidjan in a Forces nouvelles-controlled area. The Group will continue to monitor these activities.

4. **Cocoa**

45. The previous Group of Experts reported extensively on the Ivorian cocoa industry (see S/2009/521, paras. 211-248), and the current Group has continued investigations in the following areas.

46. First, the Group continues to assess measures that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire has reportedly enacted to improve the transparency of cocoa revenues administered by the Comité de gestion de la filière café-cacao\(^8\) (see S/2009/521, para. 229). In particular, the Group is conducting investigations following reports of extrabudgetary expenditures of around US$ 7 million on machinery parts.

47. Second, the Group is currently undertaking an analysis of the financial impact on the Government and Forces nouvelles of the increase in cocoa bean prices (2009-January 2010) in the international market, including the availability and use of surplus revenues.

48. Third, the Group is reviewing the role that middlemen play in transactions with international companies and any measures that neighbouring countries have taken to control their operations in the cocoa smuggling reported in paragraph 231 of the report of the previous Group of Experts (S/2009/521).

B. **Other finance-related issues**

49. The Group is currently investigating several organizations and activities that may be used to channel funds for the acquisition of arms and related materiel.

1. **Comité national de soutien aux forces de réunification**

50. The Comité national de soutien aux forces de réunification (CONASFOR) is reportedly a private venture designed to raise funds for the purchase of equipment for mixed (FDS-CI and FDS-FN) defence and security force units (see S/2009/521, paras. 185-188).

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\(^8\) The Coffee and Cocoa Management Committee.
51. In a meeting in February 2010, representatives of CONASFOR informed the Group that the organization aims to facilitate the deployment of 8,000 elements assigned to the Integrated Command Centre. The President of CONASFOR, Evariste Meambly, claimed that the organization had, between May and December 2009, raised around US$ 1.1 million and had invested a portion of those funds in providing tents, bedding and associated equipment to Centre units and in conducting needs assessments of Centre units in 10 administrative zones of the country.

52. The Group continues to investigate equipment provided to defence and security forces by CONASFOR, including vehicles for potential military use.

2. La Centrale

53. In January 2010, the Group met the General Director of La Centrale, André Ouattara. According to Mr. Ouattara, the organization, which commenced operations in February 2004, is a centralized structure to collect revenues in order to support Forces nouvelles military infrastructure and administration and to provide social relief to the population in terms of health, education, and other basic needs.

54. The Group notes, however, that La Centrale has neither the power to collect taxes from many regions under the control of Forces nouvelles zone commanders, nor the capacity to redistribute funds for the social relief claimed by Mr. Ouattara. The Group maintains, in this regard, that zone commanders are relatively autonomous and appear to retain a large percentage of the taxes levied in their respective zones for their own purposes.

55. This observation suggests that a focus on reuniting the Forces nouvelles and Government treasuries overlooks the fact that La Centrale may only be responsible for a small proportion of the revenues generated and expended in the Forces nouvelles-controlled north of the country.

3. Contraband commodities

56. The Group continues to investigate contraband commodities entering the Forces nouvelles-controlled north of Côte d’Ivoire, including fuel, household goods, vehicles and electrical appliances from neighbouring countries. These tax- and duty-free commodities are then transported for sale in southern Côte d’Ivoire. The Group is conducting investigations into possible links between the import of certain of these commodities and arms transfers (see para. 34 above).

VII. Diamonds

57. Ongoing diamond mining in northern Côte d’Ivoire, specifically in Séguéla and Tortiya, provides the impetus for exports of Ivorian rough diamonds in violation of the sanctions regime.

58. While the Forces nouvelles zone commanders responsible for each mining area monitor mining very closely, they are unwilling to prevent violations of the embargo. Government authorities, including representatives of the Ministry of Mines, are powerless in this respect.

59. Neighbouring States, specifically Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia and Mali, likewise are either unable or unwilling to monitor and enforce the embargo on the
import of Ivorian rough diamonds. Côte d’Ivoire’s neighbours justify their inability to comply with resolution 1893 (2009) by citing a lack of resources. The Group acknowledges these problems, but notes a lack of political will in most cases.

60. Authorities in neighbouring Member States claim that international diamond centres are equipped and resourced to comply with the sanctions regime. Member States with international diamond trading centres, by contrast, expect Côte d’Ivoire’s neighbours to control the inflow of Ivorian diamonds onto international markets. In this regard, the Group notes that resolution 1893 (2009) calls on all Member States, equally, to prevent the importation of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire, regardless of whether these diamonds enter their territories directly or indirectly.

61. The Group asserts that the majority of Member States are not taking the necessary measures to curtail ongoing violations of paragraph 1 of resolution 1893 (2009), by which the Security Council renewed the diamond embargo.

A. Diamond mining in Séguéla

62. Diamond mining continues to be the main economic activity in Séguéla. The rough diamond industry in Séguéla is scarcely affected by the sanctions regime. Extensive diamond mining continues at the primary diamond deposit sites of Bobi, Diarabana, Forona and neighbouring areas. The Group maintains that diamonds from these sites must be entering international markets because there is no domestic stockpiling of Ivorian diamonds.

63. The Group conducted field research in Séguéla and visited the Bobi and Diarabana dykes. The Group also met diamond buyers at Séguéla’s diamond buying office, the Bureau d’Achat.

64. During its visit to the Diarabana dyke, the Group noticed that the mined area had expanded significantly (see annex II) since the visit of the previous Group of Experts in August 2009 (see S/2009/521, para. 270). Diamond mining at Diarabana is artisanal and labour-intensive. However, mining is generally systematic and, despite some alluvial mining at the periphery, it is largely focused on higher yield primary deposits.

65. Likewise, the mined area of the Bobi dyke has also expanded since the last visit by a Group of Experts in August 2009. The mining area is now larger and miners focus their efforts on extracting diamonds from primary, rather than alluvial, deposits.

66. The newly exploited primary diamond deposits in Séguéla have significantly increased Côte d’Ivoire’s diamond production. For example, the Kimberley Process Working Group of Diamond Experts estimates that just three of the newly found primary deposits are responsible for as much as a 50 per cent increase in Côte d’Ivoire’s production of rough diamonds (see annex III). Moreover, the Group has identified a further eight exploited primary sites whose yield is yet to be accounted for.

B. Suspected technical assistance

67. There are several reasons to believe that the expansion of diamond-mining in Séguéla may have been facilitated by technical expertise that is unlikely to be found in Séguéla.

68. First, the process of identifying primary deposits necessitates the use of geological assessment maps that are protected with algorithms, which distort their accuracy. The use of these maps is supposedly restricted. The Group understands that, within Côte d’Ivoire, geological assessment maps are available from the Ivorian State mining company, Société pour le développement minier de la Côte d’Ivoire (SODEMI). It is unclear who might have access to these maps.

69. Second, even with a geological assessment map and the appropriate algorithms, identifying a small primary deposit necessitates the use of geophysical equipment. As reported in the Kimberley Process Working Group Diamond Experts “Report to Plenary” of 3 November 2009, it is statistically unlikely that artisanal miners could have identified three relatively small primary diamond deposits without the aid of modern surveying techniques.

70. The Group notes that several companies in Côte d’Ivoire employ helicopter-operated geophysical equipment of the kind needed to survey diamond fields. This equipment is in regular use in a variety of industries (for example, surveying copper and gold deposits).

71. The Group concludes that it would be technically feasible for parties within Côte d’Ivoire to have obtained the required technical assistance and equipment to survey and identify primary diamond deposits. It continues to investigate this possibility.

C. Neighbouring countries

72. The Group visited Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia and Mali to discuss the sanctions regime on Ivorian rough diamonds. It intends to visit Ghana in the second part of its mandate.

1. Burkina Faso

73. Burkina Faso has no controls that might detect the import of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire. The relevant authorities appear unconcerned by the potential for illicit imports of Ivorian rough diamonds. Despite its proximity to Côte d’Ivoire, and a high volume of land trade with the north of the country, Burkinabé Customs reports no seizures of diamonds. Burkina Faso has expressed interest in becoming a Kimberley Process member, which the Group considers a risk to the Ivorian sanctions regime for all of the above-mentioned reasons.

2. Guinea

74. Recent political changes in Guinea appear to have had a positive impact on the country’s transparency. Guinean officials informed the Group that the country lacks an effective system of warranties (a paper trail that identifies the mining location of diamonds), does not have inspectors at mining sites and has porous borders. The Group welcomes Guinea’s frank assessment of its situation and notes that local
officials are currently working with the Kimberley Process to prevent Ivorian diamonds from entering Guinea’s markets.

3. Liberia

75. The Group’s investigations regarding an illicit Ivorian diamond trading network, which is believed to operate in Liberia, have been delayed owing to a lack of cooperation from Liberian officials. Although Liberia cooperated well with the previous Group of Experts, the Ministry of Energy, Lands and Mines refused to grant the Group access to documents related to the above case. The Group is currently working to obtain access to the documentation in order to resume its investigations.

4. Mali

76. The Group continues to receive reports of the involvement of Malian nationals in the illicit trade in Ivorian rough diamonds. Malian authorities have exhibited a lack of will in assisting the Group with its investigations. The Group believes that Ivorian diamonds enter international markets through Mali, but awaits important information requested from the Malian authorities.

D. Kimberley Process

77. Three out of five States bordering Côte d’Ivoire (Ghana, Guinea and Liberia) are members of the Kimberley Process and ostensibly comply with its requirements. However, these States have proven to operate ineffective controls on diamond trading. Despite this, the Kimberley Process fails to take action when its participants do not, or cannot, adhere to its principles. This problem is not restricted to the region, but applies to Kimberley Process participants more generally.

VIII. Aviation

78. During the first part of its mandate, the Group continued to assess the status of military aircraft of the Forces aériennes de Côte d’Ivoire (FACI). The Group also monitored the aircraft leased to the Government of Côte d’Ivoire by Helog AG, which are used to transport high-level civilian and military officials.

79. It maintained regular contact with the Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA) and with the cargo handling agency, the Régie administrative d’assistance en escale.

80. The Group visited several neighbouring countries to investigate suspect aircraft operators and flights. During those visits it analysed the traffic statistics for the region’s major airports. The Group toured most of the airfields and airstrips located in the south of Côte d’Ivoire in order to monitor their use. It also investigated possible foreign assistance in the repairing of military aircraft.
A. Verification of air fleet capacity

81. The following sections summarize the Group’s monitoring of military aircraft in both the Government-controlled south and Forces nouvelles-controlled north of Côte d’Ivoire.

1. Aircraft at Abidjan Airbase

82. FACI has not operated airworthy aircraft since October 2008.

83. The Mi-24 helicopter gunship, registered TU-VHO, does not appear to have been moved from the position it has occupied since the last report of the Group of Experts (S/2009/521).

84. The Antonov 12, registered TU-VMA, is technically an air asset of FANCI, although it has been used in the past for civilian purposes. This aircraft remains grounded, and has been since 11 November 2007 as a result of a fault in the port side (left) engine. A FACI officer confirmed that the last test of the remaining operational engine was performed on 19 March 2008.

85. The IAR-330 helicopter, registered TU-VHM, does not appear to be airworthy. According to a FACI officer, the aircraft made its last flight on 14 October 2008. The arms embargo has reportedly prevented the import of the spare parts required for repairs.

2. Aircraft at Bouaké Airbase

86. On 27 January 2010, the Group inspected Bouaké Airbase, which is controlled by the Forces nouvelles. The site is unused and in a state of neglect. The Group inspected five Alpha Jets, six Beechcraft Bonanza and one Cessna 421 aircraft, all of which are in very poor condition and have clearly not been moved or repaired for a long time.

87. According to an FDS-FN officer present during the inspection, these aircraft have not flown since 6 November 2004, when the French armed forces destroyed most of the FACI air fleet.

88. The Group believes that substantial resources would be needed to rehabilitate the aircraft. This expenditure is unfeasible and the Group, therefore, concludes that the aircraft will not fly again.

3. Aerostar unmanned aerial vehicle in Yamoussoukro

89. In January 2010, the Group inspected the FACI airbase in Yamoussoukro. No piloted aircraft have operated from the airbase since 6 November 2004, when FACI transferred its operational aircraft to Abidjan Airbase.

90. The Group inspected the only aircraft that remains at the airbase, which is an Aerostar unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). This aircraft is unarmed and designed

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10 The Aerostar was reportedly one of two UAVs transferred by Israel to Côte d’Ivoire in 2003. The Group believes the second, which was stationed in Abidjan, was destroyed by the French military in November 2004 (see the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfer Database at www.sipri.org).
for aerial surveillance. It was reportedly maintained by Israeli military technicians, who left Côte d’Ivoire in November 2004.

91. The UAV appears, externally, to be well maintained. The Group also visited the mobile control room, which is, likewise, in a good state of repair (see images below). According to a FACI officer, the UAV was operational until November 2006, but has not flown since that date because the embargo on arms and related materiel has “prevented maintenance”.

Figure
UAV mobile control room (left) and UAV (right) at Yamoussoukro Airbase

92. The Group received reports, on 15 March 2010, that the UAV and control room had been removed from Yamoussoukro Airbase. It requested that UNOCI military observers in Yamoussoukro conduct an inspection of the facility in order to verify the reports. FACI officials, however, refused access to the team on the grounds that they had not been provided with advance notice of the inspection (see paras. 29-32, above, on the problems associated with UNOCI providing notice before inspections).

93. The Group is concerned that the UAV may have been relocated nearer to Abidjan for surveillance purposes. It recalls that a member of the Group of Experts witnessed a UAV of similar type, which did not belong to the impartial forces (UNOCI and Licorne), in flight over Abidjan on 14 February 2010.

94. Côte d’Ivoire probably does not have the technical capacity to maintain and fly the UAV, which is evidenced by previous reliance on foreign technicians. If, indeed, the UAV is operational and has flown, the Group believes that this may be evidence of renewed foreign technical assistance. It continues to investigate the whereabouts of the UAV.

4. Helicopters of the presidential fleet

95. Helog AG, a German company, leases four IAR-330 helicopters to the Ivorian authorities, which are registered DH-AXE, DH-AXF, DH-AXR and ST-AXU, respectively, and are stored and maintained next to Abidjan Airbase. Of the four helicopters, three are operational. ST-AXU and DH-AXR are assigned to the
presidency. DH-AXE and DH-AXF are assigned to diverse operations, including the training of Helog’s pilots.

96. A representative of Helog AG informed the Group that his company’s aircraft are used exclusively for civilian purposes.

5. Aircraft of the presidential fleet

97. As reported in the reports of previous Groups of Experts, the presidency of Côte d’Ivoire operates three aircraft: one Fokker 100, registered TU-VAA, damaged by a rocket attack in 2007; one Gulfstream 3, registered TU-VAF, under maintenance in St. Louis, Missouri (United States of America), since October 2009;11 and one Gulfstream 4, registered TU-VAD, which remains the only operational aircraft of the presidential fleet.

B. Cargo document verification

98. As in previous mandates, the Group maintained regular contact with ASECNA and also with the Régie administrative d’assistance en escale. Through these contacts, the Group monitored domestic and international flights and verified documents accompanying goods unloaded at Abidjan Airport. The Group’s analysis and verification of cargo manifests and air waybills have not raised any particular concerns.

99. In connection with the recommendation in the final report of the previous Group of Experts (S/2009/521, para. 520), the Group organized a meeting between ASECNA officials at Abidjan Airport and the UNOCI embargo cell quick reaction task force. The aim of the meeting was to sensitize ASECNA officials regarding the mandate of the task force and facilitate information-sharing between ASECNA and the task force. ASECNA officials have committed to providing the task force with all information necessary to its monitoring mission.

C. Airports and airstrips

100. During the first part of its mandate, the Group visited the main airports and airstrips in southern Côte d’Ivoire. It plans visits to other airport facilities, including in northern Côte d’Ivoire, during the second part of the mandate. The Group held discussions with several operators of airports and airstrips and UNOCI personnel stationed at some of these sites.

101. The airstrips visited were primarily facilities used for domestic flights and without Ivorian Customs personnel. Aircraft wishing to land at these airfields must apply for special permission (for overflight and landing) from the Directorate of the National Agency for Civil Aviation. Having granted permission, local civil aviation authorities must deploy the necessary personnel for police and Customs formalities. According to local interlocutors, such airstrips very rarely receive aircraft from abroad.

11 This aircraft has reportedly not returned owing to unpaid maintenance fees.
102. Because UNOCI personnel are present on these airfields only for arrivals and departures of United Nations or Force Licorne flights, no information is available regarding potential suspect flights.

103. Following the recommendations contained in the final report of the previous Group of Experts (S/2009/521, para. 519), the embargo cell is currently developing a system to enable UNOCI personnel to monitor nearby airports and airstrips.

104. The embargo cell is also taking steps to ensure coordination between the embargo cell quick reaction task force and the Togolese battalion stationed at Abidjan Airbase and has provided both elements with cameras to film any suspicious activity at the site.

D. Foreign military assistance

105. On 18 February 2010, a confidential source reported to the Group the presence of Robert Montoya in Abidjan. Mr. Montoya had in the past acted as an intermediary for the sale of Belarusian arms to Côte d'Ivoire, in particular Mi-24 and Sukhoi aircraft, which was noted by previous Groups of Experts (see S/2006/964, paras. 29-31).

106. On 4 March 2010, a media report indicated that Mr. Montoya had led a Belarusian delegation, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Agriculture and Food, to Côte d'Ivoire.

107. The Group later learned that Mr. Montoya, a French national, was accompanied on his visit by Mikhail Kapylou, a national of Belarus. Both individuals are known to have recruited foreign technicians who, prior to late 2006, had maintained and flown the Mi-24 helicopter registered TU-VHO (see S/2006/735, para. 74 and S/2006/964, para. 25).

108. On 10 March 2010, the FANCI Chief of Staff addressed a note to UNOCI and Force Licorne announcing the resumption of maintenance work on the Mi-24 helicopter. Maintenance work had reportedly stopped in 2006 because the sanctions regime prevented foreign technical assistance and the import of spare parts (see S/2007/611, para. 44).

109. The Government of Côte d'Ivoire does not have technicians capable of rehabilitating the Mi-24, nor does it have trained pilots. The Group believes that the Mi-24 can only be rehabilitated and flown by foreign personnel and probably requires imported spare parts. Each of these activities would constitute a breach of the sanctions regime.

110. At the time of writing, no maintenance work on the aircraft had commenced. The Group remains vigilant for any signs of foreign technical assistance or imports of spare parts. It notes that previous flights by the Mi-24 helicopter, in 2005 and 2006, had the effect of raising tensions in Abidjan, with implications for security in the country more generally.

13 On 22 February 2005 and again on 21 February 2006, UNOCI had authorized FANCI to test the helicopter on the last Wednesday of each month (see S/2006/735, para. 65).
IX. Customs

111. During the first part of its mandate the Group conducted investigations along the northern border of Côte d’Ivoire, at Abidjan seaport and airport and in neighbouring countries.

A. The north

112. Côte d’Ivoire’s continued division remains the determining factor in the lack of customs control within the country. No Government Customs authority operates in the Forces nouvelles-controlled north of the country. Trucks entering and leaving the north do so without official Customs documentation and, as a consequence, there is no registry of imports, exports or transit\textsuperscript{14} goods.

113. Ivorian authorities complained to the Group regarding the loss of Customs revenues owing to the export of goods, including cocoa, from the north to neighbouring countries; particularly goods transiting Burkina Faso for export from the port of Lomé, Togo. The Customs authorities in Burkina Faso informed the Group, during a meeting in February 2010, that they do not inspect transit goods because of agreements reached by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) that exempt transit goods from Customs controls.\textsuperscript{15}

114. The Group notes, in this regard, that the Ivorian State does not regulate exports from the north of Côte d’Ivoire, which suggests that neither the ECOWAS nor the UEMOA agreement should be cited as grounds for a lack of control. The Group urges Burkina Faso to enact Customs controls on all transit shipments bound for, or leaving, the territory of Côte d’Ivoire.

115. Authorities in Burkina Faso and Guinea confirm that they have no contact with the Forces nouvelles and that they only exchange Customs information with the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, which controls the south. Likewise, the Ivorian General Directorate of Customs informed the Group, in March 2010, that it was completely unaware of Customs procedures and goods transported without official documentation in the north of the country.

116. The taxation of trucks at checkpoints throughout the north (see S/2009/521, paras. 193-196) is effectively arbitrary and dependent on the will of local Forces nouvelles units. It is unclear how the Force nouvelles redistribute these levied taxes and to what extent they are shared between local zone commanders and the Forces nouvelles treasury, La Centrale. It is clear, however, that La Centrale does not use the funds for social services and the welfare of the population of the north. The system is conducive to all types of abuse and individual enrichment.

117. Following its visits to diamond mines in Séguela, the Group observed that the trade in rough diamonds is heavily monitored, from extraction to sale, by Forces nouvelles representatives (see para. 58 above). Given the unwillingness of the Forces nouvelles to enact proper customs controls, the Group notes that the only

\textsuperscript{14} See S/2009/521, para. 436, which confirms the absence of transit documentation.

\textsuperscript{15} See ECOWAS Treaty, art. 45, “Re-exportation of Goods and Transit Facilities”, in particular para. 2, and Recommendation No. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA, in particular, art. 5.II.
effective way to police the embargo on rough diamond exports is to operate controls at the point of extraction.

B. The south

118. The Ivorian Government has not adhered to the recommendations of previous Groups of Experts, particularly with respect to integrating references to the embargo into national legislation (see S/2009/521, para. 522). The General Directorate of Customs informed the Group on 10 March 2010 that the list of embargoed goods, provided to it by the UNOCI embargo cell, had not been formally distributed to Ivorian Customs agents in the south.

119. Customs personnel at the Port of Abidjan only assist in the transhipment (reloading onto trucks) of goods in transit. They do not inspect them because delays caused by inspections increase port charges. The Directorate General of Customs informed the Group that Customs personnel do not verify whether declared values correspond to goods in transit, and the system is open to abuse. According to Customs officials, transporters frequently claim that transit goods have been stolen in the Force nouvelles-controlled north, whereas they have, in reality, been sold illegally on the Ivorian market.

120. Ivorian Customs authorities also complain that exported Ivorian commodities return illegally to the country because of the lack of control in the north. For example, fuel is cheaper in Bouaké than in Abidjan, despite the greater distance from the refinery. The logical conclusion is that fuel destined for export, in fact, remains in the north of Côte d’Ivoire. For these reasons, Ivorian Customs officials have taken the decision to mark exported petrol with a red dye. The Group has viewed “red” petroleum for sale throughout the north.

121. Transporters carrying goods for export should have to pay a bond, which is reclaimed once the goods have left the country. Prior to the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, Customs officials demanded proof of the original declaration in electronic form. Owing to the lack of a functioning customs administration in the north, however, they now repay the bonds on the basis of copied documents or certificates drafted by the Forces nouvelles. Under these circumstances there is no guarantee that goods for export actually leave the country.

122. The UNOCI embargo cell conducts regular inspections and analysis of cargo documents at the ports of Abidjan and San Pedro and Abidjan Airport. The embargo cell quick reaction task force also conducts additional checks. However, this inspection regime would be more effective if UNOCI undertook physical inspections according to a risk assessment methodology (see S/2008/598, paras. 16 and 191). The Group believes that this would expedite the inspection schedule by reducing the overall number of physical inspections.

123. In this regard, the Group notes that its recommendation that additional Customs personnel be assigned to the embargo cell has not been implemented (see S/2009/521, para. 475).
C. Neighbouring countries

124. In February 2010, the Group visited Burkina Faso and Guinea to discuss cross-border issues. The Ministries of Finance and Transport in Guinea confirmed that they have problems controlling the transport of goods between Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire because of the political instability in both countries, which impacts negatively on Guinean Customs revenues. Given the steady decline in the value of the Guinean franc, and following reports by Guinean Customs, the Group believes that most of the cross-border trade flows in the direction of northern Côte d’Ivoire.

125. The Customs authorities in Burkina Faso informed the Group that they have no interest in tracking goods in transit, such as coffee and cocoa. This is because of the ECOWAS and UEMOA agreements (see paras. 113-114 above) and because transit goods are not taxable. However, the Group is concerned that many transit commodities do not leave the territory of Burkina Faso. Although Burkinabé Customs authorities insist that all transit goods are containerized or otherwise sealed, the Group notes that most transit cargoes, including cocoa, are transported in open trucks (see S/2009/521, fig. XII).

D. Dual-use goods

126. In February 2010, the Group met representatives of the Compagnie française de l’Afrique occidentale (CFAO) in Abidjan. The previous Group of Experts noted in its report that it considered the import of vehicles by CFAO, which are destined for Ivorian defence and security forces, a violation of the embargo on arms and related materiel (see S/2009/521, paras. 71-74).

127. The Group is now aware that the company imports vehicles to Côte d’Ivoire in batches. Only after importation does the company know to which customers (whether civilian or defence and security) it will sell the vehicles. This means that the imports are something of a “grey area” in respect to the sanctions regime.

128. French and European Union legislation\(^\text{16}\) indicates that companies that are aware that their products are dual-use items (i.e. of civilian types, but destined for military uses) must inform relevant authorities in the exporting country.

129. The Group maintains that, by this rationale, companies that are aware that their products are destined for use by defence and security forces in Côte d’Ivoire should consider their exports to be of a dual-use nature.

130. In the case of CFAO, the company is aware, at the time of export, that some of its vehicles (although not necessarily all) are destined for the defence and security forces of Côte d’Ivoire.

131. Following a constructive meeting with representatives of CFAO, the Group addressed a letter to the company proposing, in the interests of transparency, that CFAO notify the sanctions Committee when it makes sales of vehicles to the Ivorian defence and security forces. In addition, the Group strongly recommended that, before exporting vehicles to Côte d’Ivoire, CFAO consult authorities in the

\(^{16}\) In particular, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000, art. 4, para. 4 (22 June 2009); and Directorate General of Customs and Indirect Taxes, *Guide sur les exportations de biens et technologies à double usage*, para. 5 (June 2009).
exporting country as to whether or not it need apply for an exemption request from the Committee.

132. The Group will contact a number of other importers of dual-use equipment in the second part of its mandate.

X. Individual sanctions


134. The Group reiterated, during meetings with authorities in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali, the need for national authorities to remain vigilant for any travel or financial activity involving the three individuals.

135. The authorities of Burkina Faso informed the Group that, on 15 January 2010, the Ministry of Finance and Economy had issued a decree freezing all bank accounts in the country that belong to the sanctioned individuals. The Group is currently assessing the actual impact of the decree.

A. Martin Kouakou Fofié

136. On 29 January 2010, the Group held a meeting with Martin Kouakou Fofié at the Fansara military base in Korhogo.

137. Mr. Fofié explained to the Group that the sanctions were imposed on him mistakenly, unilaterally and without any prior investigation. He expressed his will to contest the charges should an independent commission be put in place to investigate him.

138. Mr. Fofié also confirmed to the Group that his zone of control (Zone 10) includes the diamond-producing region of Tortiya. The Group continues to investigate possible revenues that Mr. Fofié may obtain from the trade in diamonds, in addition to gold-mining in other locations under his command.

B. Eugène N’goran Kouadio Djué and Charles Blé Goudé

139. The Group continues its investigations into possible violations of the individual sanctions imposed on Mr. Djué and Mr. Blé Goudé and expects to hold meetings with the two individuals during the second part of its mandate.

XI. Recommendations

140. In addition to the recommendations set out below, the Group believes that those contained in the final report of the previous Group of Experts (S/2009/521) remain valid.
141. The Group calls upon those Member States, and public and private institutions, that have not yet responded to its requests for information to assist the Group in fulfilling its mandate by transmitting their replies in as timely a manner as possible.

A. Arms

142. The Group recommends that UNOCI immediately terminate its practice of providing 48 hours notice prior to inspecting Ivorian defence and security forces.

143. The Group urges the Government of Burkina Faso to commence investigations into arms and ammunition transfers from the territory of Burkina Faso to northern Côte d’Ivoire.

144. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire clarify its position to the sanctions Committee in relation to inspections of Republican Guard units in the light of comments made by the Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the United Nations.

B. Finance

145. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire facilitate the Group’s investigations into the finances of the oil, gas and mining sectors by granting access to all necessary documents and ensuring Ivorian-registered companies do likewise.

146. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, particularly the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture, take the necessary measures to impede any embezzlement or fraud of funds managed by the Comité de gestion de la filière café-cacao.

147. The Group recommends that cocoa industry middlemen, international companies and neighbouring countries remain vigilant to cocoa-smuggling and take the necessary measures to avoid paying revenues to Ivorian parties, including Forces nouvelles zone commanders, who may be using such funds to purchase illicit arms and related materiel.

C. Diamonds

148. The Group urges the Ivorian Ministry of Mines, with the assistance of respective Forces nouvelles zone commanders, to keep records of diamond production in Séguéla and Tortiya, and to record diamond sale details, including the names of buyers, price and carat weight.

149. The Group urges the World Federation of Diamond Bourses to monitor the activities of individuals and companies that are involved in the trade in Ivorian diamonds. The Group also urges the Federation to prevent those convicted of trading in illicit diamonds from trading with Federation members.

150. The Group urges Government authorities in Mali and Burkina Faso to monitor their borders vigilantly for the possible transit of Ivorian diamonds through their customs territories.
D. Aviation

151. The Group recommends that UNOCI regularly monitor any activity around the UAV and the UAV control room at Yamoussoukro Airbase.

152. The Group recommends that the embargo cell quick reaction task force and the Togolese battalion stationed at Abidjan Airbase monitor all civil aircraft stationed there, including helicopters, and report immediately any use of a military nature.

153. The Group recommends that UNOCI regularly monitor any activity around the TU-VHO-registered Mi-24 helicopter at Abidjan Airbase, in particular with respect to possible foreign technical assistance in its rehabilitation.

E. Customs

154. The Group urges neighbouring countries, in particular Burkina Faso, to enact Customs controls on all transit shipments destined for, or leaving, the territory of Côte d’Ivoire.

155. The Group recommends that UNOCI conduct physical inspections of goods on the basis of a risk assessment methodology.

156. The Group recommends that UNOCI reinforce the UNOCI embargo cell with additional Customs experts.
Annex I

Meetings and consultations held by the Group of Experts in the course of its mandate

Belgium

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Federal Police of Belgium

Multilateral and bilateral entities
European Commission, Chair of the Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring; Antwerp World Diamond Centre; Chair of Kimberley Process Working Group of Diamond Experts

Private sector
International Gemmological Institute

Burkina Faso

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation; Ministry of Trade for the Promotion of Business and Crafts; Ministry of Mines, Works and Energy; General Directorate of Police; General Directorate of Customs; General Directorate of Civil Aviation; Office of the Chief of Staff, National Gendarmerie; Airport Police, Ouagadougou International Airport; Customs, Ouagadougou International Airport; National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons

Private sector
Chamber of Commerce for the Industry and Craft of Burkina Faso

Côte d’Ivoire

Government
Ministry of Defence; Ministry of the Interior; Ministry of Mines and Energy; General Directorate of Customs; Gendarmerie; Régie administrative d’assistance en escale; Banque nationale d’investissement (BNI); Comité de gestion de la filière café-cacao

Forces nouvelles
Chief of Staff, Forces armées des Forces nouvelles; La Centrale; Commander of Zone 3; Commander of Zone 10
Diplomatic missions
Embassy of Belgium; Embassy of Israel; Embassy of South Africa; Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Embassy of the United States of America; European Union

Multilateral and bilateral entities
Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA)

Private sector
Compagnie française de l’Afrique occidentale (CFAO); Comité national de soutien aux forces de réunification (CONASFOR); Helog AG; International Aircraft Services Ltd.

France
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Multilateral and bilateral entities
European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol)

Guinea
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water; Ministry of Security; Ministry of Transport

Civil society
Centre du commerce international pour le développement (CECIDE)

Liberia
Government
Ministry of Finance, Bureau of Customs and Excise; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Land, Mines and Energy

Mali
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Economy and Finance; National Agency for Civil Aviation; National Directorate of Mines and Geology
Civil society
Groupe d’appui aux programmes (GAP); Partnership Africa Canada (PAC); Fondation pour le Développement au Sahel (FDS); Publish What You Pay Canada

United States of America

Government
Department of State; Department of the Treasury; United States Geological Survey

Multilateral and bilateral entities
World Diamond Council

Private sector
New York Diamond Dealers Club
Annex II

Diarabana dyke: expansion of the mine (May 2009-January 2010)

Source: Group of Experts
Note: The first picture was taken at the Diarabana dyke in May 2009. The width of the excavated area was around 1 metre. In the second picture, taken in January 2010, the excavated area has increased in width to 40 or more metres.
Annex III

Côte d’Ivoire’s diamond production estimates

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<td>Séguéla</td>
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<tr>
<td>Old deposits</td>
<td>104,000-173,000 carats</td>
<td>80,500-127,000 carats</td>
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<tr>
<td>New deposits</td>
<td>55,300-150,000 carats*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tortiya</td>
<td>10,000-15,000 carats</td>
<td>10,000-15,000 carats</td>
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|          | 114,000-188,000 carats | 145,800-292,000 carats |


* The production volume estimates are based on diamond yield data prior to the crisis. The figures are approximations and are not definitive.