Letter dated 8 April 2009 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, and in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1842 (2008), I have the honour to transmit herewith the midterm report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire.

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Claude Heller
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire
Letter dated 20 March 2009 from the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004)

The members of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire have the honour to transmit herewith the midterm report of the Group prepared pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1842 (2008).

(Signed) Grégoire Bafouatika  
(Signed) James Bevan  
(Signed) Noora Jamsheer  
(Signed) Joel Salek  
(Signed) El Hadi Salah

Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Investigation methodology</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Cooperation with stakeholders</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Monitoring of the embargo</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Verification of the air fleet capacity</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Airports and airstrips</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Verification of flights and aircraft movements to Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Military assistance</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Arms</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Violations of the arms embargo</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Continued investigations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Arms trafficking in the Lac Buyo region</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Needs of the National Police and Gendarmerie in terms of law enforcement material</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Imported explosives (Schlumberger case)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Recent imports by the Ivorian Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Imperial Armour case</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Finance</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Government budget</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Forces nouvelles revenues</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. Diamond embargo</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Diamond production in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. State of the international rough diamond industry</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Updates on previous diamond cases</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Ghana</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mali</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
X. Customs ................................................. 20
  A. Deployment of Customs in Côte d’Ivoire ................. 21
  B. Exchange of Customs information with neighbouring countries ................. 21
  C. Transit cargo ............................................. 22
XI. Individual sanctions ........................................ 22
  A. Martin Kouakou Fofié ..................................... 23
  B. Charles Blé Goudé ........................................... 24
  C. Eugène N’goran Kouadio Djoué ......................... 24
XII. Recommendations ........................................... 24
  A. Customs ....................................................... 24
  B. Arms and military assistance ............................. 25
  C. Finance ........................................................ 25
  D. Diamonds ...................................................... 26
  E. Individual sanctions ......................................... 26

Annexes

I. Meetings and consultations held by the Group of Experts in the course of its mandate ........ 27
II. Advisory note submitted by the Group of Experts to the Togolese battalion of UNOCI stationed at Abidjan Airbase ............................................. 31
III. Unreported mining sites in Côte d’Ivoire ........................................ 32
IV. Ongoing mining activities in Séguéla and Tortiya ........................................... 33
V. Sample of diamond production in Séguéla .................................................. 34
VI. Industrial equipment in operation at diamond-mining site .................................... 35
VII. Review of controls agreed by Member States to prevent the importation of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire .................................................. 36
VIII. Rough diamond bookkeeping system newly adopted by Ghana ......................... 37
IX. Harmonized System Customs codes that encompass goods subject to the embargo (in use with the UNOCI embargo cell) ........................................... 38
X. Inter-State transit document (Carnet Trie CEDEO) found in the custody of Forces nouvelles offices in Ouangolodougou, Côte d’Ivoire ........................................... 39
**Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASECNA</td>
<td>Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCFA</td>
<td>CFA franc</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACI</td>
<td>Forces aériennes de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDS-CI</td>
<td>Forces de défense et de sécurité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDS-FN</td>
<td>Forces de défense et de sécurité des Forces nouvelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. Introduction

1. In letters addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 16 December 2008 (S/2008/793) and 5 January 2009 (S/2009/5), the Secretary-General announced his appointment of the members of the Group of Experts as follows: El Hadi Salah (Algeria, Customs expert and coordinator), Grégoire Bafouatika (Republic of the Congo, aviation expert), James Bevan (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, arms expert), Noora Jamsheer (Bahrain, diamonds expert) and Joel Hernando Salek (Colombia, finance expert). The Group was assisted by a consultant, Isidore Tiemtore, and by Manuel Bressan, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Secretariat.

2. The Group of Experts commenced its work on 12 January 2009. Its activities included meetings with Member States, relevant international organizations and Government authorities in Côte d’Ivoire to obtain background information in support of detailed investigations, primarily in the region. Members of the Group visited Belgium, Burkina Faso, France, Ghana, Guinea, Israel, Liberia, Mali, Senegal and the United Arab Emirates. The Group maintained a continuous presence in Côte d’Ivoire and conducted numerous inspections of military equipment and installations in all major sectors of the country, in addition to conducting field-based investigations throughout Côte d’Ivoire. The Group will continue to intensify its field visits within Côte d’Ivoire during the second part of its mandate, recognizing that research of this nature has provided the Group with invaluable information.

3. The Group notes that, while the political situation in Côte d’Ivoire remains relatively peaceful, it would be incorrect to interpret this as a sign of progress towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In the north of the country, quasi-private militias maintain control over natural resources and continue to extract rents from local businesses and the civilian population. Like all such quasi-State economies, that of northern Côte d’Ivoire depends on the availability of foreign markets for the export of natural resources and on relations with foreign suppliers for the importation of strategic goods, including fuel, vehicles and weapons. The economic networks that operate in the north of Côte d’Ivoire extend both north and south. The Group is of the view that economic stakeholders resident in neighbouring States, and in the Government-controlled south of Côte d’Ivoire, benefit from the status quo.

4. The Group believes that several years of north-south polarization have introduced new political and economic tensions into the crisis. The north of the country is fractured into a series of politico-military commands, which compete (sometimes violently) for control over natural resources and commerce. Should the political situation in the country deteriorate, and the economic interests of some parties be threatened by such events, the Group cannot exclude a situation in which armed violence may escalate rapidly, particularly in the north. Despite the arms embargo, the parties to the conflict remain sufficiently heavily armed to engage in sustained armed hostilities and some are rearming. In the months ahead, some parties will further entrench their control over the territory and economic resources of northern Côte d’Ivoire — thereby raising the stakes of any future political settlement.
II. Investigation methodology

5. The Group prioritized field-based investigations but also reviewed evidence provided by States and national, regional and international organizations and private companies.

6. The Group sought incontrovertible documentary evidence to support its findings, including the physical evidence provided by the markings applied to arms and ammunition. When evidence of this specificity was not available, the Group required at least two independent and credible sources to substantiate a finding.

7. The Group conducted investigations in each of its mandated fields of investigation to evaluate potential violations of relevant Security Council sanctions. The Group’s findings vis-à-vis States, individuals and companies were, to the extent possible, brought to the attention of those concerned to give them an opportunity to respond.

8. The present document is the midterm report of the Group, provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1842 (2008). In order not to compromise a number of ongoing investigations, the Group has elected not to disclose specific details of its enquiries in this report.

III. Cooperation with stakeholders

9. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1842 (2008), the Group continued the cooperation of previous Groups with UNOCI and Force Licorne and exchanged information on measures taken to monitor the sanctions regime and possible violations thereof. The Group also cooperated extensively with the Panel of Experts on Liberia appointed in pursuance of resolution 1854 (2008), particularly in the matter of cross-border arms trafficking and the movement of armed combatants. Experts from both Groups shared information regularly and conducted a joint visit to Conakry for discussions and meetings of mutual interest with Government parties.

10. The Group regrets that a number of Ivorian authorities — notably the Ministries of Defence, the Interior, Mines, and Finance — failed to respond to requests for meetings, despite the Group’s repeated attempts to schedule meetings during the first half of its mandate. The Group, however, appreciates the continued efforts made by the Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the United Nations to arrange meetings between the Group and Ivorian authorities.

11. The Group welcomed the cordiality of the Ivorian authorities during meetings, but noted that many of the Group’s requests for information, primarily with respect to inventories of military materiel, access to military sites and installations and finance, remain unanswered.

12. In connection with its visits to a number of Member States (Belgium, Burkina Faso, France, Ghana, Guinea, Israel, Mali, Senegal and the United Arab Emirates), the Group received cooperation from various Government authorities. The Group awaits information from a number of Member States on certain entities and individuals suspected of violating the sanctions regime in Côte d’Ivoire.
13. During its visits to neighbouring States, the Group generally received generally good cooperation from Government authorities, although it noted that, in some cases, Government representatives appeared unwilling to share detailed information on matters related to sanctions.

14. The Group regrets that many of the Member States contacted in order to request information, particularly in relation to arms transfers, failed to respond completely to such requests. The Group also notes the reluctance, on the part of certain private companies, banking institutions, and State institutions investigating financial crimes, to share information with the Group despite its assurances of confidentiality.

15. The Group regrets that not all Government authorities in the United Arab Emirates agreed to meet the Group, despite its request for meetings several weeks in advance. Those meetings were not held, either because of a delayed response on the part of the relevant authorities, or because the authorities in question requested their postponement. The Group looks forward to improving information-sharing with the authorities of the United Arab Emirates prior to issuing its final report.

IV. Monitoring of the embargo

16. The Group welcomes the recent appointment of a diamond and mines expert to the UNOCI embargo cell and the reappointment of a Customs consultant. The Group also expresses its appreciation for the consistent support of the embargo cell, particularly in relation to highly effective administrative assistance, which has greatly enhanced the Group’s ability to coordinate timely travels and meetings. The Group has received extensive support, particularly in relation to its arms, Customs and diamond investigations, from the embargo cell.

17. The Group notes with concern that, in some locations, the number of denials of access on the part of the defence and security forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FDS-CI) and the defence and security forces of the Forces nouvelles (FDS-FN) has increased since the end of the previous Group’s mandate (31 October 2008). The Group is also aware that many embargo inspections are delayed because units of the Ivorian security forces have not been informed of pending inspections by their superiors — even after having received 72 hours’ notice from UNOCI. This situation is particularly evident among, but by no means restricted to, FDS-FN units, where poor communication is usually cited for a lack of advance notification and as grounds to deny access.

18. The Group expresses concern with the continued refusal of the Ivorian authorities to allow either the Group or UNOCI access to Republican Guard sites or sites that have been designated (or re-designated) as falling within “presidential perimeters”. The Group recalls in this context paragraph 5 of resolution 1842 (2008), by which the Security Council demanded that the Ivorian authorities provide to UNOCI and the Group of Experts unhindered access to equipment, sites and installations without notice.

19. The Group submitted formal requests for information on arms and ammunition held by all military, police and Gendarmerie sites to the relevant Ivorian authorities, but has yet to receive any response. The Group also requested that the Office of the
President of Côte d’Ivoire facilitate access by the Group to all sites and facilities, but has also yet to receive a response.

20. In addition to accompanying United Nations military observers during seven scheduled UNOCI arms embargo inspections, the Group attempted to conduct 21 unscheduled inspections, with varying degrees of success. It was hampered in its ability to conduct unscheduled inspections because Ivorian unit commanders, particularly those of smaller units, were unwilling to allow entry without authorization from superiors, which is rarely forthcoming. Of the 21 unscheduled inspections attempted, the Group was denied any access on six occasions and on two further occasions was denied access to certain buildings. In four cases, the Group was allowed access, but was informed that there were no weapons on site. The Group notes that these statistics suggest a reasonable level of cooperation, but it should be noted that FDS-CI and FDS-FN have not declared all military sites, and therefore many weapons remain unavailable for inspection (see para. 46).

21. The Group noted that the most common reason given for denying access to FDS-CI and FDS-FN sites and equipment is the “lack of authorization” from senior commanders. The Group has found that this claim is difficult to contest, because either the senior commander concerned cannot be contacted, or the senior commander reports a similar requirement for higher authorization. It is the Group’s contention that those who refuse access on the grounds of a lack of authorization contravene the provisions of paragraph 5 of resolution 1842 (2008), providing for unhindered access without notice to Ivorian equipment, sites and installations, and the Group has communicated this to Ivorian authorities where applicable.

22. The Group appreciates the support of UNOCI military observer teams, whose relations with Ivorian forces in some sectors enabled them to facilitate unscheduled inspections by the Group of Experts, despite initial opposition by those forces. However, the Group also noted that many military observers are unable to build important working relationships with local military, police or Gendarmerie personnel, because of the rapid turnover of observer personnel, coupled with a schedule of relatively infrequent inspections. After having consulted extensively with military observers, the Group believes that more frequent inspections, coupled with regular visits to the forces concerned, as a component of regular patrolling, would aid communications between UNOCI and FDS-CI/FDS-FN. These measures would also allow military observers to observe more closely any changes in the deployment of weapons and ammunition. The Group recalls the recommendations of the previous Group of Experts (S/2008/598, para. 195) in this regard.

23. After working closely with UNOCI embargo inspection teams, the Group notes that some military observers and United Nations police have not been trained in the proper conduct of inspections. As a result, the capabilities of inspection personnel vary. This is noticeable in the quality of inspection records (incomplete serial numbers and inaccurate model designations) and in the clarity and composition of photographic evidence (particularly of marks on arms and ammunition) submitted by inspection teams. The Group has undertaken, where feasible, to assist military observers and United Nations police in developing more effective methods of gathering evidence, and has provided written material to the UNOCI embargo cell to facilitate evidence collection during inspections.

24. The Group notes that neither military observers nor United Nations police receive predeployment training on how to conduct embargo inspections. In the past,
the UNOCI embargo cell has responded to the lack of predeployment instruction by organizing 3 to 4 day training sessions in various regions of Côte d’Ivoire. These “embargo induction” sessions have covered issues ranging from arms and ammunition and diamonds to associated legal issues. They have, however, proved to be expensive to carry out because they necessitate many people travelling to the training location from team sites throughout the country. As a consequence, the embargo cell has not organized training sessions for several months. The Group believes that embargo induction courses for all UNOCI military observers and United Nations police — integrated into predeployment training schedules — would reduce expenses and ensure that all relevant personnel receive the required instruction prior to commencing embargo inspections. The Group stands ready to assist in this regard, as necessary.

25. The Group remains concerned that there is no arms expert permanently assigned to the embargo cell. It notes in particular that, while military observers often have a better grasp of arms-related issues than civilian personnel, the monitoring and analysis of arms necessitates the services of an arms expert — notably a person with specific expertise in identifying weapons and with experience in analysing the arms trade more generally.

26. The Group believes, recalling paragraph 5 of resolution 1842 (2008), that the Group of Experts, and where necessary UNOCI, should continue to conduct unscheduled inspections, given that Ivorian parties often fail to disclose weapons during scheduled inspections (see para. 46).

V. Verification of the air fleet capacity

27. The Group visited Abidjan Airbase on 28 January 2009 during a scheduled inspection conducted by the UNOCI embargo cell. This visit enabled the Group to review the status of the military aircraft that are currently parked in hangars at the Airbase.

28. During the visit, the Group was not able to discern any visible improvement in the airworthiness of the military aircraft. The TU-VHO-registered Mi-24 helicopter does not appear to have been moved from its previous position and remains in the same condition as observed by the previous Group in September 2008.

29. The TU-VMA-registered Antonov 12, which belongs to the army but is used for civilian purposes, has been grounded since November 2007 because of a technical problem in one of the left engines. The aircraft cannot fly, and the last test of its remaining operational engines was conducted on 19 March 2008.

30. The IAR-330 helicopter, which is registered TU-VHM, was last flown on 14 October 2008. According to the FACI officer overseeing the inspection, the aircraft has not flown since that date because the arms embargo has, reportedly, prevented the import of parts required for maintenance.

31. Two IAR-330 helicopters are parked in the hangar that is reserved for Ivorian presidential aircraft. These helicopters were previously registered in Germany (D-HAXI and D-HAXW) and bore the initials “UN” (United Nations). The previous Group of Experts was informed by FACI personnel that these helicopters were chartered by UNOCI. This information was confirmed by the United Nations air operations. The helicopters flew under United Nations numbers 480 and 481.
32. During the current Group’s inspection on 28 January 2009, the Group found that the same helicopters bore South African registration numbers ZS-RKC and ZS-RVO. The FACI officer overseeing the inspection did not allow the Group to photograph the two helicopters because, according to him, the aircraft were not subject to the embargo.

33. According to information gathered by the Group, these helicopters, which were initially leased by Helog SA to the United Nations, have since been purchased by a South African company, Starlite Aviation, which now leases them to the State of Côte d’Ivoire.

34. The aircrew of the two helicopters are not nationals of Côte d’Ivoire and, during the visit, the Group noted the presence of four non-Ivorian technicians at work on one of the helicopters. The Group has a mandate to monitor any assistance provided by non-Ivorian technicians to civilian aircraft, if those aircraft can be converted to military use, in contravention of sanctions. It therefore requested to speak with the technicians. Despite the Group’s request, the FACI lieutenant who oversaw the visit did not allow the experts to interview the technicians.

35. Air traffic statistics made available to the Group indicate that, since September 2008, the two helicopters have regularly transported Ivorian dignitaries, including the President of the Republic and military authorities. The helicopters have also made local flights around Abidjan Airbase, some of which occurred at night.

36. The Group was unable to obtain information as to the purpose of these night flights. The Group contacted Starlite Aviation, which owns the helicopters, to request information on the terms of use specified by the contract signed between Starlite Aviation and the Government of Côte d’Ivoire. Following this request, Starlite Aviation requested additional information regarding the scope of the embargo. The Group advised the company that the use of the aircraft for military purposes constitutes a violation of the embargo.

37. The Group also informed the Togolese battalion of UNOCI, which is stationed at Abidjan Airbase, of the need to monitor the activities of the two helicopters and report any possible dual use, such as transporting weapons (see annex II).

A. Airports and airstrips

38. The Group visited most of the known airfields and airstrips located in the north and south of Côte d’Ivoire. Apart from airfields used by aircraft belonging to the impartial forces (UNOCI and Force Licorne), the Group has not received reports of suspicious flights at airfields and runways in these locations. It is, nevertheless, important to note that some of these airfields are not under surveillance by the impartial forces.

39. The Group learned of the existence of unsupervised airstrips in western Côte d’Ivoire, in the region bordering Liberia. The Group did not have sufficient time to visit the region, but expects to do so during the second part of the mandate.
B. Verification of flights and aircraft movements to Côte d’Ivoire

40. As in previous mandates, the Group analysed statistics obtained from ASECNA to investigate international air traffic to Côte d’Ivoire in addition to information pertaining to domestic flights. The Group continues its analysis. At the time of writing, the Group’s assessment and verification of freight documents, manifests and air way bills (Lettres de transport aérien) had not revealed any suspicious activity.

VI. Military assistance

41. The Group continues to seek evidence of external military assistance to Côte d’Ivoire which, if confirmed, would represent a violation of the arms embargo. The Group found no evidence to suggest the presence of non-Ivorian technicians capable of rehabilitating military aircraft parked in hangars at Abidjan Airbase.

42. The Group continues efforts to ascertain whether Mikhail Kapylou remains in Côte d’Ivoire (see S/2008/598, para. 61) and to determine the possible activities of Robert Montoya in the country (see S/2006/735, para. 77).

43. In response to the Group’s enquiries regarding the potential provision of training to Ivorian nationals, Israeli authorities confirmed that courses are offered at the International Training Centre for National Security Studies (associated with the Galilee College), which are open to participants from all African countries. Israel did not confirm whether Ivorian nationals have attended these courses in the past, but informed the Group that it would take steps to monitor Ivorian nationals attending such courses (through both the Galilee College and the Embassy in Abidjan) in the future and would notify the sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire if those courses appear to contradict relevant United Nations resolutions.

VII. Arms

44. The Group focused, initially, on reviewing the types and origins of arms and ammunition under the control of FDS-CI and FDS-FN. The Group used this information to generate a history, or “baseline”, of the types and relative numbers of arms and ammunition under the control of various Ivorian parties prior to the embargo. The Group was then in a better position to judge which arms and ammunition might have been acquired post-embargo, and any weapons that might, therefore, warrant further investigation.

A. Violations of the arms embargo

45. The Group acquired physical evidence that suggested a consistent pattern of violations of the arms embargo. This evidence was later corroborated, independently, with oral testimony. The Group of Experts will provide a complete analysis in its final report.

46. The Group notes with concern that the number, age and condition of weapons that are presented for inspection (whether to UNOCI or the Group of Experts)
frequently do not accord with the weapons that are visible on the streets in the hands of various security forces. The Group is obliged to conclude that both FDS-CI and FDS-FN units have deliberately removed weapons from sites and facilities in advance of inspections, or have failed to declare where these weapons are stored. In particular, military observers and other United Nations personnel note that, in times of tension among FDS-FN elements, weapons of new appearance — primarily Kalashnikov-pattern weapons but also heavy weapons, including truck-mounted heavy machine guns — become visible on the streets. These weapon types have not been seen during embargo inspections in the areas concerned, either before or since such sightings. The Group recalls similar observations made in the final report of the previous Group (see S/2008/598, para. 17).

47. The Group spot-checked the hunting weapons, usually of homemade fabrication, and ammunition which are common among the civilian population in the north of Côte d’Ivoire. The only variety of ammunition found to be in possession of individuals using these weapons was marked “Darma, Mali”. The Group believes that this ammunition is either manufactured, in whole or in part, in Mali or is manufactured abroad for the civilian market in Mali. The ammunition, like most shotgun ammunition, is undated and the Group was therefore unable to confirm whether it might have been imported into Côte d’Ivoire after the commencement of the arms embargo. The Group has addressed a letter to the Government of Mali requesting further information on the Darma brand and sales records.

B. Continued investigations

48. The Group continued several investigations that previous Groups had pursued or initiated. The results of these investigations are given below.

1. Arms trafficking in the Lac Buyo region

49. The previous Group requested that UNOCI conduct an investigation into arms trafficking in the Lac Buyo region of Côte d’Ivoire (see S/2008/598, paras. 99 and 100). Military observers and United Nations police visited the region at the end of 2008 and, having interviewed local communities in the immediate vicinity, reported that instances of arms trafficking appear to be relatively commonplace. Local reports suggest that arms are transferred across the border from Guinea close to the town of Toubá (Côte d’Ivoire). Those weapons are subsequently transported by pirogue, southwards on the Sassandra River to Lac Buyo. Given that most trafficking is reported to occur at night, it is unlikely that anything short of a major surveillance operation is likely to detect significant evidence of illicit activity. Demand for weapons is reportedly high in the Lac Buyo area, owing not to the north-south conflict but to ethnic tensions which may also have an economic dimension.

2. Needs of the National Police and Gendarmerie in terms of law enforcement material

50. The Group requested detailed inventories of the weapons and ammunition that are currently under the control of the National Police and Gendarmerie. The Group believes that unless it receives a precise account of the arms and ammunition that
are already in possession of these forces, it cannot make an informed assessment of the specific requirements of each force.

51. The Group is, however, in agreement with the views of the previous Group (S/2008/598, para. 71), in that reported arms and ammunition requirements appear to far exceed requirements, given Ivorian police personnel numbers and existing weaponry visible on the streets. The Group therefore requests that the relevant authorities provide detailed and realistic inventories of existing stocks, in accordance with the Group’s formal requests, so that this matter can be clarified as quickly as possible.

52. The Group shares the concerns of United Nations police with respect to the use of assault rifles by the Ivorian police. These weapons are deployed on the streets because of a reported shortage of pistols and of pistol calibre ammunition. The use of military assault rifles, however, poses problems for the police, both in terms of the image of the police presented to society, and also because of the threat to public safety posed by weapons that fire high-velocity ammunition and which are capable of automatic fire.

3. **Imported explosives (Schlumberger case)**

53. The Group received a response from the United States of America to the effect that the explosives supplied to Côte d’Ivoire were explicitly designed for non-military uses and therefore were not shipped in contravention of the arms embargo. The Group recalls the view of the previous Group (see S/2008/598, para. 65) that the goods fall squarely under the term “arms or any related materiel”. However, given the nature of this explosive materiel — and the significant differences between military and civilian explosives, despite potential dual-use applications — the Group is of the opinion that the shipment is not in contravention of the arms embargo.

54. The Group of Experts would like to suggest that in similar cases involving transfers of potentially dual-use material, Member States should inform the Committee prior to shipment.

4. **Recent imports by the Ivorian Ministry of Defence**

55. The Group has not received an answer to the correspondence in which it requested information on imports consigned to the Ivorian Ministry of Defence (see S/2008/598, para. 77).

5. **Imperial Armour case**

56. The Group requested information from South Africa regarding the status of ongoing investigations by the South African authorities in relation to the export of riot equipment to Côte d’Ivoire. The Group has not yet received a reply.

57. In discussions with United Nations police representatives in Côte d’Ivoire, the Group raised the question of riot control equipment. United Nations police representatives had not viewed significant numbers of the types of equipment listed in the commercial invoices obtained by the previous Group, and expressed surprise at the number of items listed.
58. While the Group is concerned about the lack of information from the South African authorities and from the Director General of the Ivorian Police, it looks forward to receiving the required clarification during the remainder of its mandate.

VIII. Finance

59. The Group is currently investigating sources of revenue that might be used by Ivorian parties to purchase arms and related materiel, in pursuance of paragraph 7 (b) of resolution 1727 (2006), by which the Security Council mandated the Group of Experts to gather and analyse all relevant information in Côte d’Ivoire and elsewhere on the sources of financing, including from the exploitation of natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire, for purchases of arms and related materiel and activities. The Group intends to present a comprehensive analysis of these economic structures in its final report. Information in possession of the Group indicates that elements within the Government of Côte d’Ivoire and the Forces nouvelles operate powerful economic networks. Rather than being scattered, unconnected efforts to divert funds, or to profit from the trade in natural resources, these networks are well entrenched within major sectors of the country’s economy, including the cocoa, coffee, timber, cotton and cashew nut sectors. In a number of cases, the networks cut across the north-south political divide.

60. The Group of Experts will provide a complete analysis of the most significant natural resource revenues in its final report.

A. Government budget

61. The Group pursued enquiries into several outstanding financial issues raised during previous mandates, in particular those reported in the final report of the previous Group (S/2008/598, para. 114) pertaining to information requested of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Group requested a meeting with the Ministry concerned, but has yet to receive a response.

62. The Group stresses the importance of having access to the Government of Côte d’Ivoire’s quarterly budget and execution statements. According to an IMF report of January 2009, “normalization of budget execution procedures since early 2007 has helped restrain sovereignty spending [discretionary spending by the offices of the President and Prime Minister] but extra-budgetary spending caused overall spending overruns around mid-2008”. The IMF report also states that a “large share of public expenditures (over 50 per cent in 2006) was executed outside regular budget procedures using discretionary treasury advances, some oil revenue stayed off-budget, quasi-fiscal levies on cocoa were not used by the sector’s agencies to the benefit of producers as intended, and Government’s procurement methods have lacked transparency”. The Group believes that it is important to follow up on any Government efforts to clarify large revenues that remain unaccounted for or are subject to discretionary spending.

63. On 29 January 2009, the Group retransmitted questions to the Ministry of Agriculture that had been sent by the previous Group of Experts on 3 July 2008, but had not been replied to. The Group has yet to receive a response to these questions, which concern the management of Réserve de Prudence and Sacherie Brousse accounts (accounts administered jointly by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture). As the Group has not been able to obtain detailed information on either account, it cannot exclude the possibility that funds might have been used to purchase arms and related materiel.

64. The Group met the Minister of Agriculture on 6 March 2009 in Abidjan. The Minister expressed the view that the Group’s questions with regard to the Réserve de Prudence and Sacherie Brousse accounts exceeded the mandate of the Group. The Group disagrees with this assertion and believes that the requested information is pertinent to the effective execution of the Group’s mandate, but is not available in the public domain. The Group reiterates that it is mandated to conduct such investigations by paragraph 7 (b) of resolution 1727 (2006).

B. Forces nouvelles revenues

65. During its field investigations in the north of the country, specifically along the Man-Korhogo trade route, the Group observed that the Forces nouvelles generate revenues by taxing persons and companies involved in the production and trade of natural resources. The revenues demanded by the Forces nouvelles vary according to the financial capacities of individuals and businesses.

66. For instance, in terms of taxes levied on individuals, the Forces nouvelles “Customs” checkpoint in Ouangolodougou, Côte d’Ivoire, charges every person on board a vehicle the sum of FCFA 1,000. The Forces nouvelles in Ouangolodougou has also set the price for truck operating licenses, for vehicles that regularly transit the area, at FCFA 25,000 per month, per truck. At the same time, it also charges a toll fee of FCFA 5,000 for every truck that passes the checkpoint. A truck travelling from one town to another must pay fees of this value, or similar fees, at every checkpoint along the route. These fees vary in value, depending on the type of commodity being transported. In some cases, the Forces nouvelles tax trucks according to cargo weight (per kilogram).

67. The Forces nouvelles also tax private companies. For instance, in December 2008 several Forces nouvelles commanders formed a committee to harmonize the fees levied on raw cotton exports in the north-east. The committee demanded that every cotton company pay FCFA 80 million (roughly US$ 160,000) for the 2008-2009 cotton season. After bargaining, the cotton companies managed to obtain a reduction, but the fee remains a matter of debate. The Forces nouvelles in this region have demanded similar fees from cashew nut companies, since the aforementioned committee also regulates this product.

68. Forces nouvelles zone commanders dispute one another’s access to the fees levied on natural resources. The Group has been informed of numerous examples of such disagreements, including one that arose early in 2009 between the Forces nouvelles zone commanders of Ouangolodougou-Diwala and Ferkessédougou. This dispute was apparently settled by the chair of the committee that regulates cotton and cashew nut fees — a superior of both zone commanders.
69. The cocoa industry is also subject to taxes imposed by the Forces nouvelles, but more so than either cotton or cashew nuts. In the case of cocoa, the Forces nouvelles levy from FCFA 300,000 to FCFA 1 million in taxes on one 40-ton truck load of cocoa. The Forces nouvelles also charge an operating tax of up to FCFA 50,000 for each truck. These taxes are in addition to the fees paid by cocoa companies to cocoa syndicates at the place of production. For example, trucks carrying cocoa from Vavoua to the north-east of Côte d’Ivoire must pay operating taxes in addition to the fees already paid to the cocoa syndicate in Vavoua. Moreover, as each truck transits a major town, local Forces nouvelles units charge transit taxes of between FCFA 1,000 and FCFA 5,000. On a journey from Man to Korhogo, for instance, transit taxes reach around FCFA 55,000 (a total of 11 Forces nouvelles checkpoints).

70. While each levy of fees from an individual or company might comprise, at most, several hundreds of thousands, or a few million, FCFA, such taxes are so numerous and widespread in the north of Côte d’Ivoire that the total revenue generated by elements within the Forces nouvelles undoubtedly runs into FCFA billions annually.

71. The Group met the National Secretary of Economy and Finance for the Forces nouvelles, Moussa Dosso, and requested detailed information regarding the revenues and expenditure of Forces nouvelles from 2004 to 2008, in addition to the Forces nouvelles budget for 2009. During the meeting, Mr. Dosso provided the Group with a general explanation of the financial structure of the Forces nouvelles and agreed to provide the Group with the information it had requested, to the best of his abilities.

72. The Group of Experts will provide a comprehensive analysis of Forces nouvelles revenue generation structure in its final report.

IX. Diamond embargo

73. By paragraph 1 of resolution 1842 (2008), the Security Council renewed until 31 October 2009 the provisions of paragraph 6 of resolution 1643 (2005), by which the Council decided that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the import of all rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire to their territory.

74. Recognizing the potential for the trade in diamonds to fuel armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, the Group endeavoured to identify persons and entities involved in, facilitating, and benefiting from the Ivorian diamond trade. While the existence of diamond mining sites does not contravene the sanctions regime, investigations into the operation and output of such sites is a necessary component of any investigation into possible breaches of sanctions.

75. The Group believes that, in the absence of a domestic cutting and polishing industry and any evidence of rough diamonds stockpiled within Côte d’Ivoire, increases in mining production are likely to be linked to external, rather than domestic, demand — i.e. illegal exports of Ivorian diamonds.

76. Various reports confirm the existence of previously unreported mining activities in Tingréla, Boundiali and Bouna (see annex III). The embargo cell is

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2 Mr. Dosso also serves as the Minister for Technical and Vocational Education of Côte d’Ivoire.
currently mapping mining sites in Côte d’Ivoire in order to identify which commodities they produce and the scale of production. Regular field analysis of the known diamond-mining areas of Ségou à and Tortiya continues to confirm ongoing diamond mining, which is an integral source of income for local communities (see annex IV).

A. Diamond production in Côte d’Ivoire

77. During the first half of its mandate, the Group visited diamond-mining sites in Tortiya and Ségou à to gather information on the status of diamond-mining activities, to identify the main facilitators in the diamond trade and ascertain diamond-trading routes.

78. In Ségou à, the Group observed diamond-mining activities in the villages of Bobi, Diarabana, Wongue, Tenefero and Forona. The Group was unable to obtain reliable data on the scale of diamond production, since neither the local mining cooperative, the Groupement vocation cooperative (GVC),\(^3\) nor the local authorities, maintain records of local diamond production. However, the Group discovered that all of the above-mentioned mines produce relatively large, high-yield (valuable) stones (not less than 1 carat), in addition to smaller gem quality diamonds of 0.10 carats, which are probably not exploited given the prevalence of larger stones (see annex V).

79. The Group also learned that Ségou à remains a focus for diamond trading in western Côte d’Ivoire, where diamonds are sorted and auctioned to diamond buyers resident in the town of Ségou à. During this process, sorters exclude stones that can yield FCFA 500,000 ($1,000) or more per stone from regular assortments. These exclusive stones are then sold separately.

80. Various sources confirm that diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire continue to be exported to international markets in violation of the embargo. GVC offices in Ségou à, for instance, explained to the Group that diamond traders take into consideration the risks of exporting embargoed Ivorian diamonds — and hence the greater costs borne by exporters — by asking lower prices. According to GVC offices, Ivorian rough diamonds in Ségou à currently yield from FCFA 35,000 to FCFA 60,000 ($70-120) per carat, which is significantly lower than international market rates.

81. The Group understands that all diamond transactions in northern Côte d’Ivoire are cash-based (FCFA), and will therefore prioritize investigations into financial networks facilitating the Ivorian diamond trade.

82. The Group met an official of the Ministry of Mines in Ségou à but was unable to clarify the Government’s capacity to regulate diamond-mining activities in the region and to enforce compliance with Security Council resolutions.

83. The Group learned of changes in diamond-mining methods in Tortiya, which suggests renewed investment in the town’s diamond-mining sector. The Group witnessed industrial diamond-mining equipment in use, which could increase the mine’s diamond production output significantly (see annex VI). Investment in

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\(^3\) For more information on GVC, see the report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire dated 7 November 2005 (S/2005/699, para. 57).
industrial equipment raises questions regarding the output of the diamond mine and its market share.

84. The above observations provide further evidence that, given the absence of continuous regulatory oversight in Côte d’Ivoire and irregular international compliance, as noted in previous reports, investors and facilitators continue to export Ivorian diamonds in violation of the embargo.

B. State of the international rough diamond industry

85. The Group received reports from several States which noted a recent increase in the number of seizures of suspicious rough diamond shipments. The Group is currently investigating these cases to ascertain whether they might contain Ivorian diamonds.

86. The Group also recognizes disparities among States’ commitments to uphold the diamond embargo on Côte d’Ivoire (see annex VII). A number of States participating in the Kimberley Process implement the diamond embargo by practising deterrence measures that discourage imports of Ivorian diamonds. These measures include origin control, risk-based analysis and intelligence-gathering. A number of States not participants in the Kimberley Process demonstrate a similar level of commitment to the diamond embargo.

87. While some States exhibit vigilance and adhere to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, others are less vigilant and do not enact the necessary measures required to dissuade imports of Ivorian diamonds into their territories. The Group considers the variation in compliance among Kimberley Process participants a serious shortcoming, which allows Ivorian rough diamonds to infiltrate the legitimate diamond industry.

C. Updates on previous diamond cases

88. The Group continued several investigations which were pursued or initiated by previous Groups of Experts. The results of these investigations are given below.

1. Ghana

89. In 2006 the Group of Experts noted (see S/2006/964) that Ghana’s system of internal controls was inadequate in preventing Ivorian diamonds from entering its rough diamond production. One of the main sources of concern for the previous Groups was the non-registration of Ghanaian galamsey miners (miners without land rights). In November 2006, however, the Ghanaian authorities formed a task force that was mandated to review the diamond production system in Ghana and to adopt corrective measures to rectify weaknesses in the system.

90. Following meetings with the Ghanaian Ministry of Mines, the Group welcomes the Ministry’s reports that it has registered approximately 6,000 galamsey miners, leaving no more than 1,000 to be registered in the coming months. If these figures are accurate, the estimated number of galamsey miners should be revised down to 7,000 miners from the previously reported 10,000. The Precious Minerals Marketing Company reported that galamsey miners comply with the newly enacted
bookkeeping system, which is designed to strengthen Ghana’s system of internal controls (see annex VIII).

91. Morphological analysis of rough diamonds\(^4\) is a second measure applied to prevent the infiltration of Ivorian diamonds into Ghana’s diamond production. The analysis is conducted by the Kimberley Process Working Group Diamond Experts and the Precious Minerals Marketing Company on all Ghanaian rough diamond exports. By instituting this process, the Kimberley Process Working Group Diamond Experts produced a footprint of Ghana’s diamond production, which details the morphological features of Ghana’s diamond production.

2. Mali

92. Three cases presented by the previous Group of Experts (S/2008/598, paras. 141-166) provided evidence of an illicit diamond trade route extending from Côte d’Ivoire to Mali. The current Group visited Malian Customs authorities to determine the status of each case.

93. In the first instance, the Group learned that the case involving the rough diamonds seized at Bamako International Airport in 2007 (and reported in documents S/2008/235 and S/2008/598) has been submitted to the Malian judicial authorities. The Group awaits the outcome of the judicial process. The Group continues to investigate the remaining two cases, which involve suspected illicit diamond transfers from Mali to Israel and Belgium.

X. Customs

94. After having conducted field visits to numerous entry points on the borders of Côte d’Ivoire, the Group met Ivorian Customs authorities towards the end of the first half of its mandate. The Group wished to obtain clarification on the efficacy of the Ivorian Customs infrastructure and on the possible risks of embargoed materiel entering or leaving the territory of Côte d’Ivoire. The Group concluded, following its field research and meetings with Ivorian authorities, that deficiencies in the country’s Customs infrastructure represent serious risks in terms of potential breaches of the arms embargo.

95. The Ivorian Customs authorities reiterated that the relevant Security Council resolutions related to the sanctions regime on Côte d’Ivoire do not specify, in sufficient detail, the list of products that are subject to embargo. The same Customs officials reported that the provisions contained in the resolutions are too vague and imprecise to enable them to determine which goods should be considered subject to embargo and, therefore, subject to control.

96. The Group believes that this reported lack of clarity could be addressed to some extent with the assistance of the UNOCI embargo cell, which has already drafted an unofficial list of relevant Harmonized System Customs codes which encompasses many of the goods subject to the arms embargo and related materiel (annex IX), a list that could be extended to include other embargoed items.

\(^4\) The morphological features of diamonds reflect the conditions in which they were formed. These features give diamonds unique characteristics that can be used to identify where they were formed.
A. Deployment of Customs in Côte d’Ivoire

97. The Group is convinced that there is an urgent requirement for the Customs authorities of Côte d’Ivoire to deploy throughout the country. The de facto division of the Customs territories presents a great obstacle to the effective control of goods entering or leaving Côte d’Ivoire. In the northern, Forces nouvelles-controlled part of the Ivorian Customs territories, there is no official Customs authority to apply the rule of law. The region could be described as outside any central control, where Forces nouvelles units have failed to adopt the normal functions of a Customs authority. The Group notes, with concern, that, in many areas visited, Forces nouvelles units do not maintain a continuous presence on the border. This resulting lack of surveillance creates considerable opportunities for violations of the sanctions regime.

98. The Group found clear evidence of a failure by the Forces nouvelles to adopt Customs procedures in line with regional rules and regulations. For example, trucks that cross national borders in ECOWAS countries must leave one copy of an inter-State transit document (Carnet Trie CEDEO) with the national Customs authorities at the border. The driver of the vehicle retains a booklet of stubs, as proof of his/her transit route. The Group, however, discovered Forces nouvelles units to be in possession of many such books (see annex X), the retention of which not only contravenes national laws but would also prevent the onward movement of the vehicle, given that the documents are required to transit neighbouring countries.

99. The Group believes that the creation of a single Customs territory, in which laws are applied uniformly, is a fundamental precondition for a stable Customs system. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, this cannot be realized because different laws are upheld in the Forces nouvelles-controlled north of Côte d’Ivoire, laws that are in violation of those promulgated by the central authorities of the country.

100. The Group notes efforts made by the Government of Côte d’Ivoire to raise awareness in the public administration in favour of redeployment of Customs personnel to the Forces nouvelles-controlled north. The Group has, however, found no evidence that the Government has initiated the required redeployment of Ivorian Customs to cover all of the country’s Customs territories. Delays in the redeployment of Ivorian Customs are linked to the broader delays in the creation of a unified treasury (unicité de caisse) process.

B. Exchange of Customs information with neighbouring countries

101. Following consultations with Ivorian Customs authorities and those of neighbouring countries, the Group is of the view that there is no timely and systematic exchange of Customs information among the States of the region. This is despite the fact that most of the States in the region have adopted ASYCUDA (Automated System for Customs Data) — a computerized network for sharing Customs information developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development — as well as other interconnected data exchange systems (for example ALIX between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire).

102. The Group considers the exchange of information and data among countries involved in import/exports with Côte d’Ivoire as fundamental to creating a standardized, safe and controlled Customs environment.
103. The World Customs Organization has a Regional Intelligence Liaison Office in Dakar, which is tasked primarily with facilitating the exchange of information on goods seized by Customs in the region. The Group notes that there is insufficient communication between Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring countries in the Customs field and that Ivorian Customs have weak relations with the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office, despite the existence of a national liaison officer.

104. Concerning the civilian airport of Abidjan, the Group noted that there are no physical searches of passengers leaving Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, the security area is not organized in a way to restrict access to non-authorized personnel. Before anyone boards an aircraft and leaves the country, the only effective security control that exists is a metal detector. The Group is concerned that weak surveillance at the airport might facilitate the smuggling of diamonds in violation of resolution 1643 (2005).

105. The Group contacted the Ivorian Customs authorities to highlight these issues and the possible risks of sanctions violations. The Customs representatives expressed their appreciation for the remarks and gave assurances that the situation would be improved.

C. Transit cargo

106. Ivorian Customs authorities confirmed that they do not inspect transit cargo in Côte d’Ivoire. The X-ray vehicle/container scanner, which is operated by BIVAC (a subsidiary of the Bureau Veritas Group) and operates at the port of Abidjan, cannot be used to examine goods in transit owing to the nature of the agreement between the company and Ivorian authorities, which excludes the scanning of transit, transfer or empty containers.

107. Ivorian authorities concede that the risk of transit cargo being used for illicit trafficking purposes is very high. Both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have taken unilateral measures to deter unnecessary transit by declaring that goods destined for one country must enter, where possible, through that country’s main port of entry, rather than transiting through another country’s territory.

108. The Group believes that in order to comply with standard Customs procedures, Ivorian Customs need to institute a number of measures, including inspecting the itineraries of transit cargoes; ensuring that seals remain intact; escorting cargoes to the point of exit and ensuring that the authorities of the importing country take custody of them; orchestrating proper physical inspections of transit cargoes; and ensuring the exchange of necessary data among the countries involved in the transit.

109. Ivorian Customs authorities assured the Group that they were in the process of making fundamental reforms to transit procedures. There is, however, no fixed timeline for implementing these measures.

XI. Individual sanctions

110. After visiting various Government authorities in countries bordering Côte d’Ivoire, the Group notes that information regarding the sanctions imposed on the three listed individuals (Charles Blé Goudé, Eugène N’goran Kouadio Djué and
Martin Kouakou Fofié) has not been disseminated to all relevant authorities in the region, despite previous efforts made by the sanctions Committee and previous Groups of Experts.

111. The Group believes that, unless neighbouring Member States inform all relevant authorities of the measures articulated in paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004), sanctioned individuals are likely to be in a position to violate the sanctions with impunity.

112. The Group visited the Central Bank of West African States in Dakar, in order to determine the status of the Committee’s asset freeze vis-à-vis the three designated individuals. Representatives of the Bank informed the Group that details regarding the sanctioned individuals had been transmitted to the national banks of countries in the region, and that those countries had responsibility for implementing the sanctions.

A. Martin Kouakou Fofié

113. The previous Group of Experts reported (S/2008/598, paras. 176-177) that in February 2006, Brahima Traoré, a reported confident of Martin Kouakou Fofié, withdrew FCFA 66 million from Mr. Fofié’s bank account at the Ouagadougou branch of the Société générale de banques du Burkina. The present Group visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso to clarify outstanding questions concerning the withdrawal of funds.

114. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented the Group with a report on the Fofié-Traoré case, which indicated that Mr. Fofié had opened the bank account using a forged Burkinabé national identity card and forged certificate of Burkinabé nationality.

115. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Group that, while it had not identified any link between Mr. Fofié and Mr. Traoré, Mr. Traoré had a bank account at the same bank.

116. The Group has numerous concerns regarding the transaction, given the large sum of money involved, Mr. Fofié’s initial use of forged documents to open the bank account, and the unclear whereabouts of the FCFA 66 million.

117. The Group urges the Government of Burkina Faso to launch a judicial inquiry to determine how Mr. Fofié was able to use forged Burkinabé documents to open the bank account, given the assets freeze imposed by the Security Council.

118. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Group that Burkina Faso is currently assessing the prospects for a judicial inquiry, while recognizing Burkina Faso’s commitments as a signatory to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement of 4 March 2007 (see S/2007/144), specifically the provision in the Agreement by which the parties would request the African Union, through ECOWAS, to petition the Security Council for the immediate lifting of individual sanctions.

119. The Group visited Martin Kouakou Fofié on 11 February 2009 in Korhogo, Côte d’Ivoire. Mr. Fofié informed the Group that the meeting was a courtesy on his part and that he did not intend to discuss any official matters.
B. Charles Blé Goudé

120. On 10 March 2009, the Group met the Director General of the Société nouvelle de presse et d'édition de Côte d'Ivoire concerning reports of a contract to publish Charles Blé Goudé's second book, *Et pourtant c'était le chemin*. During the meeting, the Director General informed the Group that Mr. Blé Goudé had supplied the company with a manuscript but that no contract had been signed. This information contradicts the information conveyed by the previous Group of Experts, which concluded that a contract had already been signed between Mr. Blé Goudé and the company for the publication of a second book (S/2008/598, para. 173).

121. The Director General also voiced his opposition to the sanctions imposed on Mr. Blé Goudé, arguing that such measures threaten the individual's right to subsist and his freedom of speech. The Group explained that sanctions had been imposed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1572 (2004) and that, should the Director General object to them, he should inform the sanctions Committee, which would consider the matter according to paragraph 12 of resolution 1572 (2004) which outlines the procedures for exemptions to the assets freeze.

C. Eugène N’goran Kouadio Djué

122. The Group continues to investigate possible violations of the individual sanctions imposed on Eugène N’goran Kouadio Djué, which may have occurred since the end of the previous Group’s mandate.

XII. Recommendations

123. In addition to the recommendations set out below, the Group believes that those contained in the final report of the previous Group (S/2008/598) remain valid.

124. The Group calls upon those Member States, public and private institutions that have not yet responded to its requests for information to assist the Group in fulfilling its mandate by transmitting their replies in as timely a manner as possible.

A. Customs

125. Given the lack of Customs capacity in neighbouring States, and the negative impact this has on the ability of the countries concerned to enforce the sanctions regime in Côte d’Ivoire, the Group recommends that the World Customs Organization consider providing Member States with technical assistance, notably with respect to final destination control and measures to facilitate international cooperation.

126. The World Customs Organization might also consider disseminating to its member States guidelines concerning Customs administration procedures necessary to monitor sanctions on Côte d’Ivoire.

127. The Group recommends that the UNOCI embargo cell convey to the Ivorian Customs authorities the list of Harmonized System Customs codes relevant to
embargoed goods (annex IX) and consider ways in which relevant Ivorian authorities might be provided with a more comprehensive list of embargoed items.

128. Given the absence of Ivorian Customs officials in the north of the country, the Group recommends that the Customs authorities of Burkina Faso and Mali provide monthly listings of transit goods destined for Côte d’Ivoire to relevant Customs authorities of the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, in particular those based in Tébissou (road commerce) and Dimbokro (rail commerce).

B. Arms and military assistance

129. The Group recommends that the position of permanent arms expert be considered within the UNOCI embargo cell, and that this person should have specific experience in identifying weapons and experience of the arms trade more generally.

130. The Group reiterates the importance of States taking appropriate measures to sensitize their relevant Government institutions to prevent the direct (and, in particular, the indirect) supply, sale or transfer of arms or any related materiel to Côte d’Ivoire, in pursuance of paragraph 7 of resolution 1572 (2004). In this respect, the Group advises all States to remain vigilant to the possibility that weapons, ammunition and related materiel, while transferred legally from one State to another, may be retransferred in violation of the arms embargo. Before transferring weapons, including surplus weapons, to a State in the region, the Group urges exporting States to consider carefully the willingness and ability of the recipient State to take all necessary measures to prevent illicit retransfer, including the authenticity of its end-user certificates.

131. The Group requests the Committee to reiterate to Member States the standing prohibition on the provision of any assistance, advice or training related to military activities, pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1572 (2004).

C. Finance

132. The Group urges the Ivorian authorities, all financial and banking institutions, and any individuals resident in, or operating in, the territory of Côte d’Ivoire, to cooperate fully with the Group of Experts and provide unrestricted access to all information pertinent to the effective execution of the Group’s mandate.

133. Ivorian financial and banking institutions, including those of the Forces nouvelles (La Centrale), should take steps to improve transparency and accountability with regard to accounts and revenues. The Group encourages these institutions to provide copies of their respective 2009 budgets during the second part of its mandate.

134. The Group urges international and Ivorian financial and banking institutions to cooperate, share information and build joint capacity in order to better monitor and enforce the assets freeze on sanctioned individuals and combat money-laundering.
D. Diamonds

135. The Group recommends international standardization of rough diamond origin determination methodologies. The Group suggests that the Kimberley Process Working Group Diamond Experts are best placed to orchestrate this task and, thereafter, to monitor its implementation by Member States.

136. The Group urges the Kimberley Process to consider adopting morphological photographic technical analysis, as used in Ghana, as a permanent procedure within the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, particularly at points of export that exhibit vulnerability to illicit Ivorian diamond infiltration.

137. The Group encourages UNOCI to resume diamond embargo induction training for United Nations police and military observers.

138. The Group encourages UNOCI to add satellite analysis to its current methods of monitoring Ivorian diamond-mining sites and to consider other suitable technologies should they become available.

139. The Group believes it is imperative to conduct a geological survey of the diamond-mining capacities of Côte d’Ivoire. The Group suggests that the Kimberley Process consider facilitating such a survey.

E. Individual sanctions

140. The Group recommends that the Committee take steps to ensure that all Member States, in particular countries bordering Côte d’Ivoire and their appropriate institutions, are fully informed, understand and implement the requisite steps to enforce measures articulated in paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004).

141. The Group reiterates the need for all Member States, in particular those States in whose territories violations occurred and which were cited in previous reports, to inform the Committee, without delay, regarding the progress of investigations into the financial activities of sanctioned individuals.

142. The Group encourages the Committee to call upon the Governments of Côte d’Ivoire and its neighbours to freeze immediately the funds owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the three listed individuals, in compliance with paragraph 11 of resolution 1572 (2004), and to report progress in this regard to the Committee.
Annex I

Meetings and consultations held by the Group of Experts in the course of its mandate

Belgium

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Federal Police

Multilateral organizations
European Commission External Relations Directorate General; Kimberley Process Working Group Monitoring; Kimberley Process Working Group Diamond Experts; Antwerp World Diamond Centre; World Customs Organization

Burkina Faso

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Mines; National Police; National Gendarmerie; National Agency for Civil Aviation; Burkinabé Customs Authority; Directorate for Monetary and Financial Affairs; Cellule de traitement des informations financiers

Multilateral organizations
Central Bank of West African States; United Nations Development Programme

Canada

Civil society
Partnership Africa Canada

Côte d'Ivoire

Government
Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations; Direction of Mines; Ivorian Customs Authority; Air Force of Côte d'Ivoire; Société d’exploitation et de développement aéroportuaire, aéronautique et météorologique; National Commission of the Press; Ivorian Press Agency

Multilateral entities
Central Bank of West African States; Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar; United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire; Force Licorne
Diplomatic missions
Embassy of Burkina Faso; Embassy of France; Embassy of Lebanon; Embassy of the United States of America; Permanent Representative of the Facilitator for the Ouagadougou Political Agreement

Private sector
Société nouvelle de presse et d’édition de Côte d’Ivoire

France
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ghana
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Mines; Ministry of Justice; Precious Minerals Marketing Company Limited; Customs Authorities; National Police

Guinea
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Mines; National Gendarmerie; Bureau national d’évaluation (des diamants); National Diamond and Precious Stones Valuation Office; Customs Authorities; National Agency for Civil Aviation

Multilateral entities
United Nations Development Programme

Israel
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labour

Multilateral and bilateral entities
Israel Diamond Exchange; Israel Diamond Industry; World Federation of Diamond Bourses
Mali

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; National Directorate on Mines and Geology; National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons; National Customs Authorities; National Agency for Civil Aviation; Cellule de traitement des informations financiers; National Police; National Gendarmerie

Multilateral and bilateral entities
United Nations Development Programme; ECOWAS Small Arms Programme

Private sector
Kalagna SARL

Senegal

Multilateral and bilateral entities
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; World Customs Organization; United Nations Office for West Africa; Central Bank of West African States

Private sector
Reuters

United Arab Emirates

Government
Ministry of Economy; Dubai Multi Commodities Centre

Diplomatic missions
Belgian Trade Centre — Embassy of Belgium in Dubai

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Civil society
Global Witness

United States of America

Government
Department of State
Multilateral and bilateral entities
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; INTERPOL; United Nations Secretariat; Kimberley Process Working Group Monitoring — Subgroup on Côte d’Ivoire

Diplomatic missions
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004); Permanent Mission of Guinea to the United Nations; Permanent Mission of Côte d’Ivoire to the United Nations
Annex II

Advisory note submitted by the Group of Experts to the Togolese battalion of UNOCI stationed at Abidjan Airbase

Source: Group of Experts.
Annex III

Unreported mining sites in Côte d’Ivoire

Source: UNOCI embargo cell.
Annex IV

Ongoing mining activities in Séguéla and Tortiya

Source: UNOCI embargo cell.

Miners gather in groups of five, while one person oversees the overall operation.
Annex V

Sample of diamond production in Séguéla

Source: Group of Experts.

Photographic images of Séguéla’s smaller diamond production (less than 1 carat).
Annex VI

Industrial equipment in operation at diamond-mining site

A bulldozer and structural systems were spotted at Tortiya, signifying a change in diamond-mining methodology. In the light of the ongoing embargo on Ivorian diamonds, the investment in industrial equipment raises questions regarding the market size for those diamonds.
### Annex VII

**Review of controls agreed by Member States to prevent the importation of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Analysis - Diamond Producing Countries</th>
<th>Member of the KPCS</th>
<th>System of internal control</th>
<th>Rough diamond origin control</th>
<th>Reported suspicious cases 2008/2009</th>
<th>Prosecuted suspicious cases 2008/2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes - KP WGM evaluates the effectiveness of the system of internal controls</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes - KP WGM evaluates the effectiveness of the system of internal controls</td>
<td>Yes - de facto through the WGOE</td>
<td>Yes - Cases are being investigated to determine if there was an attempt to import rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes - KP WGM evaluates the effectiveness of the system of internal controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Analysis - Diamond Trading Countries</th>
<th>Member of the KPCS</th>
<th>System of internal control for Rough Diamonds</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire rough diamond origin control</th>
<th>Reported suspicious cases 2008/2009</th>
<th>Prosecuted suspicious cases 2008/2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes - KP WGM evaluates the effectiveness of the system of internal controls</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Community (EC)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes - KP WGM evaluates the effectiveness of the system of internal controls</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Yes - Awaiting Information from relevant authorities</td>
<td>Yes - Awaiting information from relevant authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes - KP WGM evaluates the effectiveness of the system of internal controls</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Yes - Cases are being investigated to determine if there was an attempt to import rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes - KP WGM evaluates the effectiveness of the system of internal controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes - Cases were submitted to the judicial process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes - KP WGM evaluates the effectiveness of the system of internal controls</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes - KP WGM evaluates the effectiveness of the system of internal controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
<td>Information not yet available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compiled from data obtained by the Group of Experts.*
Annex VIII

Rough diamond bookkeeping system newly adopted by Ghana

Annex IX

Harmonized System Customs codes that encompass goods subject to the embargo (in use with the UNOCI embargo cell)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HS Codes relating to sanctions</th>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>4203.10.00.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>6211.33.90</td>
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<td>6217.90.90.10</td>
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<td>6506.10.10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8526.10</td>
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<td>8710.00.0</td>
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<td>89</td>
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<td>90.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNOCI embargo cell.
Annex X

Inter-State transit document (*Carnet Trie* CEDEO) found in the custody of Forces nouvelles offices in Ouangolodougou, Côte d’Ivoire

*Source: Group of Experts.*